Daily Report

Latin America

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Rio Group Spokesman To Discuss GATT in Belgium

PY2209145793 Madrid EFE in Spanish 0239 GMT 22 Sep 93

[Text] Montevideo, 21 Sep (EFE)—In his capacity as Rio Group spokesman, Uruguayan Foreign Minister Sergio Abreu today travelled to Brussels to meet with EC officials and study the ways to overcome the stalemate in negotiations pertaining to agriculture within the GATT.

Abreu has been entrusted with the mission of informing EC representatives about the Rio Group disapproval of the so-called "Blair House" agreement between the United States and the EEC, which provides for a reduction up to 21 percent in the level of subsidies to agricultural production and trade protectionism in a six year period.

The 11 Rio Group member countries—Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia, Chile, Ecuador, Mexico, Paraguay, Peru, Venezuela, and Uruguay—and the two that represent Central America and the Caribbean—El Salvador and Jamaica—condemned the agreement because they believe that international trade should be further liberalized.

According to Latin American countries, the endorsement of the "Blair House" agreement will delay the opening in trade that the Uruguay round of the GATT talks has been striving for for seven years.

Abreu's agenda includes a meeting with EC Commissioner for Commercial Affairs Lion Britain and with other officials from the EC and the Belgian Government.

Abreu will depart for Japan on Thursday to convey Rio Group concern to that country. Finally, Abreu will go to the United States, where he will meet with Secretary of Commerce Mickey Kantor [as received]. In New York, the minister, who will be attending the United Nations General Assembly starting on 26 September, will inform his Latin American colleagues about his contacts.

OAS Envoys Note 'Serious' Situation in Haiti

FL2309230093 Bridgetown CANA in English 1812 GMT 93

[Text] Washington, Sept 23, CANA—The Permanent Council of the Organisation of American States (OAS), meeting on Wednesday, registered concern about renewed violence in Haiti and denounced threats by a paramilitary group to harm special OAS and United Nations envoy, Dante Caputo.

Caputo, a former Argentine foreign minister, played a key role in brokering the so-called Governor's Island Accord under which the Haitian military, in power since a September 1991 coup, agreed to the reinstatement of ousted President Jean Bertrand Aristide. The violence is linked to elements opposed to the planned return of Aristide at the end of next month.

Addressing the OAS Council, Antigua and Barbuda's ambassador, Patrick Lewis, said he was not surprised at what was happening in Haiti. "It only serves to exemplify the serious nature of the Haitian problem," he said. He continued: "in this august body, the smaller members of the organisation have repeatedly tried to draw to the attention of large entities the inter-American nature of the problem. It seems to me that we are continuing in the same measure, adopting the same procedure as in the past. We continue to demand and to condemn, but we refrain from starting to act in a forceful manner."

The council heard from Venezuela's ambassador, Guido Grooscors, that the Haitian authorities recently refused permission for a Venezuelan airline to fly through Haitian airspace. Dr Miguel Burelli Rivas, Venezuela's candidate to be the next OAS secretary-general, and other Venezuelan diplomats, were aboard the aircraft which was flying between Antigua and Jamaica.

Cuba

MiG-23 Jet Lands at Guantanamo U.S. Naval Base

PA2309211493 Madrid EFE in Spanish 2046 GMT 23 Sep 93

[Text] Washington, 23 Sep (EFE)—Pentagon sources reported that a Cuban Air Force MiG-23 fighter jet landed today at the U.S. Naval Base in Guantanamo, located in Cuba. The airplane landed at 1450 (1950 GMT), according to the sources. This is the second desertion in a week, because another MiG-23 landed in Miami a few days ago.

Pilot Requests Asylum

PA2309224393 Paris AFP in Spanish 2159 GMT 23 Sep 93

[Text] Washington, 23 Sep (AFP)—U.S. Government officials reported in Washington that a Cuban Air Force MiG-23 fighter jet landed this afternoon at the U.S. Naval Base in Guantanamo, in eastern Cuba. The pilot requested asylum. The military plane was flying in a patrol "and broke away from the group and headed to Guantanamo," explained a Pentagon official who demanded anonymity. The airplane landed at 1435 (1835 GMT).

According to a U.S. State Department official, the landing occurred a few hours after a MiG-21 airplane was returned to the government of President Fidel Castro, which on 17 September had been flown to the Key West [Florida] Naval Air Base by pilot Enio Ravelo, who also requested political asylum.

A spokesman for Cuban exiles said immediately in Washington that this second MiG landing was "one more indication of the growing weakening of Cuba and the irreversibility of the crisis facing the government" of President Fidel Castro.

Frank Calzon, representative of the humanitarian organization Freedom House, added that "it is no longer only the economy, human rights groups, and the intellectuals, but the Armed Forces as well." Calzon said that a State Department source stated that the United States would favorably view a request for political asylum from the MiG pilot who landed in Guantanamo. The State Department has not immediately reacted officially to the news.

'Prompt Solution' to Russian Crisis Supported

PA2309203493 Mexico City NOTIMEX in Spanish 1838 GMT 23 Sep 93

[Text] Havana, 23 Sep (NOTIMEX)— The Cuban Government has given its support to Russia and hopes for a prompt solution to the crisis the former Soviet Republic is facing "within the objectives expressed by the government" of Boris Yeltsin.

Deputy Vice Foreign Minister Isabel Allende said today that President Fidel Castro's government hopes a solution will be reached to the current political crisis in the largest republic of the former Soviet Union. Allende met with Guerman Belevitin, counselor of the Russian Embassy in Havana, in the Foreign Ministry building and discussed the political events in Russia.

The Russian diplomat informed the vice minister about the measures adopted by the Russian Government "to guarantee stability and maintain the integrity and unity of the federation," according to the newspaper GRANMA, the mouthpiece of the Communist Party of Cuba (PCC). Boris Yeltsin ordered the dissolution of the Russian parliament on Tuesday, thus creating a grave crisis within that republic's political structure.

A few days ago Cuba had announced the normalization of its economic relations with Russia and said that in a few months they would establish joint enterprises, including private capital. Russia continues to be one of Cuba's chief oil suppliers, and the latest agreements signed by the two nations guarantee most of the supplies, primarily oil, needed for the next harvest of sugar cane, the country's main export product.

The former Soviet Union used to provide 13 million tons of oil annually to Cuba through a commercial exchange favorable to that country. This year, Russia will deliver 2 million tons of oil to the Caribbean nation at world market prices.

Russia also approved this year a $350 million loan to Cuba to complete the projects left unfinished from the Soviet period and signed another $30 million loan to maintain Cienfuegos Province's Juragua nuclear power plant, which had come to a halt.

The agreements signed in November 1992 and July 1993 represent the beginning of a process of stabilization of economic relations based on international market practices and prices, according to official information.

The Cuban Government is striving to maintain the strategic Russian market, which has become unstable since the disappearance of the Soviet Union, Cuba's main trading partner for three decades.

Official on Yeltsin Measures

FL2309192193 Havana Radio Rebelde Network in Spanish 1700 GMT 23 Sep 93

[Text] On 22 September, Comrade Isabel Allende, vice minister of foreign relations, received a visit at the Foreign Ministry from the minister-counselor of the Russian Embassy in Havana, who explained the measures adopted by President Boris Yeltsin to guarantee the stability and preserve the integrity and unity of the Russian Federation. Allende expressed both her gratitude for the information and Cuba's hope that a solution to Russia's political crisis will be found within the objectives expressed by the Russian Government.

Commentary Warns of 'One-Man' Russian Government

FL2309162693 Havana Radio Rebelde Network in Spanish 1155 GMT 23 Sep 93

["Our Opinion" commentary, by Eduardo Dimas]

[Text] The latest events in Russia give the struggle for power in that country a new dimension: the possible elucidation, in the short term, of the disagreement that is bringing the legislative and executive branches of the government into confrontation.

First, an elucidation: The international media are placing great emphasis on the fact that the sectors opposing President Boris Yeltsin are Communist.

In my opinion, nothing could be further from the truth. The Communists are a minority in Russia, and their current political clout is minute; they lack the strength to challenge the president for the government. Such propaganda serves, rather, to justify, regardless of what may happen, the Western governments' unconditional but conditioned support for Boris Yeltsin.

The truth is quite another story: The fight for power is between reformist political sectors that wish to introduce a market economy into Russia but differ as to the methods and the speed with which they should be applied. It is clear from the latest reports that President Yeltsin's stances are consolidating, while those of the parliament and Vice President Aleksandr Rutskoy are weakening; this means that the "coup d'etat for the blind," as many observers call it, has been successful.

There is no doubt that the positions taken by the Army and the security forces have been a determining factor: They have, in fact, backed the president.

As one will recall, in an unexpected speech broadcast over Russian television [on 21 September], Yeltsin presented a decree dissolving the Congress of Deputies and the Supreme Soviet, the legislative branch's principal bodies. Yeltsin also announced that elections would be held to elect, on 11 and 12 December, a federal assembly to be made up of some 500 members. Under the Constitution in force, the Soviet Constitution of the 1970's, the president does not have the power to prohibit the activities of either the Congress of Deputies or the Supreme Soviet.

That same day, the congress decided to replace Yeltsin and designated Aleksandr Rutskoy the new president of Russia; apparently, however, the deputies lack the strength necessary to impose that on which they have agreed.

Up to now, there have been no reports of any massive actions in protest in Moscow or the Russian interior. Shows of support for either Yeltsin or the congress are minimal, as if the general public is disregarding what is happening on high, perhaps more concerned with meeting its daily needs within a chaotic economy than in the struggle for power.

Under such circumstances, the position of the Army and the security forces acquires greater muscle. I think it is obvious that Yeltsin would not have taken the step he has taken without first knowing he had the support of the military and of Russia's regional leaders.

Everything appears to indicate that the president's stance is gaining strength. This is also being helped along by the support of Western governments, especially that of the United States, which ensures a foundation of foreign support that is indispensable in the situation Russia is going through.

If this is the case, Russia will go on to have an autocratic presidential regime that, under the current conditions and given the traditions of that former Soviet Republic, could become a one-man, personal government; the possibility that such a government could even be a totalitarian one cannot be discounted.

Cubans To Leave Mexican Embassy in Santo Domingo

FL2309205093 Havana Radio Reloj Network in Spanish 2002 GMT 23 Sep 93

[Text] The group of 72 Cubans, who occupied the grounds of the Mexican Embassy in the Dominican Republic last Thursday, have reached an agreement to depart peacefully. Manuel Dominguez, director of the Valladares Foundation who worked as a mediator during the incident, told reporters that the Cubans will leave the embassy once the Dominican Government provides them with transportation and a place to stay.

The emigrants also agreed to apologize to the Governments of Mexico and the Dominican Republic for problems they might have caused and to ask for the understanding of U.S. authorities. The emigrants hope eventually to reside in the United States. The Mexican Government firmly refused to become a springboard for the Cubans occupying the embassy grounds.

More on Agreement To Leave

PA2309185393 Mexico City NOTIMEX in Spanish 1822 GMT 23 Sep 93

[Text] Santo Domingo, 23 Sep (NOTIMEX)—The director of the Valladares Foundation, an anti-Castro organization headquartered in Washington, has disclosed that the group of 72 Cubans who occupied the Mexican Embassy in the Dominican Republic last Thursday has agreed to leave peacefully.

Manuel Dominguez, the foundation's director who served as a mediator in the incident, said at a news conference that the embassy occupants will leave the premises as soon as the Dominican Government gives them transportation and a place to stay.

The Cubans also agreed to apologize to the Mexican and Dominican Governments for the problems they have caused and asked the United States to be understanding, Dominguez noted.

Balaguer: Refugees To Leave Soon

PA2409034893 Paris AFP in Spanish 0204 GMT 24 Sep 93

[Text] Santo Domingo, 24 Sep (AFP)—Dominican President Joaquin Balaguer has announced that the 71 Cubans at the Mexican Embassy in Santo Domingo will be leaving the diplomatic facility within the next few hours. Balaguer told a group of reporters that "the Cubans' departure is on the road to a solution and should occur within the coming hours."

The Dominican president assured his government "would not abandon" the Cubans, who have been in the embassy for one week now. He said he would provide them "food and lodging." Balaguer explained that the negotiations to secure the Cubans' exit were conducted through the Dominican Foreign Ministry, with the participation of the Mexican Embassy itself.

The president also said that the Dominican Republic will "leave the door open to all Cubans" and expressed his willingness to contribute to the democratization process in Cuba. He underscored, however, that "it is the Cuban people who must seek a solution to their own future."

The Cubans, mostly fishermen and their families who fled Cuba aboard rafts, entered the Mexican Embassy in Santo Domingo and initially demanded U.S. visas in order to travel to the United States. That petition was rejected by Mexico and the Dominican Republic.

This week the Cubans lowered their demands and announced they were ready to leave the embassy if the Dominican Republic guaranteed them lodging, food, and medical attention.

Still on Embassy Grounds

PA2309234393 Mexico City NOTIMEX in Spanish 2303 GMT 23 Sep 93

[Text] Santo Domingo, 23 Sep (Notimex)—The 72 Cubans, who occupied the Mexican Embassy in Santo Domingo on 16 September, are still on the embassy grounds after saying they would leave. An embassy source told Notimex: "They are still here. They have not left yet."

Earlier, local television had reported that the Cubans had started to leave for a government vacation resort. Dominican President Joaquin Balaguer has said that the occupation of the Mexican Embassy by the Cubans is a problem "about to be settled."

The Cubans entered the Mexican Embassy one week ago to demand that Mexico mediate with U.S. authorities so that they could get transit visas to travel to the United States.

Cubans Stage Sit-Down Protest by U.S. Embassy

PA2309230693 Paris AFP in Spanish 2101 GMT 23 Sep 93

[Text] Mexico City, 23 Sep (AFP)—The 11 Cubans who occupied the Mexican Embassy in Havana in order to leave their country initiated today a "sit-down" protest in front of the U.S. Embassy in Mexico City. One of the fugitives told AFP that the goal of the protest is to obtain a visa to travel to Miami. "We are staging a sit-down protest and will remain here in front of the U.S. Embassy until our problem is solved," Raul Rodriguez, one of the group members, said.

An embassy source, when questioned on the matter, commented: "I do not know anything about it; when I came to the embassy I saw a group of people there; that is all." According to Leonardo Castaneda, the Cuban group's spokesman, the U.S. mission "has been putting us off" and there is no solution in sight. The 11 dissidents took refuge on 9 September in the Mexican Embassy in Havana, after which they traveled to Mexico with the intention of ultimately going to the United States.

The embassy source said that the Cubans, like any other person, must meet a series of requirements so that their cases can be studied. The nonconformists have not met the requirements correctly. On 21 September, Castaneda commented that the U.S. diplomats sent the group to the UN High Commission for Refugees, as they do not meet the conditions to be granted a humanitarian visa to the United States.

According to Rodriguez, the "sit-down" started at 1700 GMT and "will continue until necessary." The Cubans, who are requesting a visa to travel to Miami where they allegedly have relatives, are: Leonardo Castaneda Palomino; Grissel Espinosa; Hermes Castaneda (minor); Leonardo Castaneda Valiente; Alicia Palomino; Jorge Gutierrez; Maritza Tubin; Raul Rodriguez; Ayeici Hernandez; Roberto Marrero; and Obdulio Lebrigio.

Robaina Interview on UN Strategy

FL2409000093 Havana Tele Rebelde Network in Spanish 0030 GMT 21 Sep 93

[Interview with Foreign Minister Roberto Robaina by journalists Elizabeth Noriega, Soledad Cruz, Pedro Martinez Pirez, Roberto Cavada, and panel moderator Hector Rodriguez; in Havana on the "This Very Day" program—live]

[Text] [Hector Rodriguez] This is the Monday evening issue of "This Very Day." We have been announcing through various media, radio, television, and newspapers, the presence of Cuban Foreign Minister Roberto Robaina on our program today. He is in our studio and we welcome him. Good evening, Robaina.

[Robaina] Good evening.

[Rodriguez] We will be here with a panel of in-house and invited journalists. We will begin with Elizabeth Noriega, from NTV. She is here with us today.

[Noriega] I feel like an in-house reporter.

[Rodriguez] Yes, we have very close ties. Soledad Cruz, an in-house reporter; Pedro Martinez Pirez, who is also an in-house reporter. Since this interview is being broadcast by Radio Rebelde as well, we invited reporter Roberto Cavada, who is in Studio No. 5 of Radio Rebelde. This is the panel. The presence of Foreign Minister Roberto Robaina is due to the occasion of the 48th session of the UN General Assembly. This is the topic for tonight and we will begin right now.

We will begin by giving the floor to our colleague Elizabeth Noriega, who has family ties with us. But before that, I would like to let you know that you can call on the telephone, no. 30-0521, and ask about this topic of the 48th session of the UN General Assembly. We now give the floor to Elizabeth Noriega.

[Noriega] Comrade minister, to begin, we would like to ask you what is the importance of the UN General Assembly.

[Robaina] I believe that it is an important forum for discussion, where member countries have the opportunity to debate problems of international interest and express many points of view with regard to the agenda proposed for debate by the assembly. By that same measure, we could say it is the international forum where we can discuss those points of view.

I believe success rests not only on what is discussed or what is approved in the traditional or normal proceedings of the assembly. By the same measure, when this deliberative organ, which the United Nations has today, is constituted, it is on those discussions that the work period, which will be developed during that year until the next session, depends, as far as guidelines and directives go.

[Noriega] How does the General Assembly operate?

[Robaina] That is a question that many have asked themselves. Now with the responsibilities that I have in the Foreign Ministry, I have had to investigate the subject. It is an assembly that by tradition begins on the third Tuesday of every September. In other words, the assembly will begin in a few hours. Obviously, it begins with very special characteristics.

I would say that the first week of the session is dedicated to preparing for the beginning of the general debate. That general debate does not begin until 27 September, which is just hours before part of the Cuban delegation arrives for preparation... [pauses] no longer preparation, but the realization of the debate.

The assembly is held for a period of three months. It has a first part, approximately 14 or 15 October, when it operates in plenary session, after which its seven commissions begin to develop all the tasks that pertain to those commissions. Once the first part of the plenary session ends, seven commissions are set up according to topics. These commissions meet during that period until the first days of December when the debate is reopened to submit for consideration by the assembly the issues that were discussed in the respective commissions and in the plenary session that continues for those topics that did not fit into the seven established commissions.

That is the scheme by which it operates. It involves approximately three months of participation. Therefore, we have to plan the participation of the Cuban delegation to avoid an excess of personnel for so long in that event.

[Cruz] What does the Cuban delegation hope to achieve with regard to important Cuban issues, or, in other words, issues that are more closely related to Cuba?

[Robaina] We have great expectations. I would say that they are not hopes of accomplishing something, which I think is something we should evaluate in that way, Soledad. It is not a matter of accomplishing. I believe that in any international event, especially international events, the most important thing is not what is accomplished in the resolution or the text, but the resolve with which we leave that event to begin new tasks. There are many topics we could talk about, and we could discuss this later on.

The fact is that for Cuba, in particular, this 48th session has a very special meaning. I would say that, first, we are going to follow up on the famous approval, in which these people participated and which they had the opportunity to see, when in the 47th session the resolution against the blockade imposed by the United States on our people was approved. I would say that today, in this assembly, the UN secretary general himself is to present a report on the basis of the opinions held by the countries and to promote the discussion of a new resolution that we will present.

[Cruz] It is precisely on this topic that I would like more details, in the sense that: How can it be that something is approved one year, and later, what happens? What can be expected from this? Why, when that agreement was made...[pauses] Obviously, the Cuban people had great expectations, even though at the moment it was explained that this did not mean that things would change overnight. This is an issue that I would like for you to explain, how it works. In other words, how long would this take and how much time is required?

[Robaina] Yes, I believe this is an interesting subject because it raises many doubts. I think it would be worthwhile to state that any of the resolutions or agreements that are made by the United Nations as an assembly, and I am talking about in the proceedings of the assembly itself, and from the point of view of what has been established, are not legally binding on those countries that are either condemned or in some way

favored by a resolution, text, or discussion. I would say that the most important weight is the moral obligation that falls on that commitment and which the entire world follows.

I believe this is the struggle. I believe that it is not only about, and I return to what I said previously, getting a document approved, but in my opinion to what measure and to what point we take advantage of the approval of a determined text to exploit the moral obligation that is obtained when a document of such characteristics is approved.

I would say that this could take many years. Now, someone could probably ask: We have arrived at a new period of sessions. We could even say that the measures that the U.S. Government has applied with regard to the blockade today are more intense than when the resolution was approved. In the long run, I believe these are arguments that, within this context, we need to explain and state clearly. I believe we will be discussing the issue of the blockade in many assemblies until the blockade, and not only the blockade but those who impose the blockade, feel morally pressured by the international community. That is where such rejection is effective.

[Martinez] Robaina, last year's resolution on the blockade was approved with the objections of only three countries: the United States, Israel, and Romania. The UN secretary general must render accounts this year of what has been done about the blockade. Does Cuba currently have any information on this report that the UN secretary general should present?

[Robaina] I can say we have information on the report, but obviously, we do not have the text of the report itself. This report is drafted by following certain steps. We could say that those steps establish that a group of countries should present their opinion on the resolution, the application of the resolution, and on the blockade in general to the UN secretary general himself.

For example, at this moment I can tell viewers that 27 countries have turned in these reports to the UN secretary general and that on the opinion expressed by those countries in their report, and on a special report sent by us... [pauses] I brought this report because it is interesting.

In the next few days, the UN secretary general's report will be presented. But in a document dated 25 June, we sent him a group of considerations on the specific repercussions of the blockade on our everyday life. From that, I would say that he will use the points mentioned in that document and the information sent by the 27 other countries to present a new project, which is when we should discuss the issue of the blockade, when the resolution of the 47th session will be mentioned, and when we will then submit the draft resolution that we will present on that occasion.

[Martinez] Will the UN secretary general consider, for example, the Third Ibero-American Summit, declarations by the European parliament, and other elements with regard to the blockade?

[Robaina] I believe there are many things that need to be considered during this session. I would even say that if the secretary general does not consider them in his report, they will be mentioned in our draft resolution and by many others, who will talk one way or another on these points.

This has not only the component of which I spoke before with regard to the strengthening of the blockade; in parallel with that renewal, an important aspect is that international rejection of the blockade has increased as well. We could mention the introductory paragraph, which was introduced in the president's declaration in Salvador de Bahia, and more recently, the final declaration made in the final document of the Human Rights conference in Vienna, and even more recently, the statements made by the European Parliament, which I believe, together, comprise a great group of elements and international rejection that we can count on.

I would like to say, and that is why I appreciate the question, that people should not get their hopes up, because a simple approval does not mean that the blockade will be lifted. Obviously, what it does represent is strong moral support to the extent that maybe fewer countries will vote against it or that we can achieve the approval of the resolution.

Here too, as in any public vote, in this situation, we run many risks; the risk to vote publicly against a country that one way or another is applying pressure on that vote. Other elements take place. I would even say the element of abstention and of those who do not participate in this type of vote is something that we must also consider because it does not necessarily mean that they are against the resolution of rejection. It could also mean, as we have seen on several occasions, that they do not want to take a public stand in front of those who play an important role in certain manipulations that take place in that organization.

[Cruz] What you have just mentioned is important, precisely because one of the questions that is frequently asked is: What are abstentions, and what do they mean in this scenario?

[Robaina] It is a complex topic because not always... [pauses] I would say it all depends on the circumstances, the speaker, and the topic under discussion. Many times abstention and nonparticipation become a way to avoid greater pressure. From that, independent of the topic that is being discussed, I believe we should take everything into account. Obviously, if we were asked what we all wanted, it would be the possibility of casting that public vote, openly and without fear of being pressured. It is regrettable that at the threshold of the next century, we still have to put up with this. I am not talking about

us as a country. It is regrettable that the world has to put up with this type of pressure.

[Rodriguez] Are there people who leave the assembly hall before the vote?

[Robaina] Right at the moment when the vote is to be held, and I am not talking about this case in particular or about this scenario only, at the moment of complex voting, the nonparticipation, the interview, or the tensions emerge. It is a mechanism that I believe has to be followed. We believe, and you can analyze this, and you will be completely convinced, that the root is the fear of repression or retaliation, to state it clearly.

[Noriega] Mr. Foreign Minister, this is not with the intention of getting anyone's hopes up, but you mentioned signals at the international level against the blockade. But from within the United States itself, there have been steps of rejection toward this blockade by some of the major U.S. press agencies with hints; by some U.S. businessmen; and by some sectors of the Cuban community, including, of course, the actions of the Pastors for Peace. Do these signals reach the permanent delegations at the United Nations, since they are signs given from within the U.S. territory itself?

[Robaina] Yes, these are signs. That is why we persist in striving that they not be silenced so much by the press. Since you mentioned the outstanding example of the Pastors for Peace behavior in Laredo, it is incredible that so many days went by and that only on the 20th or 21st day of the hunger strike did the people of the United States and the rest of the world, who profess to be so well informed, learn about what was happening in Laredo.

This demonstrates that when they want something covered up, they cover it up and evidently we are the ones who come out losers. What I do believe is that undoubtedly there is a very strong indication of signs of rejection of this mechanism, which increases everyday. Beyond a shadow of a doubt, this is one of the most flagrant violations of those human rights that they advocate so much.

We need to specify what is hidden behind this blockade, which has been unfairly imposed and which has 10 million people condemned to die of hunger or illness, and, even worse, 2 million children, which is something much harder and highly regrettable. I believe we need to explain this. We have many points with which to argue. But, unfortunately, it will take more than resolutions. Of course, resolutions are necessary to open doors, touch hearts, and to alert all those people in the world who still do not have all the information of the consequences of that blockade in our country.

[Cruz] In this issue of the blockade, there is another aspect that I consider important. But we must give Cavada a chance to ask a question. It seems to me that one topic of great interest to the Cuban public is your view on blockade and embargo. The fact that we use the term blockade and the United States uses the term embargo, and those who want to be ambiguous inside Cuba also use the term embargo or trade embargo.

[Robaina] This is very interesting because I believe it could, as a matter of fact, it does, disguise. We would have to discuss what an embargo and a blockade are. I would say an embargo is related only to the measures that a country applies in relation to another as far as having or not having established relations.

If a country were to decide that it did not want to have relations with our country, we would be able say that there is an embargo on our country. The consequences would not be much greater than those derived from the nonexistence of that trade.

Why, in my opinion, must we unmask and say that what is happening to our country is a simple embargo? Because the United States has not simply limited itself not to establishing relations with our country and to applying strong trade measures. It has sought to exert itself on others and use its regulations to prohibit others from trading with us and to block any business between our country and third countries.

That is where the small and great differences lie in its being a blockade and not exactly an embargo. If it were an embargo we could not criticize them. Anyone could say this for thousands of reasons. With regard to trade relations between United States and Cuba, it is not a mere embargo.

We have a long list of examples of how any attempt to establish trade with our country....[pauses] I would even say that, out of every 10 transactions that we try to establish, eight are ruined. That is not fruit of.... [pauses] Those 10 are not with U.S. enterprises, they are enterprises from other parts of the world under pressure from the United States.

So we are not talking about an embargo. I believe it is very important for our people to know that. We could talk about the U.S. economic embargo against Cuba, which is much more than an embargo. It is an embargo complemented by bribery, pressure, and persecution. Great efforts are made to persecute anyone who trades with Cuba. That is why we must establish the difference.

[Noriega] It has been said that the cost of the embargo against Cuba is approximately $40 billion. Beyond this figure, what do you think is the true weight of the blockade against Cuba and what [word indistinct] within the Cuban foreign policy or within the strategy of the Cuban foreign policy?

[Robaina] I believe Cuba has been forced to pay a tremendously high cost for the embargo, to the extent, of course, that the amount involved cannot be minimized. In any case, I believe we should not only look at the embargo in terms of economic costs. In my opinion, the embargo has had a much more significant political cost. Its political impact stems from the fact that there is no reason for us to accept another country's unilateral

decision to impose such a measure, which will not effect financial costs alone, on us. Furthermore, the embargo has also brought about a number of consequences for a country like ours, at this juncture when we have truly meager funds and resources,....[pauses] well, one has to stop and see how much our costs have increased in terms of transportation, freight; and of how many places in the world we have to go through.

A few minutes ago we were going over some papers. For instance, such a critical issue like the neuritis disease, which affected our people a few days [pauses] or months ago, about which our government, if you will, rapidly and effectively took every measure to make all medicines and supplies available to manufacture the needed tablets....[pauses] Well, had the blockade not existed, we would have not only resolved the problem of the required supplies sooner, but we would have also paid much less for them, perhaps as little as one-third of what we ended up paying.

I believe that for the simple fact of having chosen their own destiny our people do not deserve a measure that goes far beyond mere economic costs, even though such economic costs alone have been very high. I believe indeed that the economic costs we had to pay have been very high and I believe it has jeopardized the normal development of many things we could have achieved otherwise.

I do not believe the blockade could be considered to be our only evil. I am saying this because we have often been asked whether it is the only evil. I believe, however, that any analysis on Cuba must place the blockade, which is not an embargo, as one of the main causes that is preventing Cuba from moving ahead as best as possible. I am saying that it is the principal cause, although not the only one, because we have many things we need to attend to. There is no doubt, however, that it is a stumbling block for us today and that even with our meager resources we could have enjoyed a better situation had it not been for the blockade imposed on us.

[Martinez Pirez] I want to take this occasion to refer to the terms embargo and blockade mentioned by Robaina and by Soledad Cruz in her question. In this regard, I believe that the UN resolution has already clearly adopted the term blockade. Thus, the United Nations has adopted the right term; that is, blockade. Precedents are very important at the United Nations. This, along with the fact that only three countries voted against the resolution, is a very significant precedent. Now, you have spoken about the first priority of the Cuban foreign policy at the 48th Session of the UN General Assembly. What are the others?

[Robaina] Yes. I may refer to the other priorities without any problem right away because they were part of Soledad's question. The fact is that the blockade is so important for Cubans because it is a daily and painful subject that we tend to get excited about it....

[Cruz, interrupting] I would like to remark only that we will have to see how it has ultimately affected the development of our society not only economically, but psychologically....

[Robaina, interrupting] .... not only economically

[Cruz, interrupting] ....and how the entire issue has exerted a psychological pressure on our society.

[Martinez Pirez] Besides, we have to look at it in terms of international law, because the blockade on Cuba is a violation of a country's sovereignty by means of the Torricelli Law. That is clear.

[Cruz] No citizen of a besieged society may act as though he is suffering no pressures.

[Robaina] I believe that this movement of opposition to the law has continued to grow to the extent that third countries have felt more pressured by the Torricelli Law, which has affected not only Cuba's decisions, but also the sovereign decisions of other countries. I apologize to you, Martinez, you just mentioned the exact title of UN Resolution 4719 of the previous General Assembly session. I believe that our fundamental success stems not only from the terms used in, and from the approval of the UN resolution. In my opinion, the very title of the resolution has already established a precedent.

The fact that we are now discussing a document focusing on the need to put an end to the U.S. economic, commercial, and financial blockade on Cuba, [pauses] the very title of the document approved by that organization, at that forum, has great significance. Of course this is not the only subject Cuba....[pauses] I could state something else. We are not going to [30-second break in transmission], other than topics of interest to Cuba. We may ultimately think about something.

There are two other subjects which, for us, are tremendously significant in terms of the United Nations. One is our opinion about that process of democratization of the United Nations, about which we harbor a great deal of concern and ideas. We do not want to remain within the realm of concern and ideas, but rather we would like to make specific proposals and to start a process of discussions, which will not be resolved in a period of sessions alone, no matter how important it might be.

Another subject we believe we must vigorously promote at the United Nations, with strong arguments, is the human rights issue. I would like to address the human rights issue here from two standpoints, not in terms of what others might think of Cuba as a UN human rights case because the subject has been discussed so much that we have been already adequately trained in this area. We would like to state that we also have background information on human rights and that we are entitled to speak.

We are deeply concerned about human rights and we intend to vigorously state at that forum that we have a large number of examples of flagrant, massive violations

of human rights around the world. The human rights issue cannot be limited to what others might think about our country. Rather, we believe discussions must center on that false concern about human rights which overlook the fact that there are so many more human beings without rights in this world without anyone [words indistinct] a discussion we started in Vienna, which of course cannot end in one conference alone and which cannot be overlooked during this assembly session.

[Rodriguez] Incidentally, Gerardo Alvarez, a viewer in Arroyo Naranjo, has called to ask if there is currently a correlation of forces that would be instrumental in effecting changes to promote democratization of the United Nations.

[Cruz] In this respect, as I said earlier, I would like to propose that we discuss UN democratization first because I believe this is also a very interesting subject for the Cuban public. I am glad the viewer asked this question because prior to discussing a correlation of forces, I would like us to touch on the Cuban position on what has been discussed earlier, on which are the fundamental developments relevant to what we are calling UN democratization. Why isn't the United Nations democratic (?now)?

[Noriega] Since we are going to address the democratization issue, I would like to bring up another subject. Developing countries are calling for democratization, while developed countries are calling for a restructuring. What aspects can we glean from both positions?

[Robaina] Yes. I believe that the viewer's question and your remarks have made this almost like three questions in one. [laughter] Well, I believe we have many elements to explain what happens with this issue. For a few months, practically a year, the United Nations has embarked on a path in which it has been focusing on a restructuring process, which is expected to be fully completed by the 1995 assemby session, in which the United Nations will celebrate its 50th anniversary.

What has happened to Third World countries, what analyses have we conducted on this, and what position has, for instance, our comrade Fidel launched in Bahia, Brazil? Well, why do we talk about democratization of the United Nations? We do that because the phrase UN restructuring has somewhat conveyed the idea of a process that shifts a few things, that redistributes a few responsibilities, but that will ultimately give more power to those holding power today and who are currently manipulating the UN organization.

Thus, much has been said about a restructuring proposal, which in the end will not restructure anything, will give a lot more power to some, and will in no way democratize anything. In the long run, this process is bound to allow those holding power now to retain it. While some are demanding democracy from others, democracy and openness from some countries, the same demand is not being applied to organizations such as the United Nations.

Thus, [words indistinct] Comrade Fidel launched in Bahia. That is why it is necessary to democratize the United Nations and to think that, if the United Nation is to play the role we want it to play in the world, we cannot think of leaving the decisionmaking power in the hands of just a few countries.

The heart of the matter today is that irrespective of the significance of the UN Assembly, and even of the UN Security Council, the decisionmaking power continues to rest with the five permanent members of the UN Security Council.

The restructuring process does not touch on this subject. It makes absolutely no reference to the composition and characteristics of the permanent members, let alone to their veto power. I believe that, if we truly want to talk about restructuring, we can not talk about a UN restructuring without going through a democratization process.

I believe this is the phenomenon that is....[pauses] We may now link this to the question as to what correlation of forces exists today. Well, I would say the correlation of forces is very complicated, not in terms of how many are in favor or against us. I believe no one is against it, rather many are in favor of democratizing the United Nations.

The problem is that there are some who, in a very peculiar way, are insisting on maintaining these rules of the game. We have already nearly fallen for a few things. For instance, if we attempted to promote an in-depth discussion of the veto power now, article 109, if we could call it that, of the UN Charter states that any amendment to the Charter will have to be unanimously approved by the permanent members of the UN Security Council....

[Martinez Pirez, interrupting] All five of them.

[Robaina] All five of them. This means that if we said that we do not want to democratize the United Nations, but the UN Security Council; that is, if we proposed to change the rules of the game concerning the permanent members of the Security Council, it would suffice for just one of the five members to oppose it to block every possible action. The fact that some are claiming that this is democratization, that this situation can be overlooked in a democratization process, and that it was never considered in a restructuring process, obviously shows once again that the rules of the game have been improperly established.

[Martinez Pirez] Laws are made to be broken.

[Robaina] Precisely. Laws are made to be broken, which is what we have to....

[Noriega] In your opinion, in light of the role the UN Security Council is currently playing, is it overshadowing the significance you attached earlier to the UN General Assembly?

[Robaina] In the final analysis, I believe the UN Security Council presents serious problems not only in terms of its composition. In the first place, the Security Council

consists of 15 members, five of them being permanent members. The 10 nonpermanent members must be elected every two years. The five permanent members do not have to be elected. We have proposed that the five permanent members also be elected periodically by all those concerned and that we discuss substantial issues.

Yet, the restructuring proposal is currently designed to increase the number of permament members. As you know, the current permament members are: the United States, Russia, Great Britain, France, and China. The major change proposed regarding an increase in the number of permanent members of the UN Security Council is to make Germany and Japan permanent members, with the right to vote, although no decision has yet been made as to whether they should also have veto power. The proposal has not even challenged the veto power of the incumbent five permanent members.

We have raised, for instance, the fact that 400 million Latin Americans do not have a permanent representative on the UN Security Council. The entire African Continent does not have a representative either. Hence, what fair, equitable geographic distribution are we talking about? Thus, I believe we must hold in-depth discussions. We are of course using all these elements.

There isn't the remotest possibility for the issue to be resolved during this assemby session. We are going to start a discussion with a forewarning; that is, to think that....no, no, [pauses] Fidel simply announced his proposal in Bahia, aware that this battle will earn him many friends, but that those who are being questioned have the power to....[pauses] thus, there is no easy solution to this problem.

Furthermore, I would not say that the UN Security Council does not overshadow anyone, but that it simply fails to fulfill its role as an organization that should be held accountable before the UN General Assembly. The UN Security Council not only holds its meetings behind closed doors, secretly, but it makes decisions and presents fait accomplis to the General Assembly and it informs the world about its actions after they have already happened.

I said a few days ago that nothing causes us greater uncertainty than a UN Security Council meeting because no one knows what part of the world is going to be the target of bombings, attacks, or of any of the various forms of action the Council may choose to take. I believe mankind can no longer idly stand by watching these actions.

Of course, we are going to start walking a path, which will be both long and extremely difficult and which may extend over many assembly sessions. What have we proposed? To look for some alternate proposals, which may not resolve the problem today....[pauses] for instance, let us triple the number of UN Security Council members, let us increase the number of its permanent members based on an equitable, fair geographic distribution; and let us not give a veto power to any individual country but to at least three countries. This position was stated by Fidel in his speech at the Ibero-American summit. We know this position has been supported by many friends, but of course it appears to be quite unattractive to those whose power we are now challenging.

[Cavada] Good evening everyone. I believe we could really move on to a topic that is quite significant within the framework of the UN General Assembly; that is, the human rights issue. I am talking about human rights in general and human rights in relation to Cuba. Let us first focus on human rights in general terms and the very important subject concerning a UN high commissioner. In Vienna, if I am not mistaken, you referred in your speech to the appointment of a high commissioner. That is, Cuba is not opposed to the appointment of a high commissioner because it wants special cases to be analyzed at the UN General Assembly. Are you not afraid that Cuba may fall into a trap and that we may have a high commissioner appointed and that this may become part of the structure of the UN General Assembly later? What do you think about this?

[Robaina] I want to sincerely state that we are going to the General Assembly without any fears. Furthermore, we are upholding many arguments and we do not want them to make Cuba appear as opposing the creation of the high commissioner. After all, I believe one must understand the way Third World countries have defended the existence of the high commissioner.

The existence of the high commissioner is strongly defended, primarily in those countries where the people are in a desperate situation regarding their governments so their only hope and their only chance (?of survival) is for a multinational structure, i.e. a high commissioner, which may be trustworthy if devoid of manipulations, may intervene and may somehow contribute to solving the problem affecting a given country.

What kind of a situation would arise if that high commissioner does not follow legal provisions? I believe his functions ought to be duly regulated, that he should not be subordinated to any permanent member of the UN Security Council, or to any other related body. In this case, the high commissioner could represent an interesting solution for those countries having such difficulties. It may also become a weapon that could be easily used against those of us who are not viewed favorably by those in power.

If those holding power believe the time has come to enforce a measure in the name of the high commissioner against those of us who are not viewed favorably, then we would start having those notorious interventions disguised as humanitarian interventions, preventive diplomacy, and the like.

Thus, I believe our position is neither for nor against it. We have stated that we are not against the existence of such a mechanism. After all, I repeat, we are open to reviews amd checks without any problems as long as

these actions are based on previously agreed upon mechanisms. I believe that one thing we ought to state is that Cuba would only agree to the existence of a high commissioner if we are absolutely convinced that the established rules and the way the high commissioner is conceived is not subordinated to, or does not operate the way the UN Security Council operates today.

If the high commissioner should operate on the basis of the same rules governing the UN Security Council; that is, on the basis of the decisions made by its five permanent members, then we would against it from the outset. I believe this position is shared by many. It is of course open to discussion and we are still not absolutely convinced that a wide majority position can be reached in this respect.

[Cavada] Minister, I would like to ask you another question about the human rights issue, this time on the Cuban case. I do not know if my colleagues have other questions about human rights in general. You just said that Cuba is not opposed to any mechanism designed to verify any case. Regarding Cuba, we have the controversial subject of the UN special rapporteur. This subject has stirred a great deal of controversy since 1987 and 1988. Well, Cuba has maintained its position of not allowing this rapporteur to enter our country to supervise compliance with human rights by our government [words indistinct].

I believe this issue is debatable. I do not know what you think about this. After discussing the issue for so long and after Cuba has already admitted a certain commission that interviewed 1,000 Cubans a few years ago, wouldn't it be preferrable for Cuba to agree now to this rapporteur to put an end once and for all to the issue and to charges of alleged human rights violations against Cuba?

[Robaina] Life has taught us that making concessions has never taken us anywhere. I believe there are some things there that ought to be put in the right perspective. First, Cuba has become a case to the extent to which it was made a case by those manipulating the human rights issue. Cuba would not be a case if the true examples of flagrant, massive human rights violations in the world were appropriately addressed. There are daily reports in the world about child prostitution, drug addiction, the sale of human organs, of houses for rearing children for adoption or for sources of organ transplants, and related crimes.

After reviewing all these examples, you realize that the charges they are making against Cuba mean absolutely nothing. The thing is that they have tried to make a case on this front precisely because they could not attack us any other front.

As I said earlier, Cuba has never been against any inspection visits to our country as long as it is based on mutually agreed upon bases. I believe there are already cases of rapporteurs and commissions that visited our country. We should also see if the hundreds of journalists and touristis who are visiting us today are nothing but hundreds of rapporteurs who may witness tomorrow, anywhere, those allegations of flagrant, massive human rights violations.

The thing is that to simply agree to the rapporteur's visit only to avert criticism on the issue will provoke further demands. I believe that to accept the visit offhand means to accept the bases on which the rapporteur was appointed and he was appointed on the allegation that Cuba is an example of massive human rights violations.

Because the issue was obviously used in a selective, discriminatory, and highly politicized way, something we do not share, our opposition does not reflect any enmity against the person appointed as rapporteur. The problem is that we do not approve of the mechanism used because if we did it would mean acquiescing in the foundation upon which he was appointed. In my opinion, we have proven through other ways that we have received many other visits. Obviously, the way to go is not simply agree to the visit to rid ourselves of this problem. Life has shown in other places in the world that when one makes this type of concession, other demands for concessions will follow. I believe that the current rules of the game have caused us to have this approach concerning the rapporteur.

[Martinez] Nevertheless, Robaina, there is communication between Cuba and other rapporteurs.

[Robaina] Yes, with the other rapporteurs which have been established on a basis that we share there has been communication, exchange, and the supply of information. All these things exist. This one specifically has very special characteristics because of the way in which it was approved.

[Cruz] What are the bases upon which Cuba would accept the measure of a rapporteur. Under what condition? On the condition that we agree on what human rights?

[Robaina] First of all we would have to look at the conditions under which those discussions were held. It was done in a discussion with the purpose of showing us as a case. A case that went beyond....[pauses] First, they were trying to present Cuba as a case where human rights were violated massively, constantly, and flagrantly. I believe that if we leave behind that image and discussion we would not object to them coming to the country to see the truth about human rights, as has been done in the past.

I believe that if any country has examples to show of what has been done for the human rights of a population, it is Cuba. Therefore, it makes no sense that we would hide those achievements from anyone. We, more than anyone, would profit from showing those achievements, but not on the basis of established conditions where we are already condemned before being inspected. We do not need to be inspected for the simple reason that we are convinced of what we have done.

What happens is that if the United Nations does not adapt to that mechanism and does not want to retract that decision, we will find many ways to have many rapporteurs. This could include a long list of guests that could possibly be Nobel prize winners, international personalities, personalities that can and that have international authority on the basis that they come without prejudices, preconditions, or a prewritten report. This is what we must underscore.

[Rodriguez] Cavada wanted to ask you another question.

[Cavada] Yes, I wanted to refer to the comment that comrade Martinez Pirez made that Cuba has cooperated with the other commissions, etc., with regard to giving information on human rights and all the information they have requested. I believe that we could probably make reference to, I do not know if my colleagues would like to continue talking about human rights, the operations to maintain peace sponsored by the United Nations and that Cuba also has its position within Commission No. 4 on special policies and decolonization. What can you tell us, Mr. Minister, about this issue of maintaining peace, to which large ammounts of money are being allocated and which sometimes does not have purely peaceful goals.

[Cruz] Before answering that I would prefer going back to the human rights issue. There are two different ways of looking at human rights. One way is the way the rest of the world manipulates human rights and another is the way that we see human rights. In Geneva, [words indistinct] is still fresh in our memory. But for the benefit of those that do not follow this issue so closely, it would be good if you would talk to us a little about this. How did this conflict come about? When did the conflict on human rights began? Because, evidently, there are two different positions regarding the manipulation of human rights discussed in many international forums, and what we consider human rights.

[Noriega] Mr. Minister, why is it that everyday more and more developing countries are being condemned for determined human rights violations? Yet at the same time important issues such as racism and xenophobia are left undiscussed.

[Robaina] I believe this is a topic that was strongly debated in Vienna during the World Human Rights Conference and we are preparing ourselves for a human rights summit that will be held next year. I believe it is an issue of how it was presented. A topic that is highly manipulated by something I mentioned earlier: a very selective, discriminatory, and highly politicized criterion.

There is a double standard. In other words, there is a policy for some and a different policy for others. We would even have to look at the violations and the new human rights violations that exist and that take place everyday in those highly developed countries, and about which no one talks.

In addition, they want to stress those famous political freedoms, to give them a name, and the famous individual rights: the right to act, to participate. We would have to see what it represents, in a world like ours, to be a member of a any organization, when there is something that is much more important than that: survival. That is why I say we would have to go to much deeper discussions.

Too much importance and value has been given to what some people are guaranteed and no one cares of what we should guarantee for the many. Furthermore, you can see that discriminatory and selective concept for those that are favored. For example, no one talks about the recent outbreaks of xenophobia. No one talks about child prostitution. No one talks about drug addiction. No one talks about all those issues that take place in the developed world.

What do they say? They say that all the freedoms are guaranteed, that everybody can express their opinion, that everybody can participate freely. What good is being able to express your opinion, if you have no food, no home, and lack many other important things. These are the things that I believe we must discuss.

I also think that they intend to demand, from a continent such as ours and countries like ours, human rights concepts that are simply transplanted from one place to another. They are concerned that a European housewife may not understand what the situation in Latin America is. The first thing I would say is: How many women in Latin America cannot become housewives because they do not have a house or the possibility of having one. Therefore, the realities are different and we would have to see to what degree we can respond to this.

At the same time, this has been presented as the great way of worrying about the minorities. I am amazed, because if the same concern for the problems of the minorities existed for the problems of the majorities, we would have solved many of the world's problems. I believe it would be much more worthwhile to solve the problems of the gigantic majorities, and therefore eventually benefit the minorities. The fact is, as you can see, this issue could be abused greatly.

Today, for example, 100 percent of the accusers are in the First World and 100 percent of the accused are the Third World. They talk about human rights violations but they do not mention the highly developed countries. They talk about those problems in the developing countries and our difficulties. Once again, the game rules are not fair.

Obviously, they will not see this overnight. They will not give in as we have explained, but I think there are many examples. That is why I said that in human rights matters, Cuba not only has many answers to questions, but many questions to ask. That is why we have gone to all these events with many questions. That is why we have talked about the number of people in the world that do not even know they have rights. How many people do

not even know how to read or write the word rights. As Frei Betto said: For Latin America to talk about human rights like those in Cuba would be a luxury when survival rights have not even been guaranteed; when things like food and shelter have not been guaranteed. These are issues that we need to emphasize.

[Martinez] Robaina, going back to the issue of the democratization of the United Nations, the Venezuelan foreign minister, who was recently in Cuba, mentioned in his news conference a certain affinity between the Cuban and Venezuelan positions on Latin America's permanent membership on the Security Council. Does Cuba's position coincide in many areas with other Latin American and Third World countries in this battle and in the UN General Assembly session?

[Robaina] I would say that since our president made his proposal at the Ibero-American summit in Salvador, Bahia State, it has elicited strong approval from all participants. I would say that as soon as possible.- ...[pauses] whether who is going to do it and who is going to represent Latin America is a topic open for discussion. I would say that democratization was one of the proposals and that the fact that 400 million Latin Americans should be represented on the Security Council is too strong an argument for any Latin American country to be against this proposal.

Thus, I would say that there is an extremely positive situation as far as support for the proposal is concerned. Yes, we share that position not only with the Venezuelan foreign minister, but also with many other countries. I would say that the main confrontation will not be centered on this, but on the transformation we may want to make in terms of the composition of the UN Security Council. Yes, there is support and agreement on this and on many other positions.

[Martinez] In the case of the Nonaligned Movement, is there also some....

[Robaina, interrupting] There are also prospects for exchange and understanding.

[Rodriguez] Excuse me. We still have a few minutes and Cavada's question has not yet been answered.

[Robaina] Yes. Cavada primarily referred to the famous peacekeeping operations.

[Cavada] In Somalia, in Bosnia....

[Robaina] We are all concerned about that, I would say not only at our ministry or in Cuba alone. Today, the world is watching with great pain how these operations are being distorted. If one is to call it peacekeeping or humanitarian operations to deliver food at gunpoint, I believe we should stop and think what kind of peace is being kept that way and what are the basic issues being discussed.

I believe all these terms are nothing but a very surreptitious and disguised way of guaranteeing new and more updated forms of intervention and interference. This is why they are now talking about preventive diplomacy, humanitarian intervention, and peacekeeping operations.

I believe that if a peacekeeping operation is what we are currently witnessing, if a peacekeeping operation is what we have been watching happen in Bosnia, if peacekeeping amounts to all that, honestly one must take a hard look at these operations and realize that they have nothing to do with the names given to them.

[Cavada] Yes. They are blue helmets who are ultimately stained with blood.

[Robaina] That is a reality which should be discussed and which mankind can no longer tolerate.

[Noriega] Mr. Minister, Cuba is interested in making its position prevail on many subjects at the assembly. How will then the Cuban delegation be distributed during your stay at the UN headquarters and will the Cuban delegation be exclusively devoted to the 48th assemby session, or will it be involved in some other activities?

[Robaina] Your question is very interesting, Elizabeth. We have many topics. For instance, here is the tentative program for the 48th General Assembly Session. I would say that there are 157 topics, which encompass a wide variety of events taking place in the world today. Some of these issues will be discussed at committee level and others at the plenary session, as I said earlier.

The Cuban delegation consists in the first place of our permanent mission at the United Nations. A small delegation, including myself, will be departing in the next few hours. I and some Foreign Ministry specialists will stay there until the conclusion of the debates. As soon as we return, other Foreign Ministry specialists will replace us.

Our participation in all of the committees is guaranteed, in the first place through our permanent representatives. Thus, our delegation leaving from Cuba will be a very small one. I believe we will not only physically participate in every committee through our representatives, but I would repeat here what I stated at the very beginning: Although we have stated that the important issues for Cuba are the blockade, human rights, and the democratization of the United Nations, the Cuban delegation will be attending the 48th UN General Assembly Session with something that is far more important than the specific issues of interest to our country.

The Cuban delegation's position will be one full endorsement and support of principles such as sustained development, noninterference, the right to self-determination, and many other topics on which we must all establish our respective positions. I believe we have fundamentally emphasized here our dogmatic principles, which are very much in keeping with Cuban reality. Yet, regarding all this, regarding positions on all these issues, Cuba will of course be participating with the desire, the express

determination with which we have always participated in these types of international forums.

We are linked and committed to the community of nations to which we belong by, above all, advancing social justice, equality, sovereignty, and independence of all countries, not only of developed countries, but fundamentally of developing countries.

[Cruz] Outside the framework of [words indistinct], I understand there is a parallel program [programa colateral]. I believe it would be interesting for you to briefly comment on this too?

[Robaina] Yes. There is a program which I would say is just as broad as that of the General Assembly session. The agenda of the parallel program is so busy as far as meetings is concerned that it may actually compete with the main program. We will not be leaving New York because of the reasons and regulations you well know, but there are many possibilities of exchange. Great interest has been expressed by academic sectors, not necessarily for interviews by press sectors, but from executives of all of the television networks, from universities, institutions, businessmen, significant political segments of the Cuban community abroad with which we maintain ties, the Pastors for Peace, and so forth. Thus, there will be a busy program that will also start on 27 September and that will last until the day of our return.

Aside from the main program, we will comply with this other program. I believe it is extremely important to know that there are so many friends, so many people in that place who want to know about our reality and who, among other things, want to give us a viewpoint that is different from that which we normally get through the U.S. media itself.

[Rodriguez] Many viewers have called to ask questions, many of which have already been answered here. There is one question, however, that remains unanswered. I believe it was asked by Domitila Lopez. She wants to know if the existence of the United Nations is advantageous to the world today.

[Robaina] Domitila has asked a very interesting question. I would say that the question has been raised before. I believe it was in 1979 when Fidel addressed the United Nations, he asked what was the purpose of the United Nations if it was not addressing a number of problems existing at that time.

I believe the United Nations should be highly committed to playing a role in the world. Developments and history will judge later the extent to which it has been able to accomplish this. I believe the United Nations has taken on a path of discussion, of restructuring. Yet, you may realize that this restructuring is not meant to deal with the urgent problems the world is experiencing today.

Thus, I believe that Domitila and I could get together again two or three General Assembly sessions from now [laughter] to personally let her know our ideas as to whether progress has been made on this path, and whether the United Nations is truly advantageous or not. I would say that, like any other organization, the United Nations could at least play a role. Yet, if it does not undergo substantive changes, I believe many of us will be asking the same question Domitila has just asked.

[Martinez] Well, we have to thank Robaina.

[Rodriguez] Yes. Thank you so much, Mr. Minister, for having granted us this interview. We have taken some of our invaluable time. We wish you much success at the 48th UN General Assembly Session, Comrade Robaina.

[Robaina] Thank you.

[Rodriguez] Thanks to you comrades who joined us on this panel, Martinez Pirez, Soledad....

[Martinez] Robaina has promised to come back here.

[Rodriguez] Yes, upon his return.

[Martinez] Why won't you leave New York?

[Robaina] Upon my return we may (?discuss that)

[Rodriguez] Thanks to you Elizabeth too; to Cavada, who was today at Radio Rebelde. Thank you so much again, Mr. Minister, for this interview which I believe was extremely interesting. We wish you sucess again.

Robaina, Foreign Diplomats Tour Santiago de Cuba

FL2309163893 Havana Radio Rebelde Network in Spanish 0900 GMT 23 Sep 93

[Text] Foreign Minister Roberto Robaina began a visit to Santiago de Cuba Province accompanied by a large representation of the diplomatic corps accredited in our country. In Santiago, the diplomatic delegation was met by Esteban Lazo Hernandez, first secretary of the Communist Party of Cuba in Santiago de Cuba Province, who explained the province's plans for development.

The visitors toured the General Hospital of Santiago, where they received explanations of the operation of the medical center which, once completed, will have 1,100 beds, 26 operating rooms, and modern medical equipment.

Correction to Bishops' 'Provocation' Analyzed

FL2309233193

The following correction pertains to the item headlines "Bishops' 'Provocation Analyzed," published in the 23 September Latin America DAILY REPORT, page 6: Page 9, first column, fourth paragraph, second sentence make read: ...the back of (Lagrey), claim to have.... capitalizing phoneticized name.

*** Pros, Cons of 'Dollarization' Viewed**

93CA0181A Havana TRABAJADORES in Spanish 2 Aug 93 p 2

[Commentary by Renato Recio]

[Text] The announced legalization [of foreign currency] is the next important step, though not the only one needed, toward breaking a vicious circle that is paralyzing the Cuban economy and damaging the people's standard of living.

This vicious circle means that the economy cannot efficiently produce the quantities of goods necessary to obtain the foreign currency it needs, because it lacks the foreign currency to make its production machinery operate, and so its equipment is operating very much below its potential capacity.

Legalization is the start of a process that will also include other steps, so the foreign currency existing in Cuba now (and which may enter Cuba in the future) in the hands of the people may be transferred to the state through purchases that the possessors of this currency will make in special stores and markets.

Will the amount of foreign currency this measure brings in be of much use to the national economy?

I believe it will, especially if viewed in relation to Cuba's current situation, which is now experiencing an extremely grave shortage of freely convertible currency.

And also in absolute terms, that amount may come to be considerable.

I once read that Dominican emigres who live in different countries, but mostly in the United States, send to their families in the Dominican Republic no less than $1 billion every year.

It is certainly known that El Salvador receives over $800 million a year from money sent home by its emigrants.

The increase in permits for family visits to citizens of Cuban origin living abroad, the greater openness to foreign capital investments and the resulting increase in the circulation of convertible currency within Cuba, as well as the steady growth in tourism, would all seem to indicate that in the near future the possession and circulation of foreign currency is going to reach undeniable economic significance in a country that overnight saw its foreign purchasing power slashed over four times.

All this will have a dark side: the creation of privileges in the area of consumption for those with access to foreign currency. Other undesirable trends that may be imagined will probably arise as well, even though ethical standards have already been damaged by the existence of the black market, due to the lack of goods and services that the people need.

I agree, though, with those who do not see only the dark side of the matter, for tolerating those privileges and dealing with other socially negative trends should result in an improved potential to revive the national economy, the economy of all the Cuban people—of all of us.

I disagree with those who say, as if reality could never change, that the Cuban economy will inevitably be "dollarized," that is, that the instrument used for all economic transactions is going to be convertible currency.

Some with understandable concern about the inequalities that may arise think that at least part of Cubans' salaries should be paid in foreign currency to alleviate these differences.

But the steps that are being taken and will be taken could not be farther from replacing the Cuban peso by foreign currencies.

One thing needs to be understood: all the management, the movements, and uses that are made of foreign currency and the other steps taken in the citizens' economy must be associated with a goal that we must never lose sight of: strengthening the Cuban peso, restoring its purchasing power, making it again an efficient motivator of labor, and an important factor as a distributor of equity.

No one should be surprised, though, if at first the black market rate between the peso and the dollar becomes even more favorable to the dollar.

That could happen because there are 9 billion pesos in circulation in the street. This is an overwhelming money surplus. It indicates the current imbalance between the consumer goods available and the people's monetary resources, which have been maintained despite the national economy's critical situation.

As that enormous mass of money has been marginally redistributed through the black market, some segments of the population—people who have profited by diverting resources and speculation—are presumably hoarding a large part of the excess cash in circulation and will now begin to stockpile foreign currency, offering any amount of Cuban money for it.

This possibility, among other problems, makes it essential to deal with the related issue of the excessive money supply.

In summary, even though an incomplete and superficial view may suggest otherwise, we can be certain that the measures announced and those that will soon have to be taken related to the domestic economy and to services are not intended to "dollarize" the economy, but rather to create conditions designed to restore value to our national currency.

Although foreign currencies are urgently needed now, that does not mean that the focal point of the Cuban economy will not continue to be taking steps to give

greater value to the incomes the people receive in Cuban currency, even if this must be done very slowly.

* Reasons for Meeting With Gaviria Explained

93CA0187A Santa Fe de Bogota SEMANA in Spanish 17 Aug 93 pp 42-45

[Text] The announcement that Fidel Castro would visit Colombia set off a veritable earthquake in the media and in political circles. What could President Cesar Gaviria expect of a visit from the man who promoted the armed struggle in this country? Was there not a certain amount of irony in the fact that Colombia was one of the countries that extended a hand to this ceaseless promoter of revolutions?

But when Colombians saw him descend from the aircraft that brought him to Cartagena from La Paz (where he had met with Gaviria to attend the inauguration of the new Bolivian president), many saw in the aged and grizzled face of the Cuban president the justification for the visit. From the very beginning, Castro showed a face that was quite different from that of the fiery and combative orator who used to assail the American imperialists and their "lackeys in the Americas" with equal vehemence.

Instead, Colombians saw a man who is facing the dilemma of trying to adhere to his historic position without losing the dignity of 34 years of struggle, a man at a crossroads who is trying to retrace his steps without falling into an abyss.

Although Colombians expressed their support for the visit in the opinion polls, for reasons ranging from Latin American solidarity to out-and-out affection for the *caudillo*, politicians and representatives of various sectors of the economy demanded concrete results.

Above all, it was expected that Castro would unequivocally condemn the Colombian armed movement as a condition for receiving Colombia's open support for the lifting of the American blockade. But Gaviria had other ideas.

Background of Meeting

The story of Fidel's visit to Cartagena began two years ago in Mexico, on the occasion of the first Hispanic American Summit in Guadalajara. In that forum, the leaders of Mexico, Venezuela, Spain, and Colombia agreed on the need to persuade the Cuban leader that he should immediately make changes in the island's political and economic management.

The new geopolitical circumstances, especially the disintegration of the Soviet bloc and the resultant loss of most of its trading partners, beginning with Eastern Europe, made it clear that the island was headed straight for the total collapse of its economy, with the predictable effects on public order. The foreign ministries of those countries believed it was clear that whatever efforts were made to prevent a civil war in Cuba would not be enough in view of the catastrophic consequences a bloody outcome would have for the Caribbean in particular, and for the Americas in general.

On that occasion, the aforementioned leaders met with Castro to try to get some reaction out of the Cuban president. Carlos Andres Perez, with his usual rhetoric, spoke of introducing "true" democracy on the island, which merely elicited a typical response from Castro expressing disdain for what he calls "bourgeois" democracy. On the other hand, Carlos Salinas, Gaviria, and Felipe Gonzalez tried to penetrate his ideological fortress with a much more pragmatic battering ram: the economy.

Three months later, in Cozumel, the members of the group tried again, but this time Castro was less receptive. Those present got the impression that the Cuban leader felt somehow besieged. Castro, on the defensive, vehemently rejected all political suggestions from the Venezuelan president. The meeting seemed like a failure, presumably because the Cuban thought he was being backed into a corner.

In spite of everything, he once again became more receptive to the economic ideas proposed by the other participants. They had the feeling they were plowing fertile ground and that their efforts might yield a good crop, as long as they cultivated the fields with care. That became evident later when Spanish Minister Carlos Solchaga visited Cuba, because Spain obviously has greater investments to look after there.

During the time that passed between Cozumel and the summit at Salvador de Bahia, Brazil, the Cuban economy not only did not improve, but actually deteriorated. The so-called storm of the century, which caused more than $1 billion in damage at the beginning of the year, and the decline in the sugar harvest, which deprived the battered Cuban economy of another $500 million, combined to back the regime up against the wall. For the first time, perhaps following the advice his Latin American colleagues had given him, Castro allowed his arm to be twisted and took the historic step of legalizing the possession of dollars on the island.

New Circumstances

That proved that the Cuban president was willing to be more flexible, and that it was therefore worthwhile to continue talking to him. But the circumstances were different. For one thing, Carlos Andres Perez had been suspended, and his replacement, Victor J. Velasquez, was immersed in his country's problems. Felipe Gonzalez was not available, and Carlos Salinas de Gortari had cut back his activism to a minimum in anticipation of the upcoming debate on the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) in the U.S. Congress.

Fidel Castro was the one with the most interest in talking, and Cesar Gaviria was the only interlocutor left who was in a position to engage in an unhurried dialogue. Although it had originally been agreed that the

meeting in Cartagena would be held between Thursday the 12th and Friday the 13th, the Cuban President asked in La Paz, Bolivia (where he met with Gaviria at Sanchez's inauguration), if the meeting could be held earlier. He argued that his security apparatus and the domestic situation made it difficult for him to be absent from his country, and that the meeting could be held on his way back to Havana.

That request produced an impasse in the Colombian delegation. Gaviria knew that Spanish Foreign Minister Eduardo Solana would be staying at the Guest House for Dignitaries in Cartagena on a private visit to the country, having been invited by one of Colombia's large business conglomerates to discuss Spanish investments in the Baru hotel project. His presence could put Castro on the defensive again, and the talks might fail.

But at Cuban insistence, Gaviria agreed to be there at the same time as Minister Solana, who did attend one dinner but did not participate much in the serious talks, as was stated during the meeting. In the end, the presence of the Spaniard only fed speculation about the substance of the talks, and about the possibility that some spectacular announcements might be made afterwards.

Clear Recipe

In fact, what took place was a very long talk in which, for the first time, the Cuban leader did not overwhelm his interlocutor with his implacable rhetoric and his verbosity. This time, the one who did all the talking was Gaviria, and there was no mistake about his message. The Colombian president was probably the first person to tell Fidel Castro to his face that the problems in his country were caused not by the American blockade, as he stubbornly insists, but by the simple fact that his economic system is not working. "Fidel, you are not going anywhere with that political system" are the exact words that the Colombian president used at one point.

Gaviria the politician decided to have Gaviria the economist give Fidel a disquisition that lasted from dessert at the Guest House through long walks along the seashore. As Castro listened, his head hung down as if he were receiving a scolding from a friend, and occasionally took notes, Gaviria spoke for an hour and 35 minutes during the first session, and Castro took less than an hour to rebut the points he disagreed with. He said he would take the rest under advisement.

Rather than agreeing to any commitments, Castro simply listened to the Colombian president as he summed up the thinking of the Group of Three and Spain regarding the Cuban economy: It is obvious that if Cuba wants private foreign investment, the bulk of it will come from neighboring countries and friendly countries, particularly those that are aware of what would happen if developments on the largest island in the Antilles resulted in bloodshed. These investments will go primarily to projects in the service sector, one of which, a telecommunications project, is of particular importance to a Mexican group. For this reason, it is absolutely essential that the rules of the game be sufficiently clear and that the liberalization of the economy take place in a stable way so that investors will feel more secure.

The recipe these countries are recommending to Cuba is clear: as the economy opens up and investments become increasingly substantial, the political transition will become inevitable, and above all, will be a pacifying influence.

Perhaps that was why Gaviria opted to pay an undeniable political price in view of the absence of any concrete results from Castro's visit. On the guerrilla issue, he allowed Castro to limit himself to reminding the journalists who kept pestering him about the issue that the Declarations of Havana, issued shortly after the revolution in 1959, did not urge the use of violence if the conditions were right for avoiding it.

Gaviria pointed out that the dividends of the visit will translate into more Colombian investment in the island, since it is clear that Cuba has a tremendous potential for future business activity. Some countries, such as Mexico, Brazil, and above all Spain, have been quick to seize this opportunity.

The only thing about which there was no doubt was the extraordinary cordiality that characterized the meeting. Castro always travels with two chefs who prepare his favorite dishes with ingredients brought from his country. Therefore, when the buffet was served, each president offered his own dishes with an almost childlike enthusiasm, boasting of the recipes. But when it came to economic matters, clearly only one of them had the right recipes for success.

* Civil Aviation Finances Operations With MLC

93CA0181B Havana TRABAJADORES in Spanish 2 Aug 93 p 4

[Article by Ileana Minutrive]

[Text] Financing its operations in MLC [Freely Convertible Currency] is now a reality in Cuban civil aviation, which is covering its foreign currency costs with revenues and contributing to the national economy as well.

No other option could really be possible, given the vital need to maintain operations and increase efficiency, in the nation's present situation which requires establishing a [word illegible] system of priorities for MLC payments.

A method was obviously becoming essential to ensure a supply of fuels, especially special aviation fuels, additives, and spare parts, when the supply ceased to be a stable flow coming from the former socialist countries. Air transport must continue to meet its obligations and provide quality service. Of the activities included in civil aviation, international transport, airport services—all the ground services like landing services and aviation services—communications, security for planes, etc., generate foreign currency for Cuba, but areas like domestic

air transportation, agricultural aviation, and other costs, such as the international travel of Cubans flying on Cubana de Aviacion and foreign lines, require payments in MLC.

So it is easy to understand that activities that can must pay for themselves and produce added revenues to cover aviation services that do not generate foreign currency and that Cuba cannot do without.

That may seem simple, but something more complex is involved: transforming economic labor systems established for many years. Now the focal point is the constant increase in efficiency, or what is the same thing, the improved use of human, material, and financial resources. This is to make efforts so that we can produce at low cost and with high quality, and we can sell and charge appropriately for services to obtain more income and invest intelligently in order to increase civil aviation activity. Recent data indicate that civil aviation has begun to move ahead: with 10 percent of the total MLC payments generated in 1992 it financed domestic air transportation; 9.3 percent was used for services provided to agriculture; and 60.5 percent to provide the foreign currency costs of international transportation of Cuban passengers traveling abroad. So no civil aviation activities received foreign currency from the state.

Far from being a burden on the nation, it even managed to devote 20.2 percent of that total to light industry for the production of footwear. This complies with the concept that sectors that generate foreign currency should help to develop others that have a great impact on the population.

IACC [Cuban Civil Aeronautics Institute] economists say that if not for these advances, air transportation would have practically been paralyzed. This self-supporting system will be of great importance in developing tourism in Cuba and providing jobs for civil aviation workers.

Prospects for the current year are promising, and in the seven months that have already elapsed, growth has been forecast. For the present phase civil aviation should provide 13.7 percent to national air transportation, 11.8 percent for agricultural services, and 32.3 percent to light industry for footwear production. Only the international transport of Cuban passengers traveling by Cubana and foreign airlines shows a reduction in relation to the previous year—it is now 42.2 percent; this is to achieve savings and a greater increase in foreign currency for the national economy. Obtaining the maximum revenues at the minimum cost is the fundamental premise of self-financing in freely convertible currency. This is a valid concept for our economic system, and one which, in the new situation, takes on greater and more specific importance.

The 9,000 workers of the civil aviation system in Cuba know this. They are the people who work to open up new services and improve existing services. Only through that effort will superior results come, by working together with great discipline and skill. In attaining this objective, the administrative leadership and political and union organizations are playing a leading role.

The practice of self-financing in foreign currency for some economic sectors of Cuba is demonstrating the capability of Cuban collectives. Acting independently, they can make use of potential opportunities that in the past, under paternalistic and subsidized systems, were limited and tended to just get by. Today the focus is different, and it is beginning to pay off with substantial dividends.

* Veterans Group Defends Revolution

93CA0187B Havana GRANMA in Spanish 10 Aug 93 p 4

[Article by Manolo Rodriguez Salas]

[Text] Nearly 20,000 Pinar del Rio residents belong today to the Association of Combatants of the Cuban Revolution (ACRC). Two years ago, these men and women would meet by chance at one event or another, a meeting of their grassroots organizations in the Party, the Committees for the Defense of the Revolution (CDR), the National Association of Small Farmers (ANAP), or the Federation of Cuban Women (FMC).

They needed a stronger connection, something that would bring them together just because they had fought side by side, that would give them specific missions to accomplish in the battles of today.

Achieving this organized unity is the main accomplishment of the Association of Combatants. It was in this province, on 15 December 1991, in the presence of Army Gen. Raul Castro, that the veterans joined together for the first time in the country. Now, two years later, it is a good time to talk about results and experiences. Accordingly, Col. Jesus Almeyda Hernandez agreed to talk to GRANMA about his thoughts as president of the ACRC in Pinar del Rio.

[Rodriguez] What is the association's main objective, and to what extent do you think that objective has been achieved in this province?

[Almeyda] The central objective of the organization is the unconditional defense of the Cuban Revolution. Based on that, we have made sure that each of our veterans has the place, the resources, and the methodology to defend the Fatherland. The members of the association are active individuals capable of contributing to the proper training of those around them and defending to the fullest the interests and ideas of the Revolution.

Although we have not met all our objectives 100 percent, our combatants have come to the realization that setting an example is the most powerful weapon in this struggle. If we do not set a good example, we cannot enlist others in the strategic tasks of the Revolution.

That is why we have mobilized in support of the food program, why we are the first to appear at every revolutionary demonstration or parade, and why we do everything the Party asks us to do to the maximum, every task that is presented to us.

[Rodriguez] Who are the combatants?

[Almeyda] We are a nation of combatants, because for more than 30 years, the entire population has been fighting for the Revolution against the imperialists. Our association is selective, however. Its members are the people who fought in the Sierra Maestra, in the underground struggle, at Playa Giron [Bay of Pigs] or in the struggle against bandits and pirates, or in the glorious internationalist missions, and those who have been on active duty in the Revolutionary Armed Forces (FAR) and the Ministry of the Interior (MININT) for more than 20 years. They also include retirees and pensioners from those services, and the parents of those who fell in battle. This marvelous mixture of revolutionaries makes us an invincible force.

[Rodriguez] When you say that the association has nearly 20,000 members, does that number include all veterans?

[Almeyda] Actually, more than 95 percent of all registered combatants belong to the association. As it happens, many of those who fought against bandits, for example, have not received the medals they deserved, and until they do, we cannot sign them up.

[Rodriguez] Why would registered combatants not join if they meet all the requirements?

[Almeyda] That is an administrative problem, relating to the association's work. There are cases we have not gotten to yet; because when we talk to people, they always join.

There are also cases of personal antipathy among combatants, and people may refuse to join because of the one sent to recruit them. We have instructed the municipal boards that they should intervene directly in these cases, and the end result is always positive.

There are other organizational problems. Not all of our grass-roots associations have drawn up their quarterly work plans in the proper form.

[Rodriguez] Some may think of the association as a group of retirees, but you have said that the work of the combatants is also decisive at the workplaces where they are still active.

[Almeyda] I would remind you, in the first place, that all FAR or MININT officers with 20 years or more on active duty may join the association. Besides, we have required that each combatant carry out at least one task for the association every month, regardless of his function or employment status.

In addition, we have said that for a grassroots organization to work, first of all the combatants must interrelate, they must know each other, and wherever feasible, they must tell each other of their specific tasks and verify compliance.

It is also important to maintain ties with the centers that are within the grass-roots association's sphere of influence: schools, *escogidas*, workplaces, cooperatives.

[Rodriguez] How would you sum up the importance of the organization during these times?

[Almeyda] I believe, first of all, that the association has emerged just when the Revolution most needs the contribution and support of all combatants; because even though the majority of our people support the Party and Fidel, difficult times like these bring out the opportunists, the renegades, and those who would rather give in to the imperialists than live with dignity.

That is when we combatants must play the role that history has assigned to us because of our actions. The Revolution needs to be defended today against external and internal enemies, and on either of those battlefields, Fidel and the Party will be able to count on us, as always, to be on the front lines.

Haiti

Joseph Urges Government, Deputies To Compromise

FL2309190493 Port-au-Prince Signal FM Radio in Creole 1130 GMT 23 Sep 93

[Passages within quotation marks in French]

[Text] Another point in the news is the abortive session of the Chamber of Deputies on 22 September. Chamber President Antoine Joseph hopes to reach a compromise between the Malval government and the (?other) blocs within the parliament. Otherwise, he says, it will be very difficult for Prime Minister Malval to get his bills, including those he has submitted and the others he will need to do, approved by the parliament because he must have a majority in the parliament when he wants a vote on a certain number of laws.

[Begin recording] [Joseph] I believe the problem is clearly posed. "I said it and I repeated it. In my opinion, the government must work with the parliamentarians so they can define a majority that will allow them to support the government in both good and bad times. Today, I believe the government needs this majority more than ever. This majority must regularly be present at the sessions in order to work on the bills presented by the government and any others essential to the smooth operation of the executive power."

[Unidentified journalist] "Mr. President, I heard some.... [pauses] I heard some deputies, who are members of the Lavalas camp, in fact, the National Front for

Change and Democracy [FNCD] camp, complaining that the government does not care about them and does not contact them. Have you heard those complaints?"

[Joseph] "Personally, I am not in a position to know that. All that I know is that the FNCD is a member of the government. Victor Benoit, who is an FNCD member, is part of the government. He is minister of national education. I think the FNCD members should complain to Benoit and the latter will have to [pauses] will not have to, but is obliged to submit the problem to the Council of Ministers so the FNCD members in parliament will be more inclined to attend the sessions."

[Journalist] "Are you going to attempt a new session tomorrow [words indistinct]?"

[Joseph] "We have no choice. The session opened yesterday [22 September]. We have regular session days on Tuesdays, Wednesdays, and Thursdays. Tomorrow will be a normal session day. The office will be here at the usual time for the roll call and to hold the session if there is a quorum. Of course, there is a problem. I must tell you that I posed it not only to some members of the government but also to members of the international community. I posed the problem as well to the officials of political groups during the conferences of presidents. But I have noted that, so far, there has been no worthwhile solution allowing me as president of the Chamber of Deputies to hold sessions."

[Journalist] In the event that a quorum is not reached, what will be the next step [words indistinct] the Chamber of Deputies?

[Joseph] If there is no quorum, it is simple. In that case, we set Tuesday [28 September] for the next session. I believe that that is a worrisome problem. The government is supposed to make efforts to solve it. [end recording]

That was Antoine Joseph, president of the lower chamber. I should tell you that there was no quorum at the Chamber of Deputies. Consequently, they could not receive the bills separating police and Army and creating a new police force in Haiti. We should recall that two calls to extraordinary session failed on 15 September, when President Jean-Bertrand Aristide wished an extraordinary National Assembly to be held for a vote on these bills, and on 21 September. Once again, the assembly almost succeeded; there was a very fragile quorum, almost exactly what was needed for the seventh session to open. Antoine Joseph says there are now a number of problems that must be solved so these laws can be voted on; so far, the deputies are playing hookey.

Duvalierists Demonstrate at Office Inauguration

FL2309183293 Port-au-Prince Radio Metropole in French 1045 GMT 23 Sep 93

[Excerpts] An exhibition at the National Pantheon Museum, a neo-Duvalierist political party which is opening an office, a demonstration on the streets of Port-au-Prince, and the date of 22 September 1993 did not pass unnoticed here in Haiti.

The neo-Duvalierist people did not miss this occasion to make their voices heard and, primarily, to demonstrate in daylight.

Taking advantage of a confusing political climate and an atmosphere that is rather favorable to them, the supporters of Duvalierism went through Port-au-Prince displaying the black and red flag bearing the guinea-fowl, symbol of Duvalierism. Demonstrators chanting Duvalierist songs also praised the benefits of the regime. This is the first time since the downfall of the Duvalier regime in February 1986 that a political party is openly espousing Duvalierism. The Assembly of Democrats for the Republic, RDR, hopes to speak for the urban and rural masses and invites the Lavalas people to join its ranks. Edner Jean filed a report on the opening of this new office of the RDR party:

[Begin recording] It is in an atmosphere punctuated with the refrain and slogans that marked the reign of the Duvaliers that RDR inaugurated its new headquarters in the former annex of the Port-au-Prince city hall in the Biscentenaire. Nothing was overlooked in identifying the neo-Duvalierist bent of this new political party: the red and black flag, the guinea fowl, the conch shell, and the words that recall the ideas of 1946 and 1957.

In his address, the RDR president, Attorney Augustin, recalled the aspirations and achievements of the Duvalierists. Fundamentally nationalist, he demanded the departure of all foreigners who interfered in Haiti's internal affairs. In that regard, Augustin cited Dr. Francois Duvalier. He knew how to keep the foreigners at a distance, said the president of RDR. Augustin did not hide the fact that he was a convinced Duvalierist and that he intended to reinstate the doctor's ideas. [passage omitted]

Several personalities known for their Duvalierist inclinations, including former ministers, lawyers, and former legislators, participated in the office opening. Among them was the deputy mayor of the capital, Gerard Salomon, who spoke of mobilizing the members to take over the power vacuum that exists, according to Salomon. He invited the demonstrators in front of the party's premises to occupy the National Palace, empty for the past three months. [passage omitted]

However, the demonstration that followed the inaugural ceremony took place without incident, under heavy police surveillance. That is the way Papa Doc's advent to power is being observed in 1993. [end recording]

Correction to Mayor Faults Armed 'Bandits'

FL2309203993

The following correction pertains to the item headlines "Mayor Faults Armed 'Bandits' Occupying City Hall," published in the 22 September Latin America DAILY REPORT, page 5: Column two, second paragraph, second sentence make read: ...Mayor] Gerald Salomon, who is a member of the coalition [made up of Evans Paul, Gerald Salomon, and Mrs. Sablon, elected to head the Port-au-Prince Communal Council in the 16 December 1990 election]. These bandits are breaking up... (expanding editorial note and rewording for clarity.

Industry, Commerce Secretary on Joining NAFTA

PY2309222893 La Paz Television Nacional Network in Spanish 1700 GMT 23 Sep 93

[Excerpts] An article published by U.S. magazine THE ECONOMIST points out that Bolivia might be admitted to the North American Free Trade Agreement. The Bolivian Industrial Property Association is sponsoring a seminar called The Role of Industrial Property in Economic Development. Industry and Commerce Secretary Carlos Morales participated in this seminar. [passage omitted]

Morales also discussed the possibility that our country will join NAFTA, that is, the North American Free Trade Agreement:

[Begin recording] We are very interested. We have indications and signals that Bolivia might join it. I am already organizing a group of advisers in our ministry, because this is a very complex and important issue, in order to establish a timetable. This must be negotiated. One does not go without an invitation; it must be negotiated. Therefore, a timetable for negotiations and joining must be established.

Chile already has been working on this issue for a long time. They are way ahead of us. Nevertheless, we have received, I repeat, indications and signals from Mexico, the United States, and Canada that they would be pleased with Bolivia joining NAFTA. Of course, for us this involves conducting a number of reviews, not only an impact or adjustment analysis, so we can join NAFTA. [passage omitted] [end recording]

If this takes place as scheduled, Bolivia has been advised by the United States and Mexico that it may be the first South American country to be admitted to NAFTA.

El Salvador

Party Officials on Arrival of New U.S. Ambassador

PA2309222793 San Salvador Canal Doce Television in Spanish 0300 GMT 22 Sep 93

[Report by Julio Melendez; from the "Up to Date" newscast]

[Text] Nationalist Republican Alliance [Arena], Christian Democratic Party [PDC], and the Democratic Convergence [CD] were pleased by the recent appointment of U.S. Ambassador Alan Flanigan. They also hope relations between the two countries will improve substantially.

[Begin Arena leader Raul Somoza Alfaro recording] The United States should not come to unjustly try to question the disbursement of the aid it was going to give. [end recording]

This statement may have set a sour tone toward the arrival of career diplomat Alan Flanigan, who came on 20 September to serve as the new U.S. ambassador in San Salvador. Somoza Alfaro said, however, that he hoped the situation will improve in the new phase the country is going through following the signing of the peace accords. CD Deputy Jorge Villacorta agreed with him.

[Begin Villacorta recording] It is worth mentioning that since the signing of the accords to date, relations with the U.S. Government have been changing within the context of the peace process, which had the support of the United States. I do not think there has been a change in relations with the U.S. people, because I believe they were always very friendly. I think there is a new situation in the world and in the country. [end recording]

PDC Deputy Roberto Viera said that relations between El Salvador and the United States have always been cordial, although he admitted that due to the existence of closer ties with that nation, the conditions the United States has imposed on this country have been a key element in achieving respect for man's fundamental rights.

[Begin Viera recording] Undoubtedly, economic and commercial relations with the United States are very important aspects that must be viewed with great care. In this respect, I believe the economic relations that exist with the United States will be maintained in some way and continue to have an impact on U.S.- Salvadoran relations. [end recording] No political party has criticized Mr. Flanigan's appointment, although some people believe the economic aid that country is providing for the process of national reconciliation will continue to be a key factor in relations between the two countries.

Works Ministry Employees Join Striking Health Workers

PA2309151693 San Salvador Radio Farabundo Marti Network in Spanish 1800 GMT 22 Sep 93

[Report by Imelda Alvarenga from the "Facing the Moment" newscast]

[Text] About 15,000 Public Works Ministry employees nationwide went on an indefinite strike on 22 September. Salvador Acuna, secretary general of the Executive Committee of the Public Works Ministry Workers Association [ATMOP], said the strike is to support the demands being made by health workers who have been on strike for 23 days.

[Begin Acuna recording] Starting today, ATMOP joined the work stoppage to demand a viable and negotiated solution to the dispute in the public health sector. This is a nationwide stoppage, covering all Public Works Ministry divisions. We are doing this in support of the public health workers, who have been on strike for 23 days. We are concerned about the way the government is reacting to the workers' just demands, because this attitude, far from resolving the problem, is worsening it. The armed conflict in the country was resolved through consensus and negotiations, and, therefore, why cannot labor disputes also be resolved this way?

Moreover, as members of the state sector, we regard as a provocation the latest statements by President Alfredo Cristiani and government officials, as well as those by Valdivieso [not further identified] yesterday, saying the employees will be dismissed. We are telling them they are presenting us with a challenge. We are telling the Salvadoran people we are ready to defend our organizations, state employees, and what constitutes an instrument to guarantee our rights. [end recording]

Labor leader Acuna said the stoppage has gone into effect in seven Public Works divisions across the country and will continue until Public Health Minister Lisandro Vasques Sosa complies with the health workers' demands. These workers are demanding an pay raise of 500 colones and equipment and medicine for hospitals and health centers.

Guatemala

De Leon Rejects Criticism, Says Purge Part of Strategy

PA2309155193 Guatemala City Teleonce Television in Spanish 0340 GMT 20 Sep 93

[From the "Teleprensa" newscast]

[Text] President Ramiro de Leon Carpio on 19 September rejected statements made against him by those who believe his proposal to purge Congress and the Supreme Court is irresponsible. When questioned, the president said the steps taken during his working tours to

obtain popular support for the purge are promoting a political discussion of the issue, which is a part of his strategy.

[Begin De Leon recording] As a democratic president, I respect all opinions, although I do not share many of them. I do not know the origin of statements which say the proposal is irresponsible. I believe I have not only been responsible but also firm in dealing with this issue.

Making the decision to choose the most difficult path, which was to face corruption and to continue to do this until the end—as I do indeed intend to do—shows a great deal of responsibility and determination, far from displaying a lack of responsibility or determination. It would have been easier for me to act as previous presidents did, to continue using confidential expenditures, and to enter into negotiations with the deputies to Congress. I, however, chose the most difficult path with great determination and responsibility.

I have implemented this strategy because every statesman must act on a strategy. This strategy consisted of reiterating, as I did in Melchor de Mencos, the people's clamor to the other two state branches. Therefore, my actions have been in line with this strategy. You will learn of my next steps within the next few days. Nevertheless, the steps taken so far have been perfectly clear.

What has been done up until today comprises a great step forward. Even the creation and reemergence of this crisis, which has existed since 25 May, is a great step forward. The crisis reemerged and political passions were heightened as part of my strategy. The people of Guatemala are confident that the purge and political reorganization will be carried out. [end recording]

Admits Consultation Not Binding

PA2309205993 Guatemala City Teleonce Television in Spanish 0340 GMT 20 Sep 93

[Text] President Ramiro De Leon Carpio has admitted that the popular consultation [consulta popular] on the purge of state institutions is plagued with problems like the fact that it is not legally binding and that it will take time to implement.

[Begin De Leon Carpio recording] In the first place, my opinion as one who abides by the constitution—and according to my advisers—is that the popular consultation is not legally binding. It would merely have moral weight. On the other hand, it will be 45 to 60 days before it is implemented.

In this respect we felt it would be more appropiate and prudent to allow that amount of time. We do not agree with those who say we will lose the initiative. In any case this is a prudent period; regardless, we plan to make the necessary inquiries, most likely with the Constitutional Court. We expect that these inquiries of the Constitutional Court will... [pauses] Then I'll be able to confidently approach the Supreme Electoral Court with the assurance that the popular consultation will not be challenged.

It would be of no use to have a popular consultation, only to have the Constitutional Court agree to hear a challenge of the president's measures. All steps are being carefully evaluated, and all strategies have been carefully prepared and established. The initiative is still being maintained because the population is making a demand that the president of the Republic is willing to heed. [end recording]

Nicaragua

Government, Strikers Agree To Continue Talks

PA2309140993 Panama City ACAN in Spanish 1145 GMT 23 Sep 93

[Excerpt] Managua, 23 Sep (ACAN-EFE)—The Violeta Chamorro government and leaders of the transportation industry today said they are willing to continue their negotiations to resolve this year's bloodiest and most harmful strike affecting Nicaragua's economy.

The transportation stoppage, today in its fourth day following serious public disorders, has already accounted for two deaths, dozens of people injured or arrested, and damage to the streets and avenues in the capital. Public, private, and emergency services have decreased considerably because employees have been unable to get to work because of transportation problems.

The talks began at the National Assembly building at 1600 local (2100 GMT) Wednesday between a group of top government officials headed by Finance Minister Emilio Pereira and delegates from the National Transportation Commission, which is heading the protests. The negotiations are being held in a climate of distrust, difficulties, and reproach, but according to meeting spokesmen, the delegations have said that one of the achievements has been "not to break off the negotiations until an agreement is reached."

In this regard, Sandinist Deputy William Ramirez, president of the National Assembly's Transportation Commission, said: "The first party to abandon the talks loses."

Following the first two recesses in the talks, the participants pointed out that the most difficult points are the ones having to do with the repeal of the vehicle ownership tax, which prompted the serious conflict. The official delegation pointed out that President Violeta Chamorro temporarily suspended the application of the tax, but the strikers demand its definitive elimination. The government delegation also believes it will be "very difficult to resolve" the strikers' demand that the government reduce fuel prices, which were recently increased by 13.5 percent.

Deputies, who are members of the National Assembly's Transportation Commission and are participating as hosts, said progress has been made on the transportation sector's demands to withdraw a draft bill on cooperatives submitted by the executive branch. The strikers are also demanding a new law for the transportation sector and for cooperatives. They want this law drafted with the participation of leaders of the transportation sector and the cooperatives.

The strikers are demanding a program to regulate the country's transportation, and they are opposing the existence of parallel bus routes. They want the government to grant financing for the import of machinery and supplies for cooperatives.

Among the problems that have emerged at the negotiating table is who will represent the government in signing possible agreements to ensure the agreements are observed. The strikers believe it should be President Chamorro herself. [passage omitted on background, exchange of accusations between government and FSLN]

Talks Hit Impasse

PA2309132993 Managua Radio Nicaragua Network in Spanish 1227 GMT 23 Sep 93

["Special news bulletin" by Ernesto Garcia from the National Assembly—live relay]

[Text] Good morning. The talks under way since yesterday afternoon between representatives of the transportation workers' National Strike Committee and the Nicaraguan Government, which is represented by the ministers of finance, labor, and transportation, remain at a standstill.

So far the most contentious point preventing the signing of an agreement between transportation workers and government authorities is the workers' nearly inflexible demand that the price of gasoline be reduced from 14.70 cordobas to 11.70 cordobas. Government officials say this cannot be done because it lead to a reduction of revenue estimated at 80 million cordobas a month, which is more than 50 percent of the health budget.

Meanwhile, it has been reported that the transportation workers' other demands have been met by government authorities. According to what the Nicaraguan Government has offered transportation workers, they practically will not have to pay any single tax whatsoever. Even taxes paid for traffic jams at entry points to certain cities would be completely repealed, according to the government proposal.

We reiterate once again that the issue blocking the signing of agreements since the afternoon of 22 September between government authorities and transportation workers is the price of gasoline. Transportation workers are demanding that gasoline prices be set at the previous price of 11.70 cordobas, while authorities say this is impossible. Authorities say the price of gasoline should be maintained at 14.70 cordobas.

Government sources contend a reduction in the price of gasoline would represent a severe blow to the Republic's budget and would result in losses estimated at about 80 million cordobas a month. This would force the government to cut the number of its public employees in half. As Nicaraguans believe, we must choose between the lesser of two evils: The government must either meet the demands of transportation workers or maintain current prices. If gasoline prices were to be reduced to 11.70 cordobas, 50 percent of government employees could wind up unemployed.

Everything indicates the Nicaraguan Government is not ready to throw half of all government workers into unemployment. Let us go back to studios.

EPS 'Has No Plans' To Intervene

PA2409050093 Managua EL NUEVO DIARIO in Spanish 23 Sep 93 p 13

[Report by Aura Lila Moreno]

[Text] Major General Joaquin Cuadra, chief of staff of the Armed Forces, has said that the Sandinist People's Army [EPS] has no plans to intervene against the protesting public vehicle owners, because the situation has not yet exceeded the National Police's capability.

Minister of the Presidency Antonio Lacayo has confirmed this by saying President Violeta Barrios will not call in the EPS unless the police feel the critical situation of violence that occurred in Managua in the past few days gets out of hand.

Although the police have had no problems in handling the situation so far, Gen. Cuadra said the EPS has kept continually in touch with the police in case reinforcements are required.

According to Cuadra, the EPS objects firmly to the use of violence in protests and social struggle. He admitted, however, that the country is experiencing a very difficult situation due to the social and economic crisis.

"We support the efforts of several political circles and the government to prioritize a negotiated solution to the problems," Gen. Cuadra said, adding that the use of violent methods work to the detriment of the protests carried out for social and economic improvements.

After several days of failing to show up in public, the journalists took advantage of Minister Lacayo's presence at Commander Saul Alvarez' funeral and asked him about the executive's official stand regarding the recent acts of violence.

"We have always favored the conflicts between Nicaraguans being settled in the framework of law," Lacayo said. He said the government has never agreed with

those who mistake the right to strike for the alleged right to do violence and perpetrate "actions completely in violation of public order."

Lacayo bitterly criticized Daniel Ortega, secretary general of the Sandinist National Liberation Front, who blamed the government for the bloody 21 September events. "Incredibly, while Alvarez' body was still bleeding, former president Ortega made utterly reckless and unreasonable remarks," the minister said.

Lacayo said that Ortega, with his remarks, attempted to profit from the just grief of the police and all Nicaraguans for political purposes."

Ortega has insisted, however, that President Chamorro and Minister Lacayo are the true culprits of Commander Alvarez' death. Not only that, Ortega said Chamorro "is staining her hands full with blood, just as Somoza did."

"The criminal is the government with its economic policy, which is starving the people to death," Ortega reiterated. He said he will continue to back the strikers, whose delegates to the National Transport Commission were still talking with the government and National Assembly deputies at press time.

FSLN Demands Continued Protests

PA2309182893 Managua BARRICADA in Spanish 23 Sep 93 p 12

[Communique issued by the Secretariat of the National Directorate of the FSLN in Managua on 22 September]

[Text] The FSLN National Directorate, in view of the latest events that have shaken the country, states the following:

1. It reiterates its total and unconditional support for the just struggle of the transportation sector and of the public in general.

2. It blames the government of Mrs. Barrios de Chamorro for all the incidents of violence that have occurred in the country, because these incidents are the result of the stubborn application of economic policies that damage the interests of the people and society, and they are leading the country into a situation of hunger, desperation, and violence.

3. It regrets the death of Sandinist comrade Saul Alvarez and comrade Romelda Martinez, as well as injuries incurred by a large number of people during the people's protests, and it extends its condolences to the relatives of comrade Saul Alvarez, brothers, officers, and soldiers of the National Police, as well as to the relatives of comrade Romelda Martinez.

4. It calls on all militant Sandinists and the people in general to continue to fully participate in the protests in a firm and civic manner until the total repeal of the Vehicle Ownership Tax is attained, and until the taxes added to the price of license plates and the increase in fuel prices are rescinded.

5. The FSLN National Directorate expresses its support and trust in the commanders, officers, and soldiers of the National Police, whose revolutionary and Sandinist roots are a guarantee that the aforementioned armed institution will not be an instrument of those who want to mercilessly impose their economic and socioeconomic policies against the Nicaraguan people. It calls on the population to act with respect and not contribute to campaigns that can discredit our brothers in the National Police.

[Issued] Managua, 22 September 1993, Free Fatherland or Death!

[Signed] Secretariat of the FSLN National Directorate

Chamorro Decree Suspends Tax

PA2309145793 Managua Radio Nicaragua Network in Spanish 1100 GMT 23 Sep 93

[Presidential Decree No. 38-93 issued in Managua on 22 September; read by an official of the Presidency's Press and Information Directorate; from the "This Morning" Newscast—recorded]

[Text] Presidential Decree No. 38-93

The President of the Republic of Nicaragua

Whereas:

1. As a result of Decree 6-93 dated 10 January 1993, an annual tax known as the Land Vehicle Ownership Tax was levied on the ownership of all land vehicles.

2. The government of the Republic, attending to suggestions made by the various sectors of the country, and particularly the proposal by the National Assembly Board of Directors, which recommended the temporary suspension of Decree No. 6-93 until a time at which an alternate tax can be found, has decided to follow the aforementioned recommendations and suspend the application of the decree until a time at which an equivalent tax or another type of satisfactory solution can be found.

Therefore, in exercise of the authority granted by the Constitution, the president has decided to issue the following decree temporarily suspending the Land Vehicle Ownership Tax:

Article 1. Temporarily suspend the application of Decree No. 6- 93 of 10 January 1993 as published in Official Gazette No. 7 of 20 January, and better known as Land Vehicle Ownership Tax.

Article 2. The current decree becomes effective as of its public announcement via any news media, and it will subsequently be published in the Official Gazette.

[Dated] Managua, Presidential Palace, 22 September 1993

[Signed] Violeta Barrios de Chamorro, president of the Republic of Nicaragua

Presidency Draws Up Amnesty Law 163

PA2409041393 Managua Radio Nicaragua Network in Spanish 2005 GMT 23 Sep 93

[Text of Law 163, issued by the Nicaraguan Government and read by Dr. Francis Silva of the Presidential Palace's Information and Press Office, in Managua on 23 September 1993—recorded]

[Text] Law 163. The Nicaraguan president hereby announces to the Nicaraguan people that, because Law 163 was partially vetoed by the president of the Republic on 31 August and because this veto was approved in the National Assembly's session eight held on 1 September, the law shall read as follows:

Whereas—1. The government has prioritized Nicaragua's participation in the national reconciliation to gradually eliminate the ideological and political confrontations that have marked this country for over 100 years of independent life.

2. According to this spirit, the government succeeded in demobilizing close to 22,000 Nicaraguan Resistance [RN] members in 1990, gradually reduced the Army over the next two years, and in 1992 demobilized and disarmed thousands of former Sandinist People's Army [EPS] and RN members who had assumed arms to defend their personal rights or safety.

3. This disarmament and pacification process is now threatened by the presence of nearly 1,400 rearmed men who, defying government authorities and ignoring the constant appeals to peace, are still active in several regions of the country, particularly the northern area, where more and more are assuming typically criminal positions.

4. The agricultural and livestock producers of these regions, as well as the country's leading political circles, have again and again demanded that the government act firmly and end this situation, restoring the necessary stability and security for a successful crop for the good of the entire country.

5. The government, aware of the special postwar situation the country is facing, has first always sought dialogue, understanding, and tolerance, thus avoiding to the utmost of its ability the legitimate use of force by authorities responsible for maintaining public order and social peace. This strategy has resulted in the gradual depolarization of Nicaraguan society and the reinsertion to the civilian life and production activities of thousands of Nicaraguans who until a few years ago fought and killed one another.

6. During this special postwar period Nicaragua is experiencing, the economic reactivation is of great importance. It necessarily requires the participation of the country, national reconciliation, and the reinsertion to civilian life of the largest possible number of former combatants and rearmed individuals. This can be preferably achieved through the voluntary demobilization of former combatants rather than through the use of public force, which leads to the loss of more Nicaraguan lives and an atmosphere of anxiety and distress in the production areas of the country. In doing so, the government will not relinquish its decision to impose severe sanctions against those who ultimately refuse to end their criminal actions and return peacefully to a normal life.

7. After a serious in-depth study and analysis of the current situation, the conclusion has been reached that to achieve the maximum results of the plan—fostered by the government at the request of the productive and social sectors as well as the political parties—to guarantee life and work and to avoid the rearmed's continuation to commit crimes, it would be convenient to obtain their peaceful reinsertion into civilian life; therefore, it is absolutely necessary to offer them a last opportunity for their voluntary reinsertion by granting the rearmed pardon for the political crimes. This is with the understanding that the definite action taken by the Armed Forces against those who do not accept will be politically and legally justified. This action is to effectively restore public order and grant the citizens safety.

8. Recent kidnappings in Quilali and Managua that were peacefully solved through the cooperation of the most representative political forces of the nation, in agreement with the government and with Cardinal Obando y Bravo's mediation, served to disclose that the war is still possible; therefore, it is necessary to ease the tension by securing the disarmament and the immediate control of all the rebel forces that exist, independent of their political ideologies, demands, and violent background.

9. The above mentioned are the reasons on which is based the decision to extend the amnesty. Moreover, this is a political commitment made by the government to the perpetrators of the Quilali and Managua kidnappings and endowed by the main political forces of the nation. This goal will be achieved by extending the deadlines that were originally granted in the draft bill previously sent by the executive so that this pardon may contribute to laying down the foundation for an understanding among the nation's diverse sectors. This is now a nationwide clamor.

The Presidency, in use of its faculties, has drawn up the following amnesty law:

Article 1. That broad amnesty be granted to the Nicaraguans who are up in arms due to political motives or socioeconomic demands, as of 28 August 1993 in the Matagalpa, Jinotega, Esteli, Madrid, Nueva Segovia,

Boaco, Chontales, and the north-south Atlantic Autonomous regions. All of this in agreement with the corresponding lists and registers that the special disarmament brigade has.

Article 2: This amnesty covers political and common crimes committed by 28 August 1993, except crimes of war and against humanity, according to international law.

Article 3: The benefits included in the two previous articles only cover those rebels who voluntarily demobilize and turn in their weapons and military equipment no later than (?15 September) 1993, as long as they have already entered the previously established security zones by the Government Ministry no later than 28 August.

These security zones were publicly listed at Waswali Military Base on 18 May 1993. These benefits also include those up in arms who have demobilized and turned in their military equipment to the BED in a period between 18 May 1993 and the date this law takes effect.

Article 4: In connection with the preceding article, the Government Ministry is empowered to issue the demobilization letter, which accredits those up in arms in the previously listed departments who have taken up the amnesty granted through this law.

Article 5: The benefits of this amnesty cover Nicaraguans who belong to irregular groups of the self-described 3-80 Northern Front and Dignity and Sovereignty Command for political and common crimes committed in connection with the kidnappings that took place in August 1993 in El Sungano, Quilali, and at the National Opposition Union, UNO headquarters in Managua. There is no further need to comply with additional requirements, except to voluntarily take up amnesty, stating so before the Government Ministry representative accredited to this task and afterward to obtain the demobilization credential mentioned in the preceding article in this law.

Article 6: This law does not affect the functions and intentions of the Tripartite Commission created by the Verification Protocol on 2 October 1992 to clarify events and cases submitted for consideration and for determining subsequent responsibility.

Article 7: This law will become effective from the date it is published by any media, regardless of its later publication in the official gazette.

Issued at the National Assembly in the City of Managua, on 17 August 1993, thus overriding the 1 September 1993 veto.

[Signed] Gustavo Tablada Zelaya, president of the National Assembly; Francisco Duarte Tapia, secretary of the National Assembly.

It has thus become law of the Republic. For publication and implementation.

[Issued] Managua, 20 September 1993.

[Signed] Violeta Barrios de Chamorro, president of the Republic of Nicaragua.

* Sergio Ramirez Seeks Amnesty for All

93CA0188B Managua BARRICADA in Spanish 6 Aug 93 p 9

[Article by Sergio Ramirez]

[Text] The front-page editorial in Wednesday's edition of LA PRENSA uses pure rhetoric to try to rebuff my arguments of peace in favor of amnesty without discrimination. I simply want to make the hotheaded editorialist face the facts: What I am asking for is amnesty for everyone, not just one group. I am not only seeking amnesty for the Sandinists who have risen up in arms, but for the old Contras who have also taken up arms. I want it for "the Jackal" [El Chacal] and Nortiel, who have frequently appeared as heroes in the pages of LA PRENSA. And I am asking people to forgive and forget the crimes which they and their followers have committed in rural areas: kidnappings, murders, robberies, rapes, and extortion, crimes also committed by the other side.

It would never have occurred to me to propose an amnesty that would exclude the *Recontras* and benefit only the *Recompas*. I do not believe that hounding the Jackal to death serves any purpose because his place will be taken by other armed "Jackals." Nor do I think much good is done by piling up criminal trials against him and his men so that we may find comfort in the idea that there is no impunity.

What I do want is for peace to be restored in our rural areas, for peasant families to live in peace, for producers to harvest their crops free of danger, for our roads to be free of attacks and ambushes, for farmers to be able to plant and harvest their crops without fear, for there to be an end to the political and personal vendettas that are now solved by shootouts.

How can this be achieved? By filling those same fields and roads with bodies? By cramming peasants, Recompas and Recontras alike, into our jails? I do not think so. First of all, the promises made to all those who laid down their arms should be kept, or we should never have made promises that could not be kept! Resources should have been funneled into those impoverished regions in the form of food, implements and tools, and credits in order to relieve their misery. Granting title to land should have been handled in a faster and more effective way.

But I am not a member of the government and I could not and cannot achieve this. What I can do, from the National Assembly, is vote for an Amnesty Law that provides those who have risen up in arms—all of them, without exception—with an opportunity to return home,

to their land if they have any, without their weapons, stripped of their instruments of murderous violence. That is all I want.

But the EL PRENSA writer seems to seek the exact opposite, with tinges of revenge: No one should be disarmed so that violence may continue unchecked while the deaths pile up. Let disorder and chaos spread so that in the end, anarchy will justify the arrival of foreign troops of intervention, the Blue Helmets now sought with so much joy, albeit hypocritical, never Christian, joy.

That is not what I want; I reject it. I want peace and I am going to do everything I can to help restore safety and peace to the rural areas of Nicaragua. For me, that is justice. Anything else is crime.

* H. Ortega's Removal Called 'Necessity'

93CA0188A Managua LA TRIBUNA in Spanish 6 Aug 93 p 11

[Article by Emilio Alvarez Montalvan]

[Text] The speech delivered on 30 July by General Humberto Ortega is shot through with militarism, the terrible plague that has devastated the history of our ill-fated country. We have once again witnessed the beginning of the historical vicious circle: the current head of the Armed Forces condemning the normal legal activities of our political parties as subversive, while the latter in turn quite rightly demand the resignation of the intrusive military chief. In the past, it has been a fight always won by the military man who ascended to his post by the force of arms. This time, General Ortega will have to submit to civil society. In any other country, the general's speech would have resulted in his immediate removal.

We say this because the style of this "new proclamation" by General Ortega reveals his situation of isolation or near desperation, as he issues reprimands right and left. Not even his colleagues are safe. His old quarrel with Major Borge has finally surfaced. Yesterday UNO [National Opposition Union] and COSEP [High Council on Private Enterprise] asked that he be removed from the post he occupies. Last week, a group of former EPS [Sandinist People's Army] soldiers challenged his leadership in Esteli and this morning, Carlos F. Chamorro recommended that H. Ortega "make room for the selection of a new commander, in accordance with the procedure established by law once such a law has been passed by the Assembly." The height of Ortega's abuse was to label the request for a partial or total reform of the political constitution or any request for Cabinet changes as contrary to public order.

Humberto's basic vision of this period of transition is eminently obstructionist. Nothing must be touched, nothing must be changed, everything must stay as it is. But it is the precise opposite that is true. The transition to democracy in all countries that have gone through it is an eminently dynamic phase in which progress is achieved daily, while making corrections in the disastrous preceding regime. This is the framework for the proclamations, manifestos, open council meetings, and mass demonstrations announced by UNO that inspire so much fear into the would-be dictator.

The military speechifier should expand his knowledge of the political history of other countries that have experienced our tribulations. In Spain, for example, more and more elections began to be held following Franco's death. In a scant six years, from 1976 to 1982, two referendums and three general elections took place. Felipe Gonzalez emerged victorious from the last of these, the transition came to a close, and a stable Spain emerged. This continuing exercise involving the people vitalized the political parties and subordinated the Armed Forces to civilian power.

Nor is that all. H. Ortega's role cannot be properly understood separately from that of his political partner Antonio Lacayo. This collusion is responsible for the failure of the first phase of the Nicaraguan transition. President Chamorro's dilemma is to recognize this and send both of them packing.

* Ortega-Ramirez Polemic Reported

* Background Explained

93CA0190A Managua LA PRENSA in Spanish 30 Jul 93 p 20

[Article by Pedro J. Chamorro]

[Text] A clash between supporters of two members of the National Board of the Sandinist Front, Sergio Ramirez and Daniel Ortega, has come to light with the publication of recent articles in three of the media allied with Sandinism: EL SEMANARIO, BARRICADA, and EL NUEVO DIARIO.

On one side, the editor in chief of EL SEMANARIO, Erick Aguirre, blames Daniel Ortega Saavedra, secretary general of the FSLN [Sandinist National Liberation Front], for the deaths in Esteli, which Aguirre attributes to Ortega's incendiary speech on 19 July, several days before the events in Esteli. And as if that were not enough, Aguirre suggests that what Ortega really needs is a psychiatrist.

Aguirre says: "With the UNO [National Opposition Union] refusing to engage in dialogue, Godoy talking with armed rebels, with Somozists who would like to do away with Sandinism, and also with the government, 29 Sandinists lit the fuse, and to add the finishing touch, Daniel Ortega dramatically announced the end of the government. What else could be expected? Only Esteli."

He adds: "They are the people responsible for the deaths. If no one else will dare to say this, I will. The attitude of a "political leader" who first turns over power peacefully and later, barely halfway through a presidential term,

acting out of desperation encourages an insurrection, seems absurd to me. That seems to me worthy only of unstable minds who really need help."

Discussing the obvious internal differences within the Sandinist leadership, Aguirre notes: "If I am not mistaken, the sensible statement released by the Sandinist Front after the events in Esteli was not the result of any participation by those people. At least one sensible person, even though he may be implicated through his passivity, is still left in the National Board of the Sandinist Front. I have even heard rumors that that statement was internally denounced by the FSLN's top leaders."

Sandinism's radical sector did not take long to rally in defense of Daniel Ortega: EL SEMANARIO of Thursday, 29 July was still nearly hot off the press when a letter attacking Aguirre was hastily published in today's BARRICADA. The letter, published in a box, was signed by Carlos Guadamuz, Dionisio Marenco, Manuel Espinoza Enriquez, and Julio Lopez Campos.

In the letter, the signers say that "with something beyond astonishment we read in your lengthy editorial in the latest issue of EL SEMANARIO that you hold "Comandante Daniel Ortega, secretary general of the FSLN, particularly responsible for the deaths in Esteli."

The signers add: "We are sure that such a criminal accusation against Sandinist comrades, and against the secretary general of the FSLN, could not appear in EL SEMANARIO, written by its editor in chief, through a spirit of improvisation."

Displaying the internal struggle between the moderate Sergio Ramirez and the radical Daniel Ortega for control of the FSLN, the signers of the letter opposing EL SEMANARIO's editor question accusingly:

"We wonder: what may be the purpose of such an irresponsible charge in a paper when the president of its board is a member of the National Leadership of the FSLN, Comrade Sergio Ramirez?"

The signers of the letter then remind journalist Erick Aguirre that the two proposals Ortega made on 19 July were the creation of a National Unity Government to resolve the political crisis and a suggestion that the Sandinist Assembly convene an Extraordinary Congress of the FSLN.

As if that were not enough, an editorial published today in EL NUEVO DIARIO, a paper linked with the radical trend of Sandinism, and signed by Francisco Bravo Lacayo, states:

"The tragedy that last week struck the three times (or four times) heroic city of Esteli has had devastating effects on the government, on the EPS [Sandinist People's Army], and on the members of the Sandinist Front."

Bravo says that after Esteli "the EPS was left in a false position in relation to the people, who accuse it of having forgotten its origins and defending a government that does not even offer crumbs to the hungry."

"As for the Sandinists," says Bravo in his article, "there are many who have lost their sense of direction and lash out against everything and against everyone, doing a great favor to their enemies who dream of seeing the Front shattered into a thousand fragments."

In his attack on the government, Bravo argues that the events in Esteli "forced the government to show its readiness to use military force to stifle social outbursts, as it has no arguments that can respond to the people's urgent needs."

* Esteli Blamed on Ortega

93CA0190B Managua EL SEMANARIO in Spanish No 146, 29 Jul-4 Aug 93 p 2

[Commentary by Erick Aguirre]

[Text] Very often in Nicaragua people resort to a foolish habit: citing—as a sort of endorsement or ethical support—the views of the "independent press" of the United States. Those views—I will mention as an example THE NEW YORK TIMES' editorials on Nicaragua—because of the distance involved, contain many angles which we, as a nation so concentrated within itself, sometimes overlook.

But on occasion the errors are glaring. This is also caused by the distance involved, in addition to the hypersubjectivity and the prejudices of some of their informants. That is the case of the ridiculous assertion that the bloody and deplorable events in Esteli formed part of a premeditated plan worked out "at the highest levels of the Army." If it were not for the gravity of the case, we would treat this as a joke, and a joke in bad taste.

I do not know if Maria Elvira Salazar was persuasive enough for them. She, more than any U.S. journalist, could state unequivocally that the missiles that passed over her head were not precisely pieces of candy. Stephen Kinzer sent reports to the TIMES about contra ambushes of civilian transport vehicles, written when he was safe in his house in Managua a few blocks from Chipote. And at times he suggested that these were Sandinist propaganda ploys, maybe because he was not there to recoil in horror before the dead bodies and the odor of burned flesh.

What I am speaking about is an example of the confusion (even worse than it was before) concerning the political and economic panorama in this country. That is why the events in Esteli gave rise to so many stories and why the most dissimilar interpretations have been woven about them.

It is said that there were deaths, and so there were. Dozens of deaths, including many citizens, civilians caught in the crossfire—they are the depressing outcome

of the political irresponsibility of the top leaders. For all the public arguments I have heard are diluted in ambiguities and in a useless theater which seeks to distribute the blame among many parties, while no one is pointing an accusing finger at the politicians' influence on the population, and the responsibility they bear for stirring up the people.

I hold the view that the demands of the rebel "recompas" are just (they are the same as those of the "recontras" and of almost all the population). I also agree that they do not justify the methods used, even though they may be "in final and desperate straits." It also seems to me that the personal actions of many of the Army and Police troops who used military force to put down the men of Pedro "the Honduran" were excessive. But enough of that. I am not trying to lay the blame for this bloody battle on either of the two sides. The blame (for the deaths, the bloodshed, the chaos, the political regression) belongs elsewhere. It lies with the political irresponsibility of those who want to continue being leaders of great social forces caught in a desperate situation.

I do not believe it is sensible—even though there was a brief mention during the exalted rhetoric, almost by chance, of the ideal of "continuing the struggle by peaceful means"—to deliver such harangues to such a large, scattered, and at times uncontrollable force as Sandinism, in the way in which harangues were delivered by most of the speakers (whose degree of responsibility will have to be determined) on 19 July.

They stirred up the crowd, and were blinded to reason. They did not realize that all those people came to the Plaza not to see the pretty faces of any of their prematurely weakened leaders, but because of the political feelings generated by the very fact of the Revolution, through nostalgia for their aborted dream, aborted in part by the U.S. financing of an unjust and hateful war, but also in part by the inability of the revolutionary leaders who once again led us astray.

In EL SEMANARIO we have recently been warning the government about the powder keg smoldering in western and northern Nicaragua, due to the government's lack of response and its failure to keep its promises. But they did not listen, and then the first shot was fired.

With the UNO refusing to engage in dialogue, Godoy talking with armed rebels, with Somozists who would like to do away with Sandinism, and also with the government, 29 Sandinists lit the fuse, and to add the finishing touch, Daniel Ortega dramatically announced the end of the government. What else could be expected? Only Esteli.

They are the people responsible for the deaths. If no one else will dare to say this, I will. The attitude of a "political leader" who first turns over power peacefuly and later, barely halfway through a presidential term, acting out of desperation encourages an insurrection, seems absurd to me. That seems to me worthy only of unstable minds who really need help.

If I am not mistaken, the sensible statement released by the Sandinist Front after the events in Esteli was not the result of any participation by those people. At least one sensible person, even though he may be implicated through his passivity, is still left on the National Board of the Sandinist Front. I have even heard rumors that that statement was internally denounced by the FSLN's [Sandinist National Liberation Front] top leaders.

What tranquility: on one side allowing the so-called "cogovernment," and on the other sabotaging—by manipulating their grass roots—the confused economic reforms of a legitimately elected government. And as soon as the Plaza was full, they seemed to be once again on the road to victory, and with the ease afforded by their influence over politically uneducated forces, brought about chaos and political regression, but above all, unfortunately, more deaths and more bloodshed. The Army went too far, it is true, but after irregular groups linked with Sandinism—the "recontras" could not have done this—took over a departmental headquarters (the contras did not do that in times when they had great financial support from the United States), the reaction of an Army accused of being a Sandinist and not a national Army, had to be energetic. Daniel Ortega himself said they do not want "blue berets" here. But if they do not want them, the Army must act in some way, otherwise the government, with an Army tolerant of rebels of its own political stripe, would have no other option but to call for the assistance of UN troops.

In any event, the blame lies with the irresponsibility with which political influence is being wielded. And in not perceiving its own decline.

* Aguirre Article Rejected

93CA0190C Managua BARRICADA in Spanish 30 Jul 93 p 12

[Letter to EL SEMANARIO editor Erick Aguirre by Carlos Jose Guadamuz, Dionisio Marenco, Manuel Espinosa Enriquez, and Julio Lopez Campos]

[Text] A recent article published in EL SEMANARIO by its editor in chief, Erick Aguirre, holding the secretary general of the FSLN [Sandinist National Liberation Front], Daniel Ortega, jointly responsible for the events in Esteli, drew a reaction from a group of Sandinists. Their response to Aguirre's article follows:

Managua, 29 July 1993 Mr. Erick Aguirre Editor in chief of EL SEMANARIO Dear Mr. Aguirre:

The people of Nicaragua and Sandinists in particular are accustomed to hearing from imperialists of the ultraright like Jesse Helms and the Godoy-Aleman faction that in Nicaragua we Sandinists are responsible for the suffering and poverty in which the Nicaraguan people live.

However, with something beyond astonishment we read in your lengthy editorial in the latest issue of EL SEMANARIO that you hold "Comandante Daniel Ortega,

secretary general of the FSLN, particularly responsible for the deaths" in Esteli. You write:

"The blame (for the deaths, the bloodshed, the chaos, the political regression, belongs elsewhere...29 Sandinists lit the fuse, and to add the finishing touch, Daniel Ortega dramatically announced the end of the government. What else could be expected? Only Esteli." And in the next paragraph you write: "They are the people responsible for the deaths. If no one else will dare to say this, I will. The attitude of a "political leader" who first turns over power peacefully and later, barely halfway through a presidential term, acting out of desperation encourages an insurrection, seems absurd to me."

We are sure that such a criminal accusation against Sandinist comrades, and against the secretary general of the FSLN, could not appear in EL SEMANARIO, written by its editor in chief, through a spirit of improvisation."

We wonder: what may be the purpose of such an irresponsible charge in a paper when the chairman of its board of directors is a member of the National Board of the FSLN, comrade Sergio Ramirez?

You are certainly aware that on 19 July Comandante Ortega made two proposals in the Plaza: 1. The formation of a National Unity Government to resolve the nation's crisis politically; and 2. A proposal that the Sandinist Assembly convene an Extraordinary Congress of the FSLN.

Comandante Ortega made these proposals in a context that clearly rejected violence. In the hearing of all those present, he said energetically: "So that war will never return, let war never return to Nicaragua." He clearly emphasized the political proposal of the National Unity Government, saying: "We are not proposing to take over the government. No, we Sandinists are convinced that as we left the government through votes, we are going to return to the government through votes. Repeatedly he insisted in his speech that the struggle should take place in the context of legality. As he said: "With all of us united and mobilized, we will be able to promote the change that the country is urgently crying out for, within the constitutional and legal framework, so that then a New National Unity Government may emerge."

Faced with this transparent civic position and a clear antiwar statement which Nicaragua witnessed, what reason may there be for you to cite Daniel as particularly responsible for the deaths in Esteli?

What political purposes will you pursue by unscrupulously manipulating the sorrow and blood of the dead to try to maintain a position that not even the right has dared to take?

We want to remind you that the right of everyone to hold and express his opinions freely, as well as the right to political disagreements both inside and outside the FSLN is one thing, but launching a criminal political accusation is something else.

In expressing to you our deepest rejection, we will leave it in the hands of Sandinism to calmly draw its conclusions and reject these views.

* Aguirre Responds

93CA0190D Managua BARRICADA In Spanish 31 Jul 93 p 12

[Article by EL SEMANARIO Editor Erick Aguirre]

[Text] In relation to the open letter signed by some media personnel concerning my article ("Political Irresponsibility" published in issue no 146 of EL SEMANARIO, I find it necessary to make the following statement: 1) This is not a matter, as it is stated, of an editorial position taken by EL SEMANARIO, whose editorial policy is clearly defined on page 6 of the same issue, where it normally and regularly appears. It is, as may be supposed, an article expressing my personal opinion which appeared in the column "From the Editor's Desk," a section in which editors of this newspaper customarily express their own personal views on national events. 2) It was not my intention to make personal accusations against anyone in particular. That this country's political leaders should be more careful in using the influence which they have over their followers in a desperate and explosive economic and social situation is a position which I will continue to uphold. Unfortunately, in a few examples I went further than in others, that was all. 3) The fact that the majority of those who belong to this newspaper may hold political positions inclined toward or in sympathy with a specific political organization does not mean that EL SEMANARIO belongs to that organization. EL SEMANARIO is an independent newspaper belonging to the PECSA [Publications, Editions, and Communications, S.A.] group, and it has always tried to serve as a tribunal for the various trends of political and social thought coexisting in Nicaragua.

[signed by Erick Aguirre, Managua, 30 July 1993]

* Chamorro Urged To Take Control

93CA0188C Managua LA PRENSA in Spanish 8 Aug 93 pp 1, 10

[Editorial: "Dona Violeta, We Insist: This Is Your Moment!"]

[Text] On the heels of the latest actions and statements by the Sandinist Front (which says one thing and does another, a Front that has never told the truth yet and that pretends to be split in order to conceal its responsibilities), there can be no doubt any longer that its policy (changing, divided, united, with or without a mask) pursues no other goal than that of discrediting the government of Dona Violeta. That is why it blocks all her efforts aimed at the moral, political, and economic

recovery of Nicaragua, thus succeeding in isolating it from its own democratic forces with the help—who would believe it?!—of the minister of the president himself, whose policy (if suicide can be called a policy!) has been an inexplicable and unlimited concession to pressure from the Front until its defeat has been turned into victory.

Thanks to that policy, it is the Sandinist Front that once again has the initiative in history, as a result of which once again—and perhaps once and for all—it is Dona Violeta who has to take her place as the Supreme Authority, backed by all the power which the majority of the people bestowed upon her—and regain her authority for initiative in changing and rescuing Nicaragua.

There is not one inch of space where the Front has not placed the stamp of its lies, as a result of which, alert and alarmed, we are writing this editorial. Everything that it has denied: its commitment to the ETAS, its order to assassinate Pastora, its terrorist policy, its tragi-comedy in Esteli, its obvious vested interests, its millions from the *pinata* [Sandinist government's looting of houses and land following its election defeat] and post-pinata, its ominous silence (as a corruptor of justice) in the cases of Bermudez, Genie, Sequeira, and more than 100 leaders of the disarmed Resistance, and on and on, is common knowledge to the entire world. As a result of which—a thing unheard-of in the annals of journalism—the most reliable newspapers in the United States (such as THE NEW YORK TIMES and THE WASHINGTON POST) and more than a few in other parts of the world have reported and editorialized telling Dona Violeta, who still enjoys respect and consideration, everything that Nicaragua has been telling her for some time through the Church, the parties, the independent unions, her friends, and all the people: "Dona Violeta, please! Show some leadership!"

Put another way: "Dona Violeta, do not get burned because Nicaragua will get burned along with you! You received your power from the people, from the will of the people, which you were to exercise with a firm hand as the first woman in history to save democracy and not (as the enemy would have it) as the protector of terrorists and thieves.

"They try to hide behind the skirts of your dignity, throw their own garbage at you, as the Sandinists' posters in Esteli ungratefully proclaimed. Translated, this means: 'This is your moment!' The experience that you have acquired gives you more knowledge and strength to get your government on the right track and regain your image as a Central American leader! That is your banner and if you will but hoist it once again, the people will grant you their support with immense enthusiasm. The entire world wants you to be who you are.

"All of which means, perhaps, that your finest hour was not yesterday, but today, because time has stripped away the masks of the masters of deceit and corruption, allowing it to be the Lady in White who will also don the immaculate white, the color of honesty, diaphanousness, transparency, justice, and the rule of law in our besieged nation.

* Crimes Against Sandinists Go Unpunished

93CA0188D Managua BARRICADA in Spanish 12 Aug 93 p 11

[Article by Sergio Ramirez]

[Text] The state of law is springing leaks in Nicaragua because certain individuals are using it to suit their tastes and whims. To tailor laws to one's own measure has always been a source of violence, which we should have realized long ago. Such is the case of the armed attack on La Gateada: The Sandinists do not enjoy the right to a state of law.

At the instigation of extremist politicians, an armed band went into La Gateada to kill Sandinists, beginning with Celestino Garcia, the political secretary who miraculously escaped with his life, and to burn and destroy anything belonging to Sandinists. Who has been held accountable for these deeds? And where are the investigations aimed at finding the instigators, the intellectual authors behind these crimes?

For some, the "state of law" means blaming Sandinists, blacklisting them, executing them in their own homes along with their families. That is what happened in the mountains of Matagalpa and Jinotega. And if those who were ordered to go looking for Celestino did not kill him and his whole family, list in hand, it was because they simply were unable to do so.

But that is no state of law! It is impunity, for all the talk there is about it. Of course there should never be death squads that go around killing anti-Sandinists, but it is also important to be clear about the fact that we cannot accept as legitimate—or excusable—the fact that there are death squads killing Sandinists!

The hierarchy of the Catholic Church should back Bishop Vega, who has already condemned what happened in La Gateada, so there will be no doubt whatsoever about taking both sides. And the president of COSEP [High Council on Private Enterprise], who is always so ready to make condemnations and reports, should be forthcoming. So should the parties in UNO [National Opposition Union] and the anti-Sandinist human rights commissions, starting with the one headed by Lino Hernandez.

Furthermore, the investigations have to be thorough. If there are deputies and mayors involved in these incidents, the Ministry of Government must make that determination and the Office of Attorney General must bring them before the courts. The National Assembly must expel any member who is involved. That is what the state of law means, rather than everyone's individual conception of it, tailor-made. Or custom-made to bury his adversaries.

*** Politicians Fail To Address People's Needs**

93CA0188E Managua EL NUEVO DIARIO in Spanish 4 Aug 93 p 4

[Article by Eddy Maradiaga Brenes and Freddy Xavier Rodriguez]

[Text] After a careful reading of the article, "The 19 July Demonstration: What Does It Mean?", written by Adolfo Miranda Saenz and carried in the 25 July edition of EL NUEVO DIARIO, a number of concerns have formed in our minds that we would like to share with our readers at large.

In his article, Miranda sheds light on a number of undeniable truths with which we agree to a great extent and which we shall mention here, albeit briefly, due to a lack of space.

1—The Sandinist Front rallied some 60,000 persons on the 19th; Aleman about 15,000 on 11 July.

2—Aleman is the UNO [National Opposition Union] leader most capable of rallying followers. (We would add, "despite his cavemanlike reaction to all progress.")

3—Most Nicaraguans remain politically undecided.

4—The Sandinist Front is the largest, best organized, and most popular party in the country. (We believe it is the only one, despite the existence of Aleman's PLC [Constitutionalist Liberal Party]. The others do not represent the people, are made up of relatives and friends, are bureaucratic, and manage a quorum only to elect officers.)

Even though we agree with Miranda on these points, we cannot fail to state that there are elements and factors of analysis that the author forgot, whether consciously or unconsciously.

The fact is that the people of Nicaragua remain silent about their true feelings, letting them show from time to time and concealing them at others. What is certain is that those feelings exist, and yet the politicians have refused or have been unable to perceive them and, in their closed higher circles, worry only about drafting formulas that suit their individual interests and plans, totally ignoring the problems and feelings of the masses.

If the politicians of this country would spend a little time listening to the people, they might come to enlightening conclusions such as the following:

1—The number of demonstrators does not guarantee an election victory (let us recall 21 February 1990).

2—As the party of the majority and even though it rallied 60,000 persons, the Sandinist Front did not achieve the success attributed to it. Aleman achieved less.

3—Success belonged to the people of Nicaragua because thousands of Nicaraguans came together in a common search, the search for a leader, because they do not currently have a leader who responds to their interests. That is why persons of different political credos rally behind the Sandinist Front or Aleman (although we do not deny that the majority sympathize with the leader heading the event).

The people of Nicaragua, determined to find a leader and clear about their common problems, are gradually laying down their ideological differences and coming together as a single force in the rural areas and cities. This explains the widespread phenomenon of a united fight waged by Sandinist groups and resistance groups against the government, always at the grass-roots level.

4—Just as they did before defeating Somoza, our people are going through a critical political situation, and while some sectors want to move up the elections, the same thing would happen that happened before: The people would not have anyone to vote for. None of the leaders shows any real interest in helping the people out of their economic, political, and social dilemmas.

5—The failure of the politicians is so overwhelming that they are left with nothing to say and none of their rhetoric convinces the people, no matter what fine phrases they may utter. Their speeches are like the majority's stomachs: empty.

6—Nicaragua has grown tired of so much social psychology applied to inflame their passions in one direction or tone them down in another. With the best of all intentions, the masses would like to find someone among the politicians who would seize the opportunity to learn from them. No one so far has tried.

That is why they have stopped believing and why, deep inside, they have never believed in Lacayo's government. They do not believe in the National Directorate which, honestly speaking, has already fulfilled its historic role, a role that was admirable until Sapoa. Nor do they believe in the splinter groups that call themselves political parties.

7—The people have also stopped believing in the obliging Cardenal because they have discovered that he is just another demagogue who beats his chest while the blood of the people—never of the elite of any sector—continues to be shed, paying for his fancy vulgar art (the new cathedral), whence he can observe hundreds of children wandering around hungry and orphans robbed of their rights. Dario seemed to have known this character because somewhere in his works he says: "...the priest is also the ally of the executioners of the people. He chants his Tedeum and repeats his Paternoster (more for the millionaire than the disinherited."

8—The hunger and resulting prison now suffered by Nicaraguan society leaves a clear threat of the possibility of violent acts similar to or worse than what happened in Esteli. Society no longer wants any unnatural alliance or marriage between the government and the Sandinist leadership.

It wants neither malefactors nor consenters. It wants no mediators who hold its legal intentions and the use of its law. It does not need to be advised to abandon a strike or any other form of legal struggle. It has grown tired of mediations such as that of Wheelock Roman in the cane sector or of Ortega in any other sector supporting the signing of documents, from above, that continue to float down without ever landing.

9—If the politicians would only listen to the people, they would understand more deeply that Antonio Lacayo is skillful, as he has demonstrated that he is. He governs and coordinates persons no less intelligent, although he later privately excuses himself at his "working dinners" or with a phone call from Cancun.

10—Esteli is a reference point from which politicians may begin to meditate more responsibly. They should be aware that the people of Esteli and the entire country supported the cause but not the method of those who have taken up arms again. What our people need the most is a climate of peace, but hunger forces them to risk their lives.

That is why, if the existing problems are not corrected, there will remain the latent possibility of another Esteli. The people will then be ready to point out those guilty of manipulating the law from their positions of privilege and causing misfortune among the poor, who are always the ones to die. That is why Nicaragua is looking for a leader or for one who has been mistaken to return to the right path. To go on as we are at present would be fatal, an even deeper tragedy.

It is a national challenge.

Panama

Cruz Trial Begins; Defense Seeks U.S. Confirmation

PA2309161993 Panama City Telemetro Television Network in Spanish 1730 GMT 22 Sep 93

[Report by Juan Francisco Galdames from the "Telemetro, Reports" newscast]

[Excerpt] The trial of separated Attorney General Rogelio Cruz began today amid tight security and limited access to the media. Once the preliminary phase of the trial ended, Cruz's defense lawyers proceeded to present three motions, as permitted by law, which were subsequently rejected by Supreme Court Justice Aura de Villalaz.

The most significant motion was a request to extend the one-hour time limit for the defense to present its statements, as established for this type of trial. The defense attorneys consider this to be a vital motion because they argued they needed more time to establish Cruz's innocence.

In addition, the defense requested official confirmation from the U.S. Embassy, indicating that a note sent by Ambassador Deane Hinton to Cruz was not work-related but of a personal nature. [passage omitted]

Argentina

Senate Approves Social Security Reform Law

PY2309115693 Buenos Aires NOTICIAS ARGENTINAS in Spanish 0257 GMT 23 Sep 93

[Text] Buenos Aires, 22 Sep (NA)—Shortly before midnight the Senate approved the new social security reform bill establishing an optional capitalization system. The bill, sponsored by the executive branch, seeks to create a capital market to mobilize some $3 billion annually.

Justicialist senators and representatives of the Neuquen People's Movement voted for the reform, while Radicals [Radical Civic Union members] voted against it.

Pension Reform Bill 'Finally' Approved

PY2309223893 Buenos Aires BUENOS AIRES HERALD in English 23 Sep 93 pp 1, 11

[Text] (DYN-NA)—The pension reform bill was finally approved in the Senate before midnight last night after the government managed to overcome opposition from Radical senators and from within their own ranks who had requested a postponement of the vote until after October's elections.

The new law, which is due to come into force within a year, will allow pensioners the freedom to choose the social security system of their choice—either distributionist or capitalization—and most notably will raise the minimum retirement age.

According to the new legislation, as of 1994 women will be allowed to draw their pension at the age of 57 (currently the requirement is 55) and the minimum age for men will rise from 60 to 62. The law also dictates that the minimum retirement age will be subject to further rises in 1996 and 1998 with the result that by the end of the century men will retire at the age of 65 and women at 60.

In order to be eligible for a pension, it will be necessary to have paid a minimum of 30 years of contributions to the pension fund. Currently these contributions account for 10 percent of salary and under the new law this will increase to a deduction of 11 percent. Those earning in excess of 3,300 pesos a month will not have to pay higher contributions.

Once the new law comes into force, all employees will automatically be placed into a capitalization pension scheme unless they request to remain in the distributionist plan which will remain in the hands of the state.

However, while the Senate debate was in progress there were serious clashes outside Congress between a group of pensioners and the police. The pensioners had gathered in order to protest against their meagre social security payments and confronted the police throwing eggs and overturning several barricades.

It was later reported that several elderly people had fallen under the barricades and in the ensuing battle with the police, who were protecting the entrance to Congress, a 69-year-old man was injured and, after passing out, was taken to hospital in the company of pensioner activist Norma Pla.

After the disturbances, the press secretary of the National Coordination group for pensioners, Carlos Imizcoz, warned that "the government will pay dearly, for we shall be registering a protest vote on 3 October."

Foreign Bonds Issued in European Market

PY2309191793 Buenos Aires NOTICIAS ARGENTINAS in Spanish 1504 GMT 23 Sep 93

[Text] Buenos Aires, 23 September (NA)—The Economy Ministry has reported that Argentina today issued foreign bonds worth a total of 1 billion German marks, equivalent to $625 million, on the European financial market.

The term of issuance is five years and the rate is 8 percent per annum.

It was also reported that the performance of this bond is "250 points above those issued by the German Treasury for the same term."

This operation will close effective 5 October.

The Economy Ministry added that this transaction falls within the government strategy to finance itself at lower costs, expand Argentine investments, improve the maturity profile of Treasury obligations, and open new financial markets to Argentine private borrowers.

Provinces Forbidden From Borrowing Money Abroad

PY2409005593 Buenos Aires NOTICIAS ARGENTINAS in Spanish 2042 GMT 23 Sep 93

[Text] Buenos Aires, 23 Sep (NA)—Economy Minister Domingo Cavallo today announced that the federal government has forbidden provinces from borrowing money abroad without prior permission from the Federal Government.

Cavallo stated that the measure was taken in light of "a $60-million credit that Cordoba Province Governor Eduardo Angeloz secured on the international market, the interest on which is much higher than that obtained by the nation."

Cavallo said that Angeloz offered as collateral on the loan "funds that had been appropriated by the Federal Government to the province by virtue of the revenue-sharing agreement."

Bolivia

Congress To Study Letting U.S. Soldiers Stay Longer

PY2409024893 La Paz Television Nacional Network in Spanish 0100 GMT 24 Sep 93

[Report by Gabriela Orozco]

[Text] The national Congress will study whether the U.S. soldiers who came to our country a month ago will be allowed to extend their stay in order to train special antinarcotic forces in Beni Department.

Bolivian, Paraguayan Presidents Meet in Santa Cruz

PY2309202893 La Paz Television Nacional Network in Spanish 1700 GMT 23 Sep 93

[Text] The presidents of Paraguay and Bolivia, Juan Carlos Wasmosy and Gonzalo Sanchez de Lozada, respectively, are meeting right now in Santa Cruz de la Sierra, initiating an ambitious phase in the commercial and economic relations between the two countries.

The initial protocol meeting of the two heads of state took place at 1040 this morning at the Viru Viru international airport.

After attending the ceremonies at the Santa Cruz municipality and laying a wreath at the 24 de Setiembre Square, the two presidents and their entourages began a working meeting which is scheduled to last the entire afternoon. They are discussing bilateral issues.

Included in the agenda are vital points—of paramount importance—for the two nations, including the Paraguay-Parana waterway, the construction of the Transchaco highway, the sale of gas, and the sale of the iron ore in Mutun.

Brazil

Commission Studies Border Dispute With Uruguay

PY2409015593 Sao Paulo FOLHA DE SAO PAULO in Portuguese 21 Sep 93 Section 1 p 14

[Article by Gustavo Krieger]

[Text] Brazil and Uruguay are involved in a strange diplomatic duel. In the next few months a diplomatic commission formed with representatives from both countries will spend time and money to discuss the possession of a village of less than 1,000 inhabitants and a sand bank located at the mouth of Uruguay and Quarai Rivers. The sand bank that has an area of less than four hectares and disappears during the rainy season is claimed by the two countries.

The place known as "Ilha Brasileira" will change names if the Uruguayan Government effort succeeds. The issue was included in the agenda of the bilateral commission created last week by Brazil and Uruguay to discuss the development of the Quarai region.

The commission's problem will be a geographical one. It will have to determine if the small island is on the Uruguay River or the Quarai River. In the first case the island would be Uruguayan territory. In the second case it would be part of Brazil. It will be a difficult job because both rivers change course precisely at the point they meet.

The village called Vila Thomaz Albornoz is part of an area of 220 square km in the form of a triangle known in Brazil as "Rincao de Artigas."

The region has been considered Brazilian territory since the 1851 Treaty that defined the borders between Brazil and Uruguay. The area was not disputed for more than 100 years until Army Colonel Horacio Vicco, an Uruguayan geographer, published an article defending the theory that there was a "monumental geographical error" in the border definition. According to Vicco, the 1851 Treaty considered the wrong river branch as the border line. The commission that outlined the original treaty concluded that the "Invernada stream (small water current)" was the mouth of the Quarai River and, therefore, the border line. Uruguay maintains that the true mouth of the Quarai River is located a few kilometers up river, in a stretch parallel to the Brazilian town of Santana do Livramento.

PMDB Support for Government Reveals 'Disagreement'

PY2309130593 Rio de Janeiro O GLOBO in Portuguese 22 Sep 93 p 3

[Text] Brasilia—Participants in the PMDB [Brazilian Democratic Movement Party] meeting gave a standing ovation to Para State Governor Jader Barbalho's interpretation of the results of their voting: "The party has decided that it has its own candidate for the presidency."

It was the only moment of unanimity. Instead of a declaration, the party opted for a speech on the preservation of unity, which will probably last as long as the support for the administration does. No one within the PMDB doubts that the support for the government was caused by the disagreement between PMDB ministers and that this unity will last until just before the convention to elect a candidate to run for the presidency.

Former PMDB President Orestes Quercia, through his advisers, and Governor Luiz Antonio Fleury Filho, through private conversations, are no longer concealing that they are involved in a struggle for dominance of the PMDB. Quercia has associated himself with Senator Jose Sarney and Fleury with the so-called Pernambuco Group. Against the two will be the so-called historical

PMDB followers, headed by former government leader Pedro Simon and prefect Jarbas Vasconcellos.

The historical faction admits an understanding with Fleury, depending on the success of Minister Antonio Britto's administration, because Britto is their candidate to succeed Itamar Franco. The historical faction might even occupy a post in the government through Deputy Odacir Klein (RS) [Rio Grande do Sul], who is a candidate for one of the vacant ministries, probably the Agriculture Ministry. If Klein is appointed minister it will constitute additional support for the so-called "Britto project."

Yesterday, President Itamar Franco chose not to comment on the results of the PMDB National Council meeting, which decided to support his government.

Minister Explains Mechanism To Reduce Prices

PY2309130393 Sao Paulo O ESTADO DE SAO PAULO in Portuguese 22 Sep 93 Economic Section p B3

[Text] Brasilia—Yesterday, Finance Minister Fernando Henrique Cardoso confirmed that the government is thinking of negotiating with private companies a mechanism to reduce monthly adjustments to product prices. According to Cardoso, a measure like this one, if it is approved, will be negotiated with entrepreneurs because it is an economic team policy "to respect the market. Imposition is not the right way," Cardoso said.

The implementation of a mechanism to reduce adjustments to utility rates, and negotiations with private companies for the application of the same principle on prices, was admitted by Industry and Commerce Minister Eduardo Andrade Vieira. "What Minister Andrade said is that there is a spontaneous effort to implement that mechanism," Minister Cardoso said. He said President Itamar Franco has given him "full support" to increase interest rates every time the financial market acts speculatively on a possible increase or loss of government control over the rate of inflation. Cardoso announced the president's support during a ceremony to sign the renegotiation of 12 states' debts, two of them governed by the PMDB [Brazilian Democratic Movement Party], a party that in the past few days has been pressuring the government to implement measures to fight inflation.

Minister Cardoso took advantage of the opportunity to send a message to speculators: "Those who bet against the government will lose because the Central Bank has solid reserves and will not hesitate to push interest rates up." This was the first time that the minister had mentioned President Itamar Franco by name to assure people that the increase in interest rates is a government policy. During his speech the minister also talked about the difficulties in balancing this year's accounts, following the suspension of the Provisional Tax on Financial Operations (IPMF), and in covering a $20-billion deficit in the 1994 budget. Cardoso said the economic team is studying measures to avoid postponing the release of funds.

Yesterday Labor Minister Walter Barelli stated his support for the idea of implementing the mechanism to reduce adjustments to public utility rates, which would have an immediate effect on the price of other products. Barelli said he had always supported a measure such as this. He made these remarks before participating in a seminar at the Science and Culture Forum of Rio de Janeiro's Federal University, and suggested a more rigorous tracking of prices by the government in order for the mechanism to succeed.

According to Barelli, the adjustment of public salaries by 10 percent below the inflation rate two months ago should have produced a 2.25 percent per month price reduction, already assuming the inflation rate was 30 percent. The problem is, Barelli said, that "many companies are not adjusting their prices based on costs, but on what they expect the future inflation rate to be."

Barelli thinks that the use of the mechanism reducing prices is a way to give "justice to workers, who are paying more for products and receiving less with their salaries."

Paraiba State Agrees To Repay $1.1-Billion Debt

PY2409010393 Brasilia Voz do Brasil Network in Portuguese 2200 GMT 23 Sep 93

[Text] Another state has promised to repay its debt with the federal government: Paraiba Governor Ronaldo Cunha Lima has promised to pay up.

During a meeting today with Finance Minister Fernando Henrique Cardoso, the governor managed to reduced the debt by $300 million—the equivalent of the fines imposed on the state. The debt, which originally stood at $1.4 billion, thus dropped to $1.1 billion.

The governor says he wants to cooperate with the federal government and balance the country's finances.

[Begin Cunha Lima recording] It is of most interest to me. Today I disbursed 12 percent of my budget to repay the debt. After the rescheduling, I will pay 17 percent of my budget, while the cabinet established an 11-percent ceiling. I am spending 17 percent per month of my budget on the debt. [end recording]

The governor expects to sign the debt rescheduling agreement next Tuesday. Paraiba State refused to sign the agreement that 11 states and the federal district signed at the beginning of the week, because governor Cunha Lima said it was first necessary to revamp the debt figures.

Chile

President Aylwin Proclaims Fourth Labor Code Reform

PY2409025393 Santiago Television Nacional de Chile Imagen Internacional in Spanish 0100 GMT 24 Sep 93

[Text] President Patricio Aylwin today proclaimed the fourth labor reform. The initiative grants benefits to seasonal workers and domestic employees. In what has been called a cultural innovation—pay attention—parents are entitled to take leave if their child under one becomes sick.

More than 3.5 million workers will benefit from this bill. This is the fourth labor reform by which the labor code revision process sponsored by the government has been concluded. For example, as of now all workers, those with an either five- or six-day work week, will be entitled to 21 days of vacation per year, that is, three weeks.

Other good news is that the childbirth subsidy can be passed on to the father in case the mother dies. Mothers now will be able to pass on to the father the subsidy for the illness of a child younger than one. Another benefit for women is that the prohibition on women carrying out certain kinds of jobs just because they are women has been lifted.

Domestic employees who live in the house where they work are entitled to 12 hours of rest without interruption.

Seasonal workers were given the right to demand their contract within the first five days after labor relation begins.

[Begin Aylwin recording] The country has made progress, not through spectacular leaps, not through great victories of some people over others, but in an atmosphere of peace and understanding, in sustained progress that allows us to expect a better future for all our fellow countrymen. Thank you. [applause] [end recording]

Foreign Minister Silva Cimma Arrives in New York

PY2409013293 Santiago Radio Cooperativa Network in Spanish 2300 GMT 23 Sep 93

[Report by Fernando Reyes from New York]

[Text] Foreign Minister Enrique Silva Cimma this afternoon joined the 48th UN General Assembly. The activities of the United Nations proper are accompanied by other political activities, such as the meeting of the so-called Group of 15, which is made up of countries with a relatively higher level of development within the southern hemisphere. Chile has been recently incorporated into this group and Minister Silva Cimma was greeted when he joined the session. The minister said that despite the difficulties for President Patricio Aylwin to travel to India during December, the president was willing to go because the trip is an important step forward in the process of strengthening Chile's international relations.

According to the information released during the meeting of the Group of 15 today, President Aylwin will travel to India two or three days after the legislative and presidential elections in Chile.

* Aylwin Addresses Exporters' Concerns About Policies

93SM0408B Santiago EL MERCURIO in Spanish 13 Aug 93 p C2

[Text] President Patricio Aylwin has told Chilean exporters that he is fully aware of the need to modernize the foreign ministry so that its operations will focus on the realm of international economic relations on a priority basis, and more specifically, on the activities pertaining to the Chilean presence abroad.

He stressed that the government has already moved ahead with studies on this matter and expects, in the near future, to submit a draft law reorganizing the Ministry of Foreign Relations along the lines mentioned.

The chief executive also announced that his administration will hand on to the next government the studies needed to launch a broad reform of the state with a view to reducing the size of the public apparatus and making it more efficient.

President Aylwin made these statements in an address delivered last night at the Fifth Annual Meeting of the National Exporters' Corporation. This event was held at the Hotel Carrera and was attended by ministers of state, business leaders, outstanding professionals in the economic sector, and a large contingent of exporters.

Recognition awards were presented at the meeting to Minister of Economy Jorge Marshall and businessmen Roberto Fantuzzi, Jorge Prado, and Ernesto Ayala.

In the opening address at the ceremony, Ronald Bown, the president of the Corporation, outlined the main problems of concern to exporters, as well as some proposals designed to increase the competitive capacity of the Chilean economy.

In this connection, Bown described the need to expand the infrastructure effort and to establish a new legal framework allowing private investment into areas in which public investment is proving socially unprofitable.

Specifically, this leader said that is necessary to formalize a rational, pragmatic, and gradual policy for the expansion of our port capacity and the modernization of the administration of our maritime terminals with a view to reducing their costs.

Bown also renewed his organization's demand for adjustments in the foreign-exchange policy. He also

proposed changes in and greater emphasis on the modernization of the state apparatus, promotion of the foreign image of the country, quality certification, technological research, productivity, reduced taxation, and rationalization of public rates.

Finally, this official proposed that an index of competitive capacity be established to show the position of our economy in this sector in comparison with other countries. He also stressed the desirability of making a survey of all the exporters in order to obtain direct knowledge about their main concerns.

President Aylwin, for his part, delivered an address in which he described the international scene, domestic economic development, and the future challenges facing the country.

He emphasized the fact that the recession affecting the industrialized world has led the nations involved to opt for restrictive trade schemes and to search for protectionist formulas. He added that this situation has also led to the weakening of the multilateral trade organizations.

He explained the paralysis that has developed in the Uruguay Round negotiations of the GATT [General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade] because of the weakening of the economies of the most developed countries in terms of this context.

He did, on the other hand, note the prospects opening up for our country thanks to the dynamism being evidenced in the Asiatic world and the recovery of the Latin American economies.

Concerning the domestic sector, the chief of state mentioned the favorable indices of economic growth, the dynamism in investment, and the reductions in unemployment and poverty evident in the country.

He stressed that these achievements have contributed significantly to the dynamism seen in export activity, which has evidenced real growth averaging almost 11 percent per year in the past three years.

With regard to the concerns expressed by the exporters concerning the foreign-exchange problem, President Aylwin said that one of his government's goals has been to enable export activity to proceed with an exchange rate that will provide adequate remuneration for the production factors employed.

However, he emphasized that the value of our national currency cannot be separated from the development of our economy and its foreign accounts. "The solid situation of both reflects the effort being made by the fiscal and monetary authorities, which must be continued so as to avoid a development in our currency that could have an adverse effect on the development of exports," he said.

In the final portion of his speech, the chief of state spoke about the challenges the country must take up in order to proceed along its present developmental path.

In this connection, he said that Chile must continue its strategy of greater openness, devoting ever-increasing attention to what is happening in the various regions of the world.

He also outlined such tasks as the counteracting of the protectionist practices being pursued on the markets of the developed world, increasing the promotion of our image on other markets, working for better access to the developing markets, strengthening our competitive capacity, as a basic goal.

The chief of state suggested specific measures such as direct investments in other countries, while at the same time trying to develop more of a partnership and cooperation among the exporters.

He also discussed the need to make adjustments in certain segments of the production and marketing chain, to step up technological research, to ensure adequate quality control, and to perfect the contractual relationship between the producers and the exporters.

On the domestic level, he said, Chile is faced with the challenge of increasing labor productivity by investing more in labor training and education and improving our infrastructure.

In the final part of his address, President Aylwin said that we cannot postpone taking up such challenges as the modernization of the state, and within this context, the reorganization of the work of our foreign service.

"Where the Ministry of Foreign Relations is concerned, we are fully aware of the need to modernize the institution and to adapt its functions, not only in the traditional diplomatic sector, but also, and on a priority basis, in the international economic relations sector," he said.

"We share the belief that the Ministry of Foreign Relations should be the agency through which all of the activities expressing the Chilean presence abroad are implemented and carried out," he added.

The chief executive assured his audience that the government has moved ahead with studies on this matter and hopes to submit a draft law on the reorganization of the Ministry of Foreign Relations to the national Congress during this session.

Regarding the port sector, he urged that public and private activity be made complementary, with a view to increasing capacity and modernizing the administration in order to reduce costs.

Finally, he confirmed the fact that his government will hand on to the next administration well-advanced studies that will enable it to undertake a broad reform of the state. On this point, he noted the necessity of "approving the reforms required to create a smaller but more efficient state capable of measuring up to the demands of our times."

*** Military Prosecutor Annuls Indictment of DINA Agent**

93SM0408A Santiago EL MERCURIO in Spanish 28 Jul 93 p C16

[Text] Major (J) Raul Rozas, the military prosecutor, has voided the indictment of Colonel Fernando Laureani Maturana, who was an agent of the former DINA [National Intelligence Directorate] and was alleged to be author of the kidnapping of MIR [Movement of the Revolutionary Left] militants Jorge Elias and Juan Carlos Andronico Antequera, who disappeared in 1974.

The annulment was approved almost two weeks ago, but was not announced until yesterday, after the parties in the case had been notified. This case has been described as very important because it was the first involving arrests and disappearances in which a former agent of the DINA was charged. In similar cases in 1986, Judge Carlos Cerda had indicted members of the so-called "Joint Command," but these indictments were later revoked and the Amnesty Law applied.

The withdrawal of the charges filed came about, it has been learned, because of the contradictory statements made by some of the witnesses, in the opinion of the current investigators, as well as other factors that led to the conclusion that the trial against Laureani lacked merit.

Prosecutor Rozas took over the case at the beginning of July after the Supreme Court had settled a jurisdictional dispute between the Fourth Criminal Court in San Miguel and the Second Military Court, ruling in favor of the military body. Osvaldo Romo, an informant for the former DINA, whose situation is still being studied, continues to be a defendant in the case.

Criminal Judge Ismael Contreras issued the indictments against Laureani and Romo. They were upheld both by the San Miguel Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court, which rejected a petition in error filed on behalf of Laureani asking that the Amnesty Law be invoked.

This was interpreted to mean that the highest court had upheld the indictment of Laureani. However, sources close to the investigation have indicated that for the time being, the Supreme Court has not ruled on this procedural situation.

Nelson Caucoto, the defendant's attorney, described the decision handed down as "unusual and surprising." He said the defense is "flabbergasted," because of "certain knowledge" that the military prosecutor approved this resolution "less than 24 hours after receiving the material in the file." Caucoto displayed the pertinent stamps on the file proving this to be true.

As to the next steps to be taken, the attorney said that "every necessary recourse" will be pursued. He mentioned an appeal and a complaint against what he described as an "abusive resolution."

In this connection, he commented that "a military prosecutor, unfamiliar with the whole of the case, has erased everything accomplished by a court of appeals and the Supreme Court with a single stroke of his pen." In conclusion, he said that this action "puts the finishing touch on our previously weakened faith in the military court system."

*** Performance of Three Major Industrial Groups Detailed**

93SM0399A Santiago EL MERCURIO in Spanish 5 Aug 93 pp B1, B10

[Article by Begona Bofill C. and Carolina Gazitua P.]

[Text] During the first half of this year, the three giants, the eternal three, were characterized by different situations. While the Luksic group is experiencing a period of dynamism that is encouraging it to carry out new projects, the Matte group has proceeded a little more cautiously, particularly because of the current situation with world prices of cellulose. Meanwhile, the Angelini group headed by Don Anacleto finds itself in an even more difficult situation because of the loss of the fishing grounds.

It appears that the Luksic group is experiencing a veritable "whirlwind of ideas." In recent months, the dynamism of the enterprises in this conglomerate has been a constant surprise. Some of the demonstrative indications include its entry into the private television sector; the study of opening up to the business market in the telecommunications sector; the strengthening of the presence of the Madeco subsidiaries in the aluminum industry; and the completion of the merger of the O'Higgins and Centrohispano Banks. And all this is "to be continued." The "whirlwind of ideas" has now left its mark in various sectors in which the Luksic family is active.

The history of recent years has placed this group in an outstanding place among the billionaires of the world. And it will certainly stay on this list, because the group is growing and consolidating its presence both in our country and abroad.

In an examination of the results achieved in the first half of the year, the increase in the earnings of the holding company headed by Madeco stands out (52.76 percent). It is explained by the improvement of 14.6 percent in the operational balance, the change that occurred in the nonoperational balance, and the one-time income of 1.0594 billion pesos from outside the operational sector.

The sectors experiencing the greatest increases in sales have been those related to telecommunications products—especially sales in Argentina, and mining and energy products, because of the major mining projects currently being carried out in Chile.

One of the most recent successes was the purchase by Indalum and Alumco, both Madeco subsidiaries, of four

companies involved in the production of aluminum sections, bringing the participation of the group in this market to nearly 90 percent.

The United Breweries Company, Inc. (CCU) also noted a major change—33.86 percent—between one half of a year and the next. According to information provided by the enterprise, the profits earned are explained by the improved balance sheets of related enterprises, lower financial costs, the monetary adjustment, and the payment of less income tax than in 1992.

The CCU has a strong plan for expansion on the national level that will involve resources in the amount of US$70 million. And as to foreign ventures, the company hopes to make a decision by the end of the year on which country in the region will be the recipient of its first productive investment. This move will launch its internationalization phase. It should be remembered that the CCU has already become active abroad thanks to the placement of ADR on North American and European markets.

In the food sector, Lucchetti Enterprises, which has been controversial in recent weeks because of its protagonism in the "pasta war," has seen a variation of almost 100 percent. This was basically due to the nonoperational balance, which showed a profit of 769 million pesos as compared with 292 million pesos in 1992, resulting "mainly from the greater profitability of investments in related enterprises."

And there are some novel developments in this sector, as well. Just a few days ago, the Luksic and Boher groups signed a partnership agreement, in accordance with which Imasa of Argentina, a subsidiary of the Boher group, will acquire control of 37 percent of the stock of Nieto, S.A., an agroindustrial enterprise in which Lucchetti Enterprises is the majority stockholder. This operation will involve resources totaling US$5.7 million.

Luksic is not lagging behind in the telecommunications sector, either. Near the end of May, Luksic announced its entry into the private television market after acquiring 75 percent of the Maxivision-owned TV Max, a firm telecasting via microwave on the UHF frequency in the metropolitan region. Luksic has also organized the Telecable South company, in the hope of developing a cable television network covering the entire country. This adds a new business to the VTR enterprises, in which the majority of the activities pursued by the group in the telecommunications sector come together. These activities include the long-distance carrier service initiated a short time ago, added-value services (fax, documents, telex), and cellular telephones. There are also the Southern Telephone enterprises and their subsidiary, the Coyhaique Telephone Company (TELCOY).

The group is involved in the financial sector through the O'Higgins and Santiago Banks. One of the principal novelties in this area in the first half of the year was the merger of the O'Higgins and Centrohispano Banks, forming a large new entity that will keep the name of the first of the two and will rank third, in terms of its capital, in the Chilean private banking system. This operation involved about US$100 million, which was made up of the contribution of $55 million representing the value of the branch of the Spanish Bank in Chile, and another US$44.5 million earmarked for the purchase of half of the share of the Luksic group in the O'Higgins Bank.

Where its interests in Santiago are concerned, the group is said to be awaiting the promulgation of the draft law on subordinate debt and new businesses, which could be the point of departure for a merger with O'Higgins.

The conglomerate, which owns 7 percent of the ENDESA [National Electric Company, Inc.], saw a decline in the results obtained by the principal domestic company generating electrical power. Its earnings were down 50 percent in the first half of the year, but despite this, there was a positive development in comparison with the first quarter, when the enterprise had earnings of only 4.491 billion pesos.

The Matte Group

It is no news that the cellulose and paper industry is experiencing a difficult period, to say the least, on the international level. Nor is it news that the prices of these products remain depressed, and no recovery is to be glimpsed in the short term.

But despite this, the Paper and Cardboard Manufacturing Company (CMPC) achieved a slightly better balance during the first half of this year than in the comparable period last year.

Against all expectations, the negative effects resulting from exports were offset in part by an excellent level of domestic activity, which "made it possible to increase the volume of sales in the country by 4.8 percent as compared with the volume in the first half of last year." Together with this, exchange parity saw a slight recovery, which contributed to some extent to making the situation characterized by low prices and dwindling exports less negative.

The turnover total for the CMPC came to 7.756 billion pesos, representing a decline of 41.9 percent in comparison with the first half of 1992. This decline was explained by the low prices for and the reduced volume of cellulose exports. However, the improved level of exports of sawed timber and logs, which rose to US$27.9 million, only partially compensated for the negative effects of the world cellulose and paper market.

On the nonoperational side, the CMPC earned a profit of 15.531 billion pesos, so that there was a complete turnabout in the picture seen last year, when an extraordinary accounting loss of US$17.4 million (approximately 6.3 billion pesos) was reported for this item as a result of the revaluation of the peso.

The company is continuing its investment projects in the industrial sector, where there are plans involving an

amount in excess of US$130 million. Notable within this context is the launching of construction work on two new factories that will use recycled paper to produce tissue products. One will be located in Chile and the other in Argentina.

In this way, the CMPC is going ahead with its internationalization process. It passed another marker along the way in January with the signing of an agreement with Procter & Gamble (P&G) for the manufacture and marketing of disposable diapers and sanitary napkins in Chile, Argentina, Bolivia, Uruguay, and Paraguay. Quite rightly, the periodical BUSINESS WEEK included this company on a list of the domestic enterprises that are expanding throughout South America in an article entitled "Chile: The Business Conquistador."

The company's prospects for this year are not very encouraging, partly due to the continued low prices being paid for newsprint and cellulose on the international market, and because of the keen competition on the domestic market for paper and related imported products.

In the specific case of Forestry Industries, Inc. (INFORSA), the average prices obtained by exporters have declined seven percent from the levels seen in the comparable period of 1992 as a result of the paper situation on the foreign markets. This situation was caused by the overstocking of paper on the international level. However, it has been possible to reduce this surplus, so that greater stability can be foreseen. Meanwhile, the domestic market is reflecting what has happened on the foreign markets in terms of declining prices. Where sales volumes are concerned, there has been an increase (13.5 percent) resulting from the improved production of paper and the growth of the economy.

Lirquen Port, Inc., another of the open companies in the Matte group, showed a profit of 1.277 billion pesos, as compared with 962 million during the first half of last year. This increase is explained by the nonoperational balance, which showed a substantial increase because of higher profits for the Lirquen Port Company, Inc., a subsidiary; the profit on sales of assets in June of 1993 in the amount of 50.6 million pesos; the positive monetary adjustment in 1993, as compared with the negative one the preceding year; and a substantial reduction in nonoperational expenditures (contingency funds).

The Angelini Group

The group headed by Anacleto Angelini again found itself affected by the poor results achieved by the fishing enterprises during the first half of this year. And this time the situation deteriorated substantially, if contrasted with the situation in the comparable period last year. While the Iquique-Guanaye Fishery suffered some losses during the first half of 1992, for example, they have now tripled, yielding a negative balance of 3.971 billion pesos. Meanwhile, Indo and Eperva experienced a deterioration from profits in excess of a billion pesos to losses of about two billion.

In any case, this came as no surprise at this point in the year. Even Anacleto Angelini himself reviewed the critical situation in this sector this past April and said that if formulas for reducing costs were not found, "the fishing industry will have no future." He also announced the closing of two plants producing fish meal that belong to Iquique-Guanaye, necessitating the dismissal of 100 individuals.

The situation is a delicate one. It is attributed to the revaluation of the peso, the increase in domestic costs, the reduced international prices of fish meal, and the closing of fishing seasons decreed by the authorities. Nor has there been any lack of discussions with the authorities on the subject of the policies announced and adopted.

The well-founded analysis carried out by Iquique-Guanaye has produced certain figures. This enterprise—which showed a loss of 3.312 billion in its operational balance as compared with a negative result of 766 billion during the first half of last year—says that the average price at which fish meal was sold in the period between January and June of 1993 was US$402 per ton, while in the comparable period the preceding year, the price was US$486 per ton.

The value of this product, the Iquique-Guanaye experts say, suffered from the effects of Peruvian overproduction that began at the end of 1992 and continued until almost the end of the first half of this year, to which was added the slow recovery of the world economy. However, some hope can be glimpsed, since it is being said that the slower rate of fishing and production in Peru following the end of the first half of the year, combined with an increase in the price of soybean flour, "justifies the expectation of a recovery for the price of fish meal."

But as of 30 June, this was no more than a projection. Where the Indo Fishery is concerned, the operational balance showed a loss of 2.1584 billion pesos, although the nonoperational balance showed a profit of 195.7 million pesos, higher than the 137.9 million the preceding year.

The operational balance of the Eperva Fishery, which like the preceding firm, saw a decline from a profit to a loss, was also affected by similar factors. Where the increase in administrative and sales expenditures is concerned, this was due to the greater depreciation in the period, with the addition of the assets of the Tocopilla Fishery, Inc., to those of Eperva beginning on 30 June 1992.

The fishing catch in Regions I and II for this half of the year was down by 27 percent from the figure for the comparable period last year. However, both Indo and Eperva suffered smaller declines of 3.7 percent and 14.51 percent, respectively. In both cases, this smaller

decline allowed these enterprises to increase their participation in the fishing in these regions.

The news has not improved for the Angelini group in the cellulose sector, either. The profits of Arauco and Constitucion Cellulose declined by 68.6 percent to 6.3304 billion pesos. The key factor was the forceful effect of the deterioration in the operational balance, which showed a loss of 1.7847 billion pesos. This was 11.1524 billion pesos less than the operational profit in the preceding period.

Other determining factors included the deterioration in the rate of exchange and the lower price for cellulose. This enterprise says that the price has dropped to the lowest level in the history of recent years, and that "world economic environment does not justify any expectation of a substantial change in the current market conditions in 1993." However, the company adds, the comparative advantages Chile enjoys in terms of forest production, together with the growing world demand for paper, guarantee that the industry will be profitable in the long run. Despite all of these factors, Celco says that the cellulose plants continued to operate at full capacity during the first half of the year.

During this first half of the year, this company also announced the placement of Eurobonds in the amount of US$150 million on the international markets. They were snapped up by investors in a matter of minutes. Of this total, US$100 million will go to refinance the short-term obligations of the company, while the balance of US$50 million will go into investment projects.

Celarauco has indicated its satisfaction with the activities of its forestry subsidiaries, and notes that the market for lumber "has been very favorable in recent months, with increasing demand and major price increases."

As for the COPEC [Chilean Oil Company], the enterprise that heads the holding operation, it saw a decline of 34 percent in its profits in the first half of this year as compared with the first half of 1992. A decline was seen in both the operational and nonoperational balances. The reason on the operational category was that despite the increase of 11 percent in the physical volume of sales, the unit margins were down by 11.6 percent and administrative and sales expenditures were up by 12.9 percent.

The nonoperational balance was greatly influenced by the reduced net profits on investments in related enterprises. This had to do in particular with the Arauco Cellulose and Constitucion subsidiaries and the Iquique-Guanaye Fishery.

Where the market for liquid fuels as such is concerned, the COPEC has indicated that during the first half of the year, there was an increase of 7.6 percent over the comparable period in the preceding fiscal year. However, the COPEC augmented its shipments to an even greater extent, increasing its market share by 2.51 percentage points.

* Poll Shows Dissatisfaction With Health Care Systems

93SM0398B Santiago EL MERCURIO in Spanish 8Aug 93 p D15

[Article by Jessica Herschman]

[Text] Chileans' views on the country's health situation are critical.

The announced and denied outbreak of meningitis, the dozens of children dead of that disease, and the suspension of activities carried out by municipal treatment centers have again put the health issue on trial, and in the public's verdict, the harshest sentences were handed out to Isapres [Institute of Public Health and Preventive Medicine] and the Executive Branch.

And despite the confidence the electorate placed in democratic government four years ago, that it would resolve the crisis into which the sector had fallen, the latest CEP [Center for Political Studies]-Ademark poll shows that expectations have not been fulfilled and that Patricio Aylwin's work in this area is given almost the same grade as was assigned to General Pinochet's administration in 1989.

The authorities seem to have noticed that for years health has been a constant concern of the people. So much so that except for delinquency, this issue is the one deemed most important by the population, with 49 percent believing that serious efforts should be applied to it.

In response to this uneasiness, the current administration has increased the area's budget by more than 50 percent. What is of concern is that the figures show that this spending increase appears not to be reflected in greater satisfaction among users.

Another surprise from the study is that, curiously, those who most strongly disagree with the system are concentrated not among those enrolled in Fonasa [National Health Fund], but rather those at the higher-income levels. This apparently privileged group pays for costly Isapre plans, and is treated at the country's best clinics, but paradoxically, feels unprotected and ill-informed.

Thus the latest opinion poll on the quality of health promises to demystify the perceptions of Fonasa and private alternatives, show whom the people blame for the current crisis, and even more importantly, reveal that the most dispossessed sectors are not the only ones affected, and that those "privileged" by the Isapre system also have something to say.

The CEP-Ademark poll was carried out between 18 June and 12 July and 1,783 respondents, mostly from the country's central region, contributed to providing a true x-ray of the various health systems, their strong points, and their major shortcomings.

According to the study, within the Chilean system 41.3 percent say they belong to Fonasa, 26.8 percent to the Isapre system, 23.6 say they do not have a health system—even though the figure is much lower since the majority benefit from the public health sector, but are unaware of that—and 5.2 percent subscribe to other alternatives, such as those offered by the Armed Forces. Disaggregating the numbers, more than 57 percent of the sample belong to Fonasa, even though they are unaware of this.

As was expected, the upper classes are concentrated in Isapre—75.2 percent—and the middle and lower classes in Fonasa, or else they do not have a treatment system. But the perception of coverage is quite low. Twenty-five percent are certain they are not covered by any system, 11 percent feel completely or almost completely uncovered, 29 percent say they are insufficiently covered by their system, and only 34.4 percent claim they are reasonably or well-covered.

Although the perception of coverage is greater within the higher-income levels, they are also the most demanding and critical. Almost 50 percent say they feel insufficiently covered or completely uncovered by their system. In fact, within the lower levels, only 26.6 percent feel sufficiently covered, and within the middle levels, 29 percent.

This apparent contradiction could be explained in that those who invest large sums of money every month in a health plan have quite high expectations for their coverage. In this sense, the figures indicate that the users feel that Isapre does not give them the level of service they expect for what they are paying.

Undoubtedly, excluding those who claim they have no provision, Fonasa beneficiaries feel the most unprotected by their plan. Fonasa subscribers and their dependents are beneficiaries of the Health Contributions Regime contained in Law no. 18,469 of 1985, and have two options for obtaining health treatment: the Institutional option—for people of limited means—through which they receive direct treatment at the National Health Service facilities and municipal clinics; and the Free Choice option, through which they are attended by professionals, in private facilities enrolled in Fonasa. Also included in this category are the state-run boarding schools.

Beneficiaries of this law are divided into four groups, A, B, C, and D, according to their income, which determines the percentage they must contribute to use the services. Users classified in categories A and B are treated free of all health contributions. The C's and D's have free primary care, but for other types of treatment they pay 25 and 50 percent of the cost of the treatment, respectively.

Of those enrolled in Fonasa, 38.9 percent belong to groups A and B; 48.1 percent to C and D, and 13 percent do not know. Similarly, 42 percent use the Institutional option and 55 percent prefer the Free Choice option—groups C and D.

Another interesting point about coverage is the precarious situation of young people. They comprise the sector that feels most marginalized and uninformed about the system, and they thus mistrust the benefits they could receive from it.

Contrary to all the beliefs about Fonasa, almost one-third of the plan's beneficiaries claim they would not change to Isapre because they prefer their current system. Among the high-income sector, more than 40 percent say they would not choose Fonasa because of the lack of information they would need in order to decide.

Faced with a hypothetical situation—that the cost of alternative provisions was the same, that is, the same amount discounted by health contributions—43.8 percent lean toward Isapre and 45.9 percent toward Fonasa in selecting their options, especially the Free Choice plan.

This fact is thought to be a true warning for Isapre, since until now it was thought that everyone aspired to enroll in Isapre and that the only reason one did not was lack of resources.

The poll also shows older sectors increasingly prefer Fonasa, and that 50 percent of young people prefer Isapre.

There were also surprises with respect to the level of satisfaction felt by the respective users of the health system. More than half of all Chileans said they were unsatisfied or very unsatisfied, and 33.3 percent said they were content.

Paradoxically, in our country, the highest level of dissatisfaction is found among those with higher incomes, 60 percent of whom claim to be dissatisfied and only 33 percent of whom are content. In the low-income sectors the level of satisfaction is less—28.8 percent—but the levels of dissatisfaction are also less—57.3 percent. The overall average is more even, with 37.4 percent satisfied and 48.9 percent dissatisfied.

Isapre has almost the same percentage of satisfied subscribers—44.1 percent—as dissatisfied—43.7 percent—compared to Fonasa where slightly more than half say they are dissatisfied.

In addition to the fact that users believe they deserve more for what they invest in Isapre—it is incomprehensible to them to pay 15,000 or 20,000 pesos for a medical consultation, when Isapre reimburses them only 4,000 pesos—there are the problems of lack of information about the plan's coverage; mistrust of Isapre—which often is seen as a business that looks after its own interests and not those of the users; and ignorance about how to efficiently use the system.

On evaluating the state system, the results are disheartening. Particularly if one considers that over the last four years the health sector budget has grown by more than 50 percent and yet most people have not noticed this increase.

More than half those polled believe the Government has kept the budget at the same level or decreased it, and 42.6 percent believe it has increased. Among Fonasa beneficiaries, who should have noticed the greater level of financing, 49 percent believe it has remained the same, and 8.6 percent believe it has decreased.

Similarly, 64 percent think that available health services have been kept at the same level over the last four years and only 33 percent think they have improved. The two extremes of the social pyramid are the most critical on this issue. Among the upper sector, almost 70 percent believe that services have become worse or remained the same, and 67 percent of people of limited resources think the same.

Many explain this phenomenon by the fact that a large part of the budget has been invested in increasing salaries, which prevents people from noticing the real changes.

As it is, users make it very clear in this poll that "they'll believe it when they see it."

Moreover, those polled were also asked to grade the available health services, and the average score was 4.1. The sector with the highest income assigned them a 4.5, while those with lower incomes gave them a 3.8. Those most satisfied seem to rely on alternative provision systems—the Armed Forces, among others—and rate their system 4.8. Isapre beneficiaries assign it only 4.6, and Fonasa beneficiaries 4.1.

In the September 1989 CEP-Adimark poll, the Health Services evaluation obtained an average score of 3.8. Although there has been a slight improvement, the grades are not completely comparable to each other, since the 1989 study included rural sectors not covered in the latest poll.

In any case, people are much more critical of the Government than of the health services. The average grade the President's administration receives in this area is 3.4, the lowest since he arrived at La Moneda.

In the view of many, this shows that public opinion has a clear idea of who is responsible for the system's shortcomings, which are afflicting the health system, and they perceive it as one of the most important issues to consider in the next election.

Similarly, those polled also evaluated the different stages of health treatment. The doctors are well-qualified and the treatment received, in general, is considered good, except by young people aged 18 to 24, who offered a great deal of criticism. Those older than 35, on the other hand, spoke in a more positive light.

Rated less highly was attendance in the waiting rooms and the slow process of obtaining treatment, although those who sought private treatment recognized that their treatment was better than that received by those attending a public facility.

While simultaneously identifying the main problems afflicting the health system in our country, the study shows that there is significant consensus. The lack of medical equipment and deterioration of the infrastructure are signs of serious shortcomings. The only difference is in the emphasis: among the high-income sector it is the deterioration of the infrastructure that is the key point—in general, because it is in plain view—and for those of lesser income, who participate in the system, it is the lack of equipment. Both sectors seem to understand the remuneration problem affecting officials, but they do not agree with the strikes and demonstrations—65 percent of the people who received treatment in a public establishment said they were against them.

The poll thus shows that even when health systems around the world are being constantly questioned, and more or less all of them show imperfections, users in our country know the shortcomings very well, and they have identified the root of the problem.

Similarly, it makes clear that it is not just the Fonasa system that has a long list of complaints, and it shows graphically the high level of dissatisfaction among those enrolled in Isapre, revealing the lack of trust and misinformation prevailing within the system in general.

Reasons For Not Converting to Isapre

Prefer Fonasa service	29.8%
Lack information to make informed decision	23.7%
Prefer Isapre but can't afford it	18.2%
Other reasons, or no response	16.8%
They're all the same	9.0%
Isapre is inferior to current plan	2.4%

Biggest Problems of the Chilean Public Health Sector

Lack of medical equipment	47.4%
Shoddy facilities	37.3%
Low salaries for officials	34.6%
Shortages of medicines	25.1%
Poor administration	18.6%
Poor treatment by employees	17.0%
Low motivation for doctors	14.3%
Other, don't know	4.5%

If Costs Were Identical, Which Would You Prefer?

Fonasa, Free Choice option	34.5%
Fonasa, Institutional option	11.4%

No response	10.3%
Isapre	43.8%

*** Conama Official Defends Proposed Environment Law**

93SM0398A Santiago LA NACION in Spanish 3 Aug 93 p 37

[Interview with Conama Executive Secretary Rafael Asenjo; place and date not given]

[Text] Conama (National Environmental Commission) Executive Secretary Rafael Asenjo disagreed completely with certain criticisms of the proposed environment law that will be voted on today in the Senate chamber. Since the issue affects him closely, he knows its process, and decided to address some of those objections, re-emphasizing that "although this is a seemingly simple law, it conforms to an important principle: it is able to be applied." He rejected opinions characterizing it as punitive, claiming rather that it is preventive. In addition to being realistic, he claims as his guiding principles participation and gradualism.

[LA NACION] What is your opinion of the view that environmental issues deserve a ministerial rank?

[Rafael Asenjo] It is necessary to advance toward a level of institutionality that, even though imperfect, can be applied in practice, be useful and efficient, and do what is intended by this law: put into action a participative environmental process, by which all State institutions take up the issue as a commitment integrated into their normal responsibilities. The best way to achieve this is by petitioning for a body that strengthens the institutional capacity of the Government departments involved in environmental issues, and subjects them to petitioning to a higher coordinative authority; that is the basic task of what is referred to in the proposal as the National Environmental Commission. Environmental management is not a sector, it cuts across all sectors, and thus the sectoralization of the environment compromises efficiency in confronting this problem.

[LN] In dividing up the responsibilities, don't you run the risk that they will be only partially assumed?

[RA] No, completely the contrary. To the extent that all ministries or institutions involved in environmental issues participate directly in exercising their responsibilities, the issue is addressed. Not freely, but rather subject to a central coordination, the highest body of which is the group of ministers with sectoral involvement. That permits a centralization of responsibility around those who bear it, and subjects it to a higher level of policy and coordination. The alternative is not for an environmental authority to take responsibility for the issue. That experience has been applied in other Latin American countries and the result is the opposite effect, because then the other ministries do not address environmental problems. It ends up becoming a big bureaucratic machine.

[LN] Does Conama have monitoring capabilities?

[RA] Conama's structure as set forth in the law is fundamentally one of coordination, but coordination among official entities, with a goal. Conama has responsibility for designing and proposing global environmental policies. The direct activities of monitoring and dictating standards continue to belong primarily to the sectoral ministries. But in Conama a secondary monitoring capability is being created, to monitor the monitors. If Conama begins to receive a number of complaints of violations, the ministers responsible for the entities being monitored are seated on Conama's committee, and thus there is a very expeditious mechanism.

[LN] What are the other benefits of this proposal?

[RA] Another extraordinarily relevant central principle is that of prevention. The backbone of the environmental policy expressed in this proposal is the instrument of environmental impact statements. This is fundamental, because in the design stage of an investment project, while performing the technical and financial feasibility studies, an environmental feasibility study has to be performed. We do not want to create an obstacle to economic development but rather an instrument that improves the projects.

[LN] Will the environmental impact studies and statements be well-monitored?

[RA] Both of them will be. The investor contracts a legal commitment. In addition, he provides a useful monitoring tool. He will no longer be monitored at whim, but rather, the monitoring will be facilitated, more objective, no longer arbitrary. At the same time, it provides a very clear signal to the investor. For the first time, we will be applying the same criteria to the public sector as to the private sector.

[LN] What areas could be improved?

[RA] There is never a proposal with which one can say one is 100 percent satisfied. If I could close my eyes and create a proposal from scratch for what I believe environmental management should be, it would obviously be different in some ways. It could be improved, but the proposal is a framework, it formalizes environmental management, and environmental management is a tremendously dynamic process.

[LN] Viewing it as a framework, what is lacking?

[RA] I do not want to look too far ahead because it is not finished. The discussions in Parliament have profiled it, fine-tuned it. The high level of talk shows the extremely high interest it has awakened among members of parliament. There are no initiatives that involve structures completely different from the central line of the proposal. For that reason we believe it has brought out a

very high level of consensus among the most relevant players in environmental management, and that is one of the proposal's objectives.

[LN] When do you think it will become law?

[RA] We are still quite optimistic. We believe that the Senate could send it to the Chamber of Deputies this week. We are seeing enormous interest within the Chamber of Deputies for this to become law soon. We hope it will become law this year. That means it has to be made law before November. But that is very hard to predict, to do so would almost imply a lack of respect, because there is a great deal of interest among the deputies.

Colombia

Drop in Petroleum Products Trade Balance Reported

PA2309195893 Santa Fe de Bogota Emisoras Caracol Network in Spanish 1200 GMT 21 Sep 93

[Text] Santa Fe de Bogota—According to Ecopetrol [Colombian Petroleum Enterprise], the Colombian petroleum products trade balance fell, despite a $344 million surplus resulting from a [words indistinct] in the current year. The Ecopetrol report revealed that the trade balance, compared to that for the same period in 1992, declined more than $100 million. Ecopetrol's exports for 1993 reached 35.2 million barrels that [words indistinct] $588 million. In August, Colombian oil production dropped by more than 65,000 barrels a day, mainly because of guerrilla activities.

Paraguay

Wasmosy To Visit Bolivia, Signs Joint Declaration

PY2309133193 Asuncion PATRIA in Spanish 23 Sep 93 p 1

[Text] Accompanied by his entourage, President Juan Carlos Wasmosy will travel to Santa Cruz de la Sierra, Bolivia, today where he will meet with Bolivian President Gonzalo Sanchez de Lozada, public sector authorities, and private sector businessmen. Vice President Angel Roberto Seifart will act as interim president during Wasmosy's absence in order to attend to routine government matters.

The Paraguayan delegation will arrive at 1030 at Viru Viru Airport, Santa Cruz, where the reception ceremony will take place and Wasmosy will deliver a speech. Later, in the Sessions Hall of the municipality, Santa Cruz Mayor Percy Fernandez Anez will hand Wasmosy the keys to the city. Wasmosy will then place a wreath at the 24 Septiembre Plaza. At noon he will have a private lunch with Sanchez de Lozada and at 1430 the Senate will hold a special session in honor of the Paraguayan president.

A joint declaration will be signed by both chiefs of state at 1700 and a news conference will be held after this ceremony. The two presidents will then have a private meeting. At 1930, the Santa Cruz municipal government will hold a session of honor at which distinguished personalities will be decorated with the Municipal Medal of Merit.

Foreign Minister: Border Islands 'Belong to Paraguay'

PY2309163493 Asuncion ABC COLOR in Spanish 23 Sep 93 p 15

[Text] Foreign Minister Diogenes Martinez stressed on 22 September that the islands located in the Parana River, which were supposedly occupied by members of the Argentine Coast Guard based in Corrientes (Argentina), belong to Paraguay. He also denied that a document exists, signed by the Paraguayan and Argentine Foreign Ministries, establishing a new territorial border between the two countries due to the construction of the Yacyreta hydroelectric plant.

Argentine Coast Guard personnel occupied the small island of Verde and another nine islands located in the Parana River, which belong to Paraguay. Paraguayan fishermen were dislodged during the incident, according to accusations made by inhabitants of Ita Cora, in the jurisdiction of Mayor Martinez, 50 km south of Pilar, capital of Neembucu Department.

"The matter is in the hands of Navy Headquarters. We have therefore asked the commander in chief of the Armed Forces (President Juan Carlos Wasmosy) to give us information, through the Navy, about the real situation in those islands," Martinez said.

The naval chart in the hands of the Corrientes Coast Guard Base indicates that these islands are Argentine. The document, which was given to Captain Angel Chamorro, commander of the Ita Cora Naval Unit, was sent to Navy Headquarters in Asuncion.

In answer to a question, the foreign minister denied that the islands that were presumably occupied belong to Argentina. "That is not true. We have a study of the location of a number of islands that determine the border and national sovereignty of the two countries. It is my belief that the information is not correct" that the two foreign ministries presumably signed an agreement establishing new border limitations between both countries from the confluence of the Parana and Paraguay Rivers to the site of the Yacyreta hydroelectric plant, due to the latter's construction.

Navy Commander Briefs Minister on Border Incident

PY2309135793 Asuncion ABC COLOR in Spanish 23 Sep 93 p 14

[Text] Navy Commander in Chief Rear Admiral Flavio Abadie Gaona spoke with Foreign Minister Diogenes

Martinez yesterday at approximately 0005, and handed him a file containing a complete report on what happened in the southern islands where, at the end of August, members of the Argentine Border Guard [as published] warned local fishermen that they had to withdraw from the islands because they belong to Argentina. The incident never amounted to anything more than a simple request, according to Abadie Gaona. The meeting between the Navy commander and Martinez took place at the airport, just before President Juan Carlos Wasmosy left for Sao Paulo, Brazil.

As far as these islands are concerned, Abadie Gaona stressed that no document has been signed granting possession of these islands to Argentina. "There is no treaty," he maintained, indicating that those who were aspiring to them were basing these aspirations on a technical document drafted around 1976 by the Joint Commission. "And now they want to claim the islands for Argentina," he said.

He commented that when the intentions of the Border Police became known, the Navy officer in charge at Ita Cora spoke with the prefect and then informed his superior that there had only been an attempt at occupation. He stated that today "everything is calm, and nothing has happened. They are uninhabited islands. There are only fishermen there and they are not permanent inhabitants," he stressed.

Asked whether it was true that up until noon on 21 September he had not yet received any official information on what had happened at the end of August, Abadie Gaona denied this, indicating that a wrong interpretation of the facts may have existed.

The foreign minister announced that after receiving the report he will initiate the appropriate moves toward seeking a definition of the matter and that for this to happen it will be necessary to contact Argentine Government authorities. He indicated talks must begin on the basis of the incident and that he will carefully study the report in order to adopt the appropriate measures.

Peru

'Single Front' Against New Constitution Urged

PY2309202493 Lima EXPRESO in Spanish 10 Sep 93 p A2

[Text] The Marxist parties grouped in the United Left [IU] emerged yesterday from their political lethargy to join the campaign against the new constitution being waged by the APRA [American Popular Revoutionary Alliance] and some opposition groups in the CCD [Democratic Constituent Congress], and called on these parties to join efforts in a "single front."

This was announced by IU President Jorge Hurtado Pozo, who said he believes the new constitutional draft is "antilabor," "turncoat," "autocratic," and "centralist."

Hurtado, a militant from the "Patria Roja" Peruvian Communist Party, said Marxist parties believe "the objective of the new constitution is not only to perpetuate President Fujimori in power, but also to ratify repression and the neoliberal economic model, which has resulted in unemployment and the surrender of public companies to foreign capital."

He reported that the IU will create committees for the "no" vote nationwide to promote this campaign.

Hurtado believes that the "no" vote campaign should be a coordinated undertaking, and therefore urged all political party leaders who are involved in the same campaign to join efforts in a "single front."

He said: "This struggle demands the unity of the opposition forces, not merely the claim of leading the movement. We are opposed to any divisionist stance because isolated campaigns favor the government."

Hurtado Pozo also reported the arrest of leftist militants, the majority of them teachers, charged with belonging to terrorist organizations.

He cited the cases of professors Javier Albanil, Ciro Cruz, and Jose Pompillo.

Hurtado also reported the arrest of the mayor of Tambo Grande. According to him, the mayor was arrested for opposing the government's decision to exploit the "polymetallic" mines located in the lower Piura area.

The news conference was summoned by the IU national board, but only Hurtado Pozo and Cesar Barrera Bazan, an UNIR [National Union of the Revolutionary Left] member, attended the meeting.

During the news conference held at UNIR headquarters, it was reported that the IU now groups UNIR, the Peruvian Communist Party (Red Fatherland faction), the Peruvian Communist Party (PCP); the Focep [Studen-Peasant-Worker Popular Front); the Socialist Political Action (APS); and the Nonparty Movement (NoPar).

Shining Path Leadership Crisis Analyzed

PY2309153093 Lima LA REPUBLICA in Spanish 12 Sep 93 pp 4-5

[Text] According to a number of specialists on the phenomenon of violence in Peru, one year after the arrest of its leader Abimael Guzman, the Shining Path is undergoing a leadership crisis, like a boxer in one corner of the ring, who is unable to get rid of his opponent.

A visible consequence of that arrest was the transfer of the main actions of the war to the mountains and to the jungle. Consequently, the group led by Osman Morote Barrionuevo, which was a minority group called the "Black Group," should now be leading the terrorist group.

For other specialists in the phenomenon of violence, like National Huamanga University Professor Ponciano del Pino, who is also a Peruvian Studies Institute researcher, the Shining Path attacks in the interior of the country and in the capital cannot be regarded as the last efforts by a dying organization, but as a warning that the Shining Path is recuperating militarily.

Del Pino, Carlos Tapia, and Raul Gonzales analyzed the phenomenon of violence in Peru after the arrest of the Shining Path leader, which occurred on 12 September 1992.

The commemoration of this event served to emphasize the role played by Antonio Ketin Vidal Herrera, who was chief of Dincote [National Counterterrorism Directorate] then, and who masterminded the arrest of the man who began a spiral of violence that has left more than 22,000 dead in the country.

Tapia said that "Ketin Vidal has his own place in history. History will recall his name when recalling the arrest of Guzman. It will not recall, for example, Nicolas Hermoza Rios." Tapia made this remark when he was asked about an official order to avoid paying tribute to anyone on the anniversary of Guzman's capture. The only purpose of this order might have been to avoid placing Vidal above President Alberto Fujimori. Tapia recognized Ketin's unquestionable achievement in the path toward pacification. Tapia said Ketin Vidal's role was outstanding, not because he was the chief of a state organ, but because of the efficiency and moral superiority that he showed when Guzman was captured.

He added that after the arrest of Guzman, some 1,500 terrorists were captured, of whom 120 to 150 were local leaders linked with regional structures. Some 700 Shining Path members were sentenced, approximately 190 of them to life imprisonment, all of which has been a harsh blow to the organization.

Tapia said that the Shining Path is currently in the strategic position of losing its forces. He indicated: "It is like a boxer in a corner of a ring, who is unable to get rid of his opponent." He added: "This does not mean it cannot deal the blows it is dealing (like the Mazamari massacre)." Tapia asked himself, however, if the Shining Path was really at one time part of a plan for alternative power in the country. He answered himself by saying: "I do not believe it was."

Tapia said that despite the arguments of some analysts, such as the case of President Alberto Fujimori, who justified the 5 April coup with his belief in the imminent threat posed by the Shining Path, it was impossible to imagine that Abimael Guzman could sit in the chair now occupied by Fujimori.

It was an armed movement that did not have the support of any political party, not the left, the radical left, nor the center parties, and definitely not the right. Neither did it have the support of any popular organization; labor, peasant, or professional union; nor the church.

The situation in Central America was quite different because the unions supported or sympathized with the insurgent groups. Besides that, said Tapia, Peru had an Armed Forces with the best technology in the socialist world, after Cuba; with about 250,000 armed men.

What is indeed true, said Tapia, is that the Shining Path created, through its actions, a situation of instability in society and especially in the governability of the country, which was particularly reflected from 1989 to 1992.

Tapia said: "This is why the Shining Path was the main problem for the country then. Now it is no longer a problem. There are other problems, such as poverty, democracy, etc."

Raul Gonzales believes, however, that there is a great difference between the Shining Path of September 1992 and the Shining Path of September 1993. He added: "The basic difference is that the Shining Path is now without direction, without political or military strategy to take over power, and has abandoned its plans." According to Gonzales, there are several regional commands that do what they want, however they can, to make it appear that the Shining Path is active on the national scene. He believes that the main problem is that an internal discussion over the leadership is taking place.

Gonzales disclosed that in the latest edition of DIARIO INTERNACIONAL, a Shining Path publication run by Luis Arce Borja abroad, a harsh attack is made on Maximiliano Durand, who is a Shining Path leader belonging to what was known as the "minority wing" of the party, which also included Osman Morote Barrionuevo, who is currently in prison.

In the publication, Arce Borja of the "majority wing" uses harsh terms (even treason) against Durand.

Also in its latest document, the Support Committee for the Peruvian Revolution, which joins together several pro-Shining Path organizations in Europe, says that the committee "is tired of witnessing the arrival of Peruvians who, incapable of staying in the fighting trenches, tell us how we should be supporting the Peruvian revolution."

Gonzales indicated that this reveals that the attempt at reorganizing the Shining Path is headed by what remains of the traditional minority of Ayacucho, and not by the majority of Guzman's supporters.

Gonzales reaffirmed his opinion that the Shining Path is finished. He explained: "What I mean is that the Shining Path is no longer the destabilizing element it was from 1988 to 1992, when it gave the impression that it was destabilizing the country, and was even creating concern in neighboring countries." He believes the Shining Path movement was never a feasible project. But the strategy to take over power did develop within Guzman's plans. He said the Shining Path went into a serious strategic crisis from 1986 to 1987.

The Shining Path did not leave the countryside because it is growing or expanding, but because it is beginning to lose ground, mainly because of the activities of the peasant defense patrols. The Shining Path can no longer think of building a Popular Guerrilla Army, as advocated by Guzman. Gonzales reiterated his theory that the Shining Path began to "overact" to make it appear that it was growing when in reality it was not. He said that "what it was doing was dispersing the enemy actions."

Gonzales believes that although the majority group no longer has support in the party, it should not be forgotten that Guzman had already changed his strategy before he was captured. He no longer talked about taking over power, nor about the party nor about the Popular Guerrilla Army, but of creating a National Liberation Front and a National Liberation Army in the document entitled: "Let Us Make the Strategic Balance Shake the Country."

Ponciano del Pino, researcher at the Peruvian Studies Institute and social sciences professor of the University of Huamanga, said we should not deceive ourselves and create illusions making us think that the Shining Path is defeated. Del Pino, who was also invited with the other experts to appear in the Radio Red program "Radio Arguments," said if one takes a close look at the national situation one cannot say that the subversive attacks are the last efforts of a dying organization. He said the number of attacks in the last two months in Ayacucho were very significant.

In Matucana Alta, the Shining Path murdered 12 people with a force of 80 men, 40 of whom carried war weapons. This was followed by an attack on Palmas, which is located only 15 minutes from San Francisco, where 30 Shining Path members murdered two businessmen. In the jungle area the Shining Path attacked truckers, killing nine of them. In Magnopampa and in the Huamanga mountain range, the Shining Path murdered nine people, including members of the peasant defense patrols, women, and children.

Del Pino said: "This shows the problem is quite serious, because the Shining Path may be reorganizing itself militarily." He added that although at the political level this terrorist group has suffered harsh blows, it may be reorganizing itself at the military level.

Del Pino also said that from Lima the actions are seen as very far away and that only major operations like the one in Satipo are publicized. Del Pino indicated that within the major operations, there are many smaller but important actions that show how the Shining Path handles its forces.

Struggle in Ucayali Viewed

PY2309223593 Lima EL PERUANO in Spanish 16 Sep 93 pp A6, A7

[Article by Braulio Orellana]

[Text] At 1000 on any day in 1990, a light Colombian plane could be seen overflying the Jorge Basadre highway in the Aguaytia-Boqueron del Padre Abad segment of Pucallpa. A few minutes earlier members of the Shining Path had blocked the highway to prevent vehicles from passing.

The frightened settlers working their agricultural land had run for the cover of their homes. They knew perfectly well that this operation would last approximately 20 minutes.

A peasant who for many years lived with this routine in the central jungle region said: "We run to our houses because this is when Shining Path members appear to protect the traffickers who land their planes in this field. This happened every day at any time."

Traffickers used this route for a long time to carry out their illegal operations under the military protection of the Shining Path.

This temporary increase of trafficking activities in the Aguaytia zone concentrated hundreds of Shining Path members in the region, hidden deep in the jungle. To do that the terrorists kidnapped hundreds of Indians of nearby communities who knew the area well.

The traffickers provided large quantities of weapons to the Shining Path; light and heavy weapons including RPG rocket launchers capable of destroying armored vehicles or helicopters. Only tank armor can resist this deadly weapon.

The arrival of a large Infantry Marine unit in mid 1991 in Aguaytia, Libertad, and Boqueron del Padre Abad considerably reduced trafficking in the Ucayali front and the traffickers have now moved to more inaccessible regions of the central jungle.

Along the Aguaytia-Boqueron del Padre Abad stretch of the road, Marine Infantry members set up large blocks to obstruct the landing of planes on that road.

One naval officer said: "No plane can land in the Ucayali front jurisdiction. Here in Aguaytia, the Navy counter-subversive base will not allow this situation to be repeated. We have the entire zone under control."

The traffickers have retreated but the Shining Path is still active in the area. This does not mean that trafficking has ended. Many people are still indirectly dependent on this illegal trade.

The Shining Path is close to being liquidated. The Ucayali political military front has valuable information on the location of the last Shining Path columns in the area. The region is, however, inaccessible and inhospitable, and it has been impossible to open trails to the Shining Path fortresses in the jungle.

A few weeks ago the Navy Intelligence Service captured several people who provided food to Shining Path militants in the jungle. They are now cooperating with the military.

This important operation has cut the food distribution system that allowed the terrorists to operate from their refuges.

An officer from the Aguaytia Navy Infantry base said: "We are 'suffocating' them in the jungle. They no longer receive supplies from Tingo Maria. They will not remain in the jungle for long without food. Eventually they will be forced to leave the jungle."

Commander "Ernesto," head of the Navy counterterrorist base, has confirmed a change in the attitude and mentality of the people in all areas where they are fighting the Shining Path. The people are becoming conscious of their role in this war and are actively participating in their eradication.

The commander said: "The Armed Forces maintain very close relations with the people. This change in the counter-subversive policy is yielding excellent results. The people fully trust our institutions, which will in the end liquidate the Shining Path in the Ucayali Front. This is very important."

The alliance between the people and the Armed Forces to eradicate terrorism and trafficking from the zone is essential, Aguaytia neighbors said. But the state must also increase its presence in the region because the Navy detachment, for instance, cannot repair the Jorge Basadre highway that has been destroyed in several stretches. The closing of the road makes it impossible to transport cultivated products to the city. Going to the city today implies several days journey.

The city does not have electricity or drinking water either. Each one must have his own generator in order to survive. In the past this served as a "culture medium" for terrorists and traffickers. Needs today are unchanged and we must not make the same mistakes.

Minister Confirms Plan Allowing Debt-Privatization Swap

PY2409000493 Lima EXPRESO in Spanish 10 Sep 93 p A5

[Text] In an exclusive interview with EXPRESO, Energy and Mines Minister Daniel Hokama—who is also president of the Commission for Promotion of Private Investment (Copri)—yesterday stated that Peru's external debt securities will be used in the privatization of government-owned enterprises that have little earning power. They also will be used in the privatization of more profitable companies, but to a lesser degree.

Hokama asked the Democratic Constituent Committee to pass as soon as possible a law that enables the executive branch to receive external debt securities as part of the payment for state-owned enterprises. These securities are currently being quoted at 44 percent of their nominal value on the international market.

This confirms the affirmative response given by Economy Minister Jorge Camet to creditor banks' Advisory Committee when the latter requested that a mechanism for a debt-privatization swap be included as one of the possible ways to settle the country's outstanding debt with them, which amounts to more than $6 billion.

It is expected that President Alberto Fujimori will make a political announcement on this issue.

At the beginning of his term in office, Fujimori flatly rejected the swap of debt securities for government assets. But his stance on this issue seems to have changed due to the fact that the country's fiscal situation would prevent the government from assuming new or greater payment commitments with creditor banks.

Hokama stated that Copri is studying what percentage of government-owned enterprises' equity will be allowed to be purchased with debt securities.

The energy and mines minister added that this decision will be instrumental in making the privatization process "more fluid and also will allow greater participation by bidders." He added that the type of debt to be used (whether short-, medium-, or long-term) will be determined according to the proposal each buyer makes to Copri.

Commenting on extraordinary Supreme Decree No. 118-PCM-93, promulgated two days ago, whereby the government assumes responsibility for the external debt of companies to be privatized, Hokama pointed out that such debt totals $3 billion, which the Treasury expects to recoup from the privatization of these companies. He noted, however, that Copri will study what debt will be taken over by the government for six months.

Hokama stated that to date, the government has collected $440 million from the privatization of state-owned enterprises and that part of the proceeds—some $240 million—is being invested in projects such as infrastructure, running water, sewage, roads, schools, and dispensaries, among other things.

He pointed out that his ministry is having 16 mini-hydroelectric power plants constructed, an investment that will amount to $30 million.

Hokama added that the government seeks to outdo Mexico, a pioneer in privatizations, in the targets achieved by the privatization of public enterprises.

"All the companies sold there exceeded their real price and thus the government was able to make substantial profits," he said.

To conclude, the minister asserted that leading mining and public utility companies, as well as major banks, will have been sold by 1994.

"The government is creating new jobs and investing in projects that will benefit those who need it the most," he said, adding that this is all the more reason for national entrepreneurs to put their shoulders to the wheel by investing in the country.

"Economic stability and greater security, which are now prevalent thanks to the head-on battle against subversion, are positive signals for investors," he noted.

The minister remarked that the fact that the privatization of public enterprises is drawing important investors from other countries and that thousands of tourists visit our major cities is proof of the interest and trust they have in the country.

Hokama pointed out that oil production currently stands at 125,000 barrels per day and public utility rates (water, electricity, telephone, and fuel) are reaching their real value. He thus ruled out any increase in the price of fuel and its by-products for the time being.

With regard to the control of inflation, which he termed as one of the government's major achievements, Hokama said that one should be pleased that inflation is going down, and asserted that the goal for 1994 is that inflation should run at an average ranging between 1 and 2 percent.

Uruguay

President Discusses Reform of State, Social Security

PY2409021793 Montevideo Radio El Espectador Network in Spanish 0000 GMT 24 Sep 93

[Excerpt] The reform of the state and the social security system are two of the main issues President Luis Alberto Lacalle addressed today at the Golf Club. During a meeting hosted by the American Association and attended by brand-new U.S. Ambassador Thomas Dodd, the president delivered a speech that lasted a little more than 30 minutes.

Concerning the social security system, the president said the subsidy being paid to the BPS [Social Security Bank] is approximately $200 million. As for the reform of the state, Dr. Lacalle recalled that Uruguay has adopted the republican representative system, which was born in the 18th century, with a Congress that controls public spending.

He said the system has changed and that it has been reversed because control now is in the hands of the executive branch. He added that institutions should change, noting however that the attitude and the mentality of political leaders and the people also should change.

He added that the reform that is being designed seeks to give the legislative branch of government responsibility at the same level as the executive branch.

As for the social security reform, the president voiced his hopes—despite the rejection of previous proposals, emphasizing that the subsidies paid to the system are equivalent to $200 million, which equals 6 percentage points of the value added tax, an amount three times as big as the farm sector's tax revenues:

[Begin recording] All of them today depend on a subsidy, the highest and biggest being paid by the state. In the current fiscal year, it will reach $200 million. This is equivalent to the cost of 6 percentage points of the value added tax. It is as big as three times the farm sector's tax revenues. This is, fellow countrymen, the most important issue we have to deal with. [end recording]

The system is tilted, the president said, because the opposition holds a majority, a situation the next administration also will probably have to face, adding that the congressional system must assume the risk of renewal:

[Begin recording] We must dare to break with this sort of malediction, which maintains that nothing will change in our country, that nothing will happen in our country, that nothing will be done in our country, because real facts—and we hope we will be able to avoid this problem—will soon hit us so strongly that we will regret failing to implement at the right time the proposals, the changes, and the attitudes that circumstances demanded. [end recording] [passage omitted]

Venezuela

Police Prevent University Student March To Caracas

PA2309170893 Caracas Venezolana de Television Network in Spanish 1601 GMT 23 Sep 93

[Video report by Melissa Soto from "The News" newscast—live relay]

[Text] As everyone knows, the march by university students demanding a fairer budget was scheduled to have been held today. Representatives from every university in the country had gathered to participate in the march.

The great surprise of the day was that here, in (Alcabala de Tazon), an operation was carried out to prevent the university students from marching to Caracas. As you can see through the camera manned by Lincoln Molino, a number of guardsmen are here, preventing the passage of buses. These buses are located on the other side of (Alcabala), where members of the media are being denied access. [video shows about a dozen riot police carrying rifles at a toll area; video zooms in on line of slowly moving traffic, shows vehicles being stopped by police]

We also have received reports that six buses are being detained in Cupira. Also in Charayave, in a place known as La Penita, two buses are being detained, and in Puente

Angostura, two others are being detained. We also learned that two of the buses that were stopped here were turned back.

Student Demonstration Ends in Clash With Riot Police

PA2309233193 Madrid EFE in Spanish 2008 GMT 23 Sep 93

[Text] Caracas, 23 Sep (EFE)—A demonstration by Venezuelan university students today in Caracas ended with clashes between riot police and the students.

Hundreds of students and teachers participated in the day's protest march, which was organized by the universities. The universities have threatened to close their doors due to a lack of funds.

The police dispersed the demonstrators by using tear gas and an appearance by the popular "whale"—a riot vehicle equipped with a water cannon usually used to quell public demonstrations in the city.

The students responded with stones and bottles, which brought traffic along the downtown streets to a standstill.

Venezuelan authorities have not yet issued any reports of casualties in the clash between students and riot police.

The universities are demanding government funds to cover their 33-billion bolivar deficit, which is about $339 million.

The university authorities said that their centers will have to close their doors if the government does not provide the requested funds.

Education Minister Elizabeth Caldera announced the approval of 17 billion bolivars—about $174.8 million—for the universities; which will now study the offer.

University Employee Killed

PA2309222693 Paris AFP in Spanish 2131 GMT 23 Sep 93

[Text] Caracas, 23 Sep (AFP)—A university employee was shot to death when demonstrators were repressed in the center of Caracas today, the rector's office of the Central University of Venezuela has told AFP.

The employee, Sergio Rodriguez, arrived lifeless at the hospital, the sources said. Nine people have been reported injured during the demonstration so far, they added.

Demonstration Reviewed, Commented

PA2409033793 Caracas Venezolana de Television Network in Spanish 2350 GMT 24 Sep 93

[Report by Melida Soto and Cecilia Pachano; from "The News" newcast]

[Text] Just as planned, university students marched to demand a fairer budget to prevent the closure of their universities. Despite security measures implemented by the executive branch, the specter of instigators could not be avoided. This distorted this peaceful protest, leaving one dead and seven injured.

Since early this morning university students gathered to protest the need for 33 billion bolivares to continue higher education activities in Venezuela, thus rejecting an offer made by the president for approximately 17 billion bolivares.

The city center awoke cordoned off by metropolitan police and National Guard members. Nevertheless, at about 1400 [1800 GMT], when the march was passing University Avenue, the tranquillity was interrupted, leaving a young university guard, identified as Sergio Rodriguez, dead. There were also seven injured, among whom is our YVKE Mundial colleague Oscar Moreno and Telecentro assistant television cameraman Carlos Murillo.

The situation was such that the presence of Federal District Governor Cesar Rodriguez was required. He met with student representatives.

[Begin Rodriguez recording] Police had precise instructions to conduct purely preventive actions; nevertheless, in all these public demonstrations the police, at a given moment, may commit excesses. Likewise, there can also be people who infiltrate these marches to generate chaos and anarchy, and the consequences are the disorders we have now seen. [end recording]

Beforehand, National Guard soldiers posted themselves in key locations to prevent access to Caracas of buses with professors, students, and administrative personnel of all Venezuelan universities. The National Guard prevented the press from doing their work and did not allow access to the buses with the students.

(Father Jose Maria Olasso), director of human rights for the Prosecutor's Office, as well as Prosecutor No. 112, (Claudia Vizanni), appeared on the scene to draft a report on the events.

[Begin (Olasso) recording] If there were no possibility that the march could be infiltrated, it would be unconstitutional. You know what happens? Who can guarantee that in a 50-passenger bus there cannot be four who will put on masks? Could you guarantee this not to happen? [end recording]

The university march concluded with a meeting held at the Miraflores Presidential Palace between the university rectors, union leaders, and the justice [as heard] and presidency secretariat ministers after 1500. The meeting, which lasted one hour, allowed Interior Minister Carlos Delgado Chapellin and Secretariat of the Presidency Ramon Espinoza to present the government's final offer to grant 17 billion bolivares to offset operational costs for the rest of the year and part of the social sector debts;

then, in 1994, the universities will receive 6 billion bolivares to cancel this debt and an additional 10 billion bolivares through an additional credit, which would total the 33 billion bolivares requested by the university sector.

[Begin University Rector Hector Munoz recording] We will immediately contact the education minister to effect what we have been told verbally today by the presidency secretariat. [end recording]

Meanwhile, a truce has been established between the university sector and the executive branch. What all sectors want is for the universities to restart activities in a climate of understanding and total normalcy.

Karabashev Begins Official Visit; Holds Trade Talks

AU2309204193 Sofia BTA in English 1940 GMT 23 Sep 93

[Text] Caracas, September 23 (BTA)—A Bulgarian governmental delegation, led by Deputy Prime Minister and Trade Minister Valentin Karabashev, started its official visit to Venezuela today.

Mr. Karabashev met Health Minister Pablo Pulido. An agreement was reached for export of Bulgarian medicines to Venezuela and for the setting up of a joint venture making medicines under Bulgarian licences and using Bulgarian technologies. Venezuela is showing strong interest in Bulgarian antibiotics.

Later on the delegation was received by Ambassador Sencler [spelling as received], secretary of the Standing Committee of the Latin American Economic System. The sides exchanged views on possible joint economic projects and decided to hold a working meeting of information experts in 1994, at which possibilities for joint ventures and trade with the member states of the Latin American Economic System will be discussed.

Mr. Karabashev also met Dr. Gustavo Perez Mijarez, minister of development, who showed interest in starting the import of Bulgarian medicines and antibiotics as soon as possible. He told Mr. Karabashev that Pharmachim of Bulgaria has presented 80 medicines to Venezuela's Institute for Hygiene for analysis and registration. A possible joint venture for medicines was discussed again. Another subject for discussion was the export of Venezuelan oil and aluminium to Bulgaria.

The Bulgarian delegation presented to members of Venezuela's cabinet draft agreements on mutual investment protection and promotion and on the avoidance of double taxation. Their signing will greatly expand bilateral trade.

The Bulgarian delegation also held talks with Minister of State Miguel Rodriguez Mendossa, president of the Foreign Trade Institute.

Meetings with Venezuela's Foreign Minister Fernando Ochoa Antich and later on with President Ramon Jose Velasquez are forthcoming.

Presidency Issues Statement on Wage Demands

PA2309175093 Caracas Venezolana de Television Network in Spanish 1548 GMT 23 Sep 93

[Statement by Ramon Espinoza, minister of the Secretariat of the Presidency, in Caracas—live]

[Text] As you well know, the university community has announced demonstrations for today. These people are demanding the reinstatement of 33 billion bolivars into their budget. In talks held with university authorities, we have pointed out to them on several occasions the difficulties faced by the executive branch in satisfying their demands for that amount.

Through great effort, and following an analysis of the national budget, however, we have been able to satisfy their demands up to 17 billion bolivars for 1993, of which 14 billion bolivars will be used for the operational phase of what remains of the academic year, which began in September. A total of 3 billion bolivars will be used to satisfy social benefits demanded by professors and university officials. For 1994, the government will pay the remainder until the 33 billion bolivars have been spent, as the university authorities have demanded.

Therefore, there is no valid reason for the aforementioned demonstrations to take place. The national authorities have always been in constant dialogue with the university authorities and students. We are asking for their understanding in light of the economic and fiscal difficulties the country faces. Consequently, because they have already started these demonstrations, we urge them to return to their classrooms as soon as possible and resume their school year for the good of the country.

In addition, the ministries and public institutions have been pressured by professionals and technicians from the public sector. They are making minimum wage demands that are difficult to meet at this time. Public sector professionals are demanding 71,000 bolivars as an initial salary, which is impossible to satisfy at this time. Consequently, we have made a reasonable offer to cover all inflationary expectations well beyond January 1994. For this specific case, the national executive issued a statement:

In terms of the wage demands made by professionals and technicians, the national executive has issued the following statement:

1. The national government is making great efforts to implement mechanisms to decrease the fiscal deficit. Efforts in the drafting of the decrees authorized by the Special Powers Law will allow the national treasury to recover from the current critical situation in the next few months.

2. The national government wants to meet its obligations to public employees, as well as to guarantee appropriate wages, depending on the academic level and performance in the duties assigned to each public employee. The national executive, however, cannot make wage commitments without the proper budgetary support. Under no circumstances can the national government make decisions that represent budget obligations that could endanger the development of the future government, which could lead to the worsening of the fiscal crisis. Likewise, the national executive will not make any wage decisions for its personnel that could create unnecessary distortions within the national labor market, such as the definition of a minimum wage.

3. The National Executive Branch, after conducting comparative studies between the Public Administration and the job market, has designed a new wage scale which will impact the budget in a way that can be absorbed by the National Treasury, and which represents a reasonable level of salaries.

This wage scale will go into effect on 1 January 1994. It will begin with an initial salary of 35,000 bolivares for newly hired-professionals. It also establishes an initial basic salary for administrative personnel of 15,000 bolivares. We must stress that the new salary levels will sufficiently compensate for inflation estimates beyond January 1994.

4. In accordance with the national interest to attend to the needs of public officials, and based on current budget possibilities, we will proceed to grant a single, special, compensatory bonus in 1993, which will be determined by each government institution in accordance with budget realities. It should be understood that the new wage scales will only cover administrative personnel, technical personnel, and professionals.

5. The national executive branch believes that the current situation in the country requires an understanding of the limitations faced by the Venezuelan state to attend to the demands from various sectors. Decisions adopted with regard to salaries are circumstantial, as the problems presented by public employees can only be resolved within the framework of a broader policy which the country must define, and which urgently calls for the modification of the role and size of the state.

We believe and understand that with this satisfaction we are giving to administrative, technical, and professional government employees, there is no reason whatsoever to continue disrupting the activities in the various government branches. Therefore, as of this moment, it will be understood that any action taken in this direction will be against the law. The government will ensure that work, the right to work, and the right of individuals to voluntarily go to their various branches of public administration are respected.

Interior, Defense Ministers Remark on Security Meeting

PA2309222893 Caracas Venezolana de Television Network in Spanish 1550 GMT 20 Sep 93

[From "The News" newscast]

[Text] A meeting of the security and defense cabinet concluded a few minutes ago at Miraflores Palace. Upon leaving this important meeting, Interior Minister Carlos Delgado Chapellin and Defense Minister Vice Admiral Radames Munoz Leon talked about the topics discussed and the results of the meeting.

[Begin recording] [Delgado] We discussed all current topics in the country during the security cabinet meeting held today. We reviewed the public order situation, as we are in a preelectoral period, and measures so that the climate during the elections is normal. We studied state security and people who continue to spread totally unfounded and absurd rumors, as well as the problem of gold panners in the south.

[Munoz] We are seeking the necessary procedures, chiefly during this period of preparation, to execute the functions of the National Guard and the Army in the border zone. Another thing is the investments we must make on the border, because we are not only concerned about the Perija Mountain Range but also about all the border areas, where problems have been growing. You know about that recent attack on the Buenavista post and how it occurred. Now, we have the problem in the Amazon region, where we must make a huge effort, not just in terms of the number of personnel and equipment but in terms of a total plan, which will entail major expenditures to fully execute the Armed Forces plan, which has been in effect for a year and a half and is called a plan for the border development of the Amazon region. [end recording]

* Private Sector Leaders on Policies of Next President

[Article by Mariela Leon]

[Text] In spite of the disparity of criteria that exists among the various sectors of the national economy regarding the electoral positions of the presidential candidates, bankers, industrialists, and businessmen all agree that the next president will have to fight inflation, reform the social welfare system and privatize money-losing state-owned enterprises.

In a recent poll, representatives of the Venezuelan Banking Association, the National Banking Council, Fedecamaras, [Venezuelan Federation of Associations and Chambers of Commerce and Industry], Conindustria [Venezuelan Council of Industry], Consecomercio [National Council of Commerce and Services] and Fedeindustria [expansion not given] rejected the possibility of a return to old economic ideas based on protectionism, paternalism and subsidies.

However, they believe that all economic policies should be directed toward improving the living conditions of the population by means of an effective system of services in the basic sectors of society, such as health, education, housing, and transportation.

They also favor the urgent approval of fiscal and financial reforms, and giving priority to reforms of the state regarding decentralization, political parties and a system of single-member congressional districts.

Furthermore, they all ask that the candidates for the presidency be honest, sincere and that they speak candidly to the country.

You Improve, I Improve

Jose Bouza Izquierdo, president of the National Banking Council: "I am surprised that only a few months before the election, we still do not have a clear picture of the terms on which the presidential candidates will base their programs. Perhaps they should make clear at the outset whether further progress will be made toward a more free market, competition within a system of supply and demand, which are what the productive sectors of the country are now using."

"It would be worthwhile to deepen the changes that have been made in the economic area in recent years, but they should be directed more toward bringing benefits to the population."

In Bouza Izquierdo's view, the wisest government program should contain the following elements:

- Establish profound reforms that will reduce severe poverty.
- Improve the distribution of wealth through job creation, effective support for the informal economy, protection for small and medium industry, and development of social programs for the less advantaged classes.

He considered the possibility of a return to a policy of subsidies unlikely, because they either tend to be regressive, do not reach the masses or are used for other purposes than those intended.

- Improve living conditions with regard to education, health, personal security, suitable housing, adequate public transportation, and recreational and cultural areas.
- A short-term social pact. If the state does not understand that its primary role is to guarantee an improvement in the quality of life of the Venezuelan people, that objective will not be attained. As his contribution, the businessman must create jobs, and the workers must begin to understand the symbiosis of labor and capital. Only in that way can we begin to make a better future for the country.
- Candidates should be more sincere in their presentations, and about what it means to be a politician.

Juan Tomas Santana, president of the Venezuelan Banking Association: the banking sector hopes initially for meaningful, constructive electoral debates, in which the problems that most trouble the country are addressed and feasible solutions proposed. He also hopes that the elections are conducted in a normal manner and that the will of the people prevail.

With regard to economic policies, he said he was unaware of the priorities that the candidates intended to propose, because they are in the process of defining their proposals with their teams. However, he expressed his hope that the winner of this election will focus on an effective fight against inflation by means of a definitive and honest reduction in government spending. This is the basis of a successful administration for a new government.

Furthermore, he said, that program must include new tax and financial laws. Similarly, the reform of the social welfare system must be in the program, and special attention must be given to improving the living conditions of the Venezuelan people, through education, health care and housing.

Neoliberalism, But Gently

Angel Gutierrez, president of Fedeindustria: from 23 to 26 September, the small and medium-size industrial sector will hold its annual meeting in Merida, with the participation of the four leading presidential candidates. At that meeting we will listen to their programs of government, specifically with regard to the country's economy.

The following are what we hope will be included in those programs:

- Strengthen customs controls and antidumping measures relating to the entry of merchandise into the country under irregular circumstances.
- Speed up the privatization of those state-owned companies that generate losses
- Reduce government spending.
- Stop the increase in the rate of inflation, which will then cause a decrease in interest rates.

Gutierrez said that the sector he represents does not agree with neoliberal policies, because they have caused much harm, particularly with the opening of the free market without the necessary regulatory and control measures.

"Mexico is always cited as an example for us to follow," he said, "because apparently neoliberal policies have halted inflation. Interest rates and other indicators are positive. But this is a country locked into dependency on the United States, the International Monetary Fund and the assembly industries. We do not want to follow that system in Venezuela."

He insisted that under the next government a real industrial reconversion must take place. In Colombia,

there are some 100,000 small and medium-sized industries, and barely 9,000 in Venezuela. We are not an industrial country and therefore we must intensify the creation of new firms, which would generate more jobs.

Jorge Redmond, president of Conindustria: the best government program should have long-term prospects, and be neither partisan nor demagogic. It should take into account the needs of the country and bring a better quality of life to the people. Furthermore, the program should be effective, attainable, and should include the views of all sectors.

He summed up the principal points of his suggestions as follows:

- Corrections, as required by the economic situation, to the program of adjustments in agriculture.
- Corrections to the customs system that affects the industrial sector.
- Enactment of laws needed to complement the adjustments program (privatization, reform of banking, taxes and of the social welfare system.)
- Elimination of the fiscal deficit.
- Strengthening of the market economy.

He pointed out that these objectives should be kept in view in the application of the following programs:

a) Encouragement of nontraditional exports; b) modernization of the customs system; c) enactment of financial and tax laws; d) labor mobility; e) reform of the school system; f) improvement of the quality of life; g) acceleration of the process of privatization.

A Full-Strength Market Economy

Berend Roosen, president of Consecomercio: we are deeply concerned over the inability to enact the Special Powers Act. This measure contains projects that are fundamental to the country's economy; the activities of the next government depend on that platform.

"These programs must be based on the tax laws, which will be the task facing this transitional government. We in Consecomercio are totally opposed to changing course in economic policy. In that spirit, we propose:

- Deepen the market economy.
- Strengthen the present weak competitiveness in commerce.
- Correct recent errors (publicize the economic program and reduce the extraneous uncertainties which impede the completion of programs and laws.)
- Prioritize the privatization process.
- Insist on decentralization.
- Resolve two dilemmas: a) the failure of the reform pact to be applied, which results in 80 percent of economic problems being related to political problems, such as reform of political parties, single-member electoral districts and suffrage;b) reform the social welfare system. The state cannot continue to bear the enormous labor deficit that exceeds one billion bolivares. A similar situation exists in the private sector of the economy. This is one of the goals to be met by the next government.

Edgar Romero Nava: president of Fedecamaras: our organization is calling a meeting with the four presidential candidates, to begin on 18 August. On that occasion we will present the central document that was approved in our recent annual assembly in Maracaibo, and we will be very interested in learning the respective government programs of the four candidates.

He indicated that these programs should have two main themes: 1. anti-inflationary measures and, 2. modernization of the state.

"We believe that by means of these two themes, the next government will have better economic tools to resolve the problems of health and juridical personality."